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Due to global interconnectedness and the rise of social media, humanitarian 
communication is said to have shifted from its groundings in the Politics of Pity towards 
Ironic Solidarity. Ironic Solidarity maintains participants act not to alleviate distant 
others’ suffering, but to perform their own identities; thus, perpetuating the very 
problems they aim to eliminate. This thesis seeks to examine this claim in the context of 
Online Feminist Movements, using the #BringBackOurGirls movement as a case study. 
This hashtag rose to global prominence following the mass abduction of female students 
in Chibok, Nigeria, by the militant group, Boko Haram. This movement is examined in-
depth to determine what led to its global prominence. Also examined is the impact of 
social media and mainstream media on the movement; the influence of its feminist ideals; 
and whether participants’ actions were solidary or in self-interest. To address these aims, 
a selection of relevant Twitter tweets and mainstream media newspaper articles from 
four distinct periods were analysed through Critical Discourse Analysis. The results of 
this study found overarching discourses of the #BringBackOurGirls movement that 
suggest it primarily relied upon power dynamic discourses, which served to enforce the 
hegemonic relationship between the west and global south. Additionally, such power 
dynamic discourses within a third world feminist movement demonstrated that western 
first world feminism had usurped the movement, thereby further disenfranchising third 
world women. The power dynamic discourses showed the presence of the Politics of 
Pity within this humanitarian movement, showcasing that this remains a firm feature of 
humanitarian communication. However, Ironic Solidarity was additionally present, 
indicating that the two humanitarian communication approaches can exist concurrently. 
The presence of Ironic Solidarity also indicated that participants acted primarily in self-
interest in their engagement with the #BringBackOurGirls movement. 
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“Bring Back Our Girls” 
This phrase was a plea for support. A cry for missing daughters and sisters. A 
display of hope at a desperate time.  
 
The mass abduction of 276 female students in Chibok, Nigeria, at the hands of 
the militant group, Boko Haram, saw these four words reverberate around the world. 
“Bring Back Our Girls” united the global public in a quest for the freedom of the 
Chibok students – a pure humanitarian effort. Or, was it? 
 
This research sought to examine humanitarian communication within the context 
of Online Feminist Movements (OFMs) to assess the mode through which participants 
contributed, and what impacts such participation might generate. The case study utilised 
in this research is the #BringBackOurGirls movement. 
 
#BringBackOurGirls was an OFM that arose in May 2014, following the 
abduction of 276 female students in Chibok, Nigeria (Smith, 2015). The Nigerian-based 
militant group, Boko Haram, claimed responsibility for their abduction and stated that 
their opposition to western education, particularly for women, fuelled their actions 
(Oyewole, 2016). The perceived inaction of the Nigerian government saw the Nigerian 
public flock to social media, and share #BringBackOurGirls to rouse awareness for the 
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abducted students (Maxfield, 2015). #BringBackOurGirls amassed international support 
and came to represent feminist ideals for many. 
 
The rise of social media has influenced the way individuals communicate, and 
information is disseminated (Ahmed et al., 2016). From the perspective of humanitarian 
communication, social media have helped to trigger a shift from the Politics of Pity to an 
era of Ironic Solidarity (Chouliaraki, 2010). The Politics of Pity portrays distant others as 
victims to be pitied (Chouliaraki, 2010). Such representation disempowers distant others 
and hinders the formation of moral bonds on behalf of the spectator (Littler, 2008; 
Chouliaraki & Orgad, 2011). By contrast, Ironic Solidarity shifts towards a gaze of self-
empowerment, where spectators choose to act on another’s suffering due to the way it 
might benefit them personally (Chouliaraki, 2013a). However, such solidarity is 
considered ironic because it disregards the humanity of the sufferer and serves to 
perpetuate the injustices it aims to erase (Chouliaraki, 2011; Eagleton, 2009).  As 
individuals become increasingly enamoured with self-expression, the adoption of 
cosmopolitan identities, in relation to distant suffering, could be harmed (Chouliaraki, 
2008). Therefore, research concerning how individuals act within the realm of 
humanitarian communication is an important area of study. 
 
Social media have also influenced feminist processes, with online platforms 
enabling greater dissemination and contributing to the development of diverse feminist 
identities (Keller, 2012). Little scholarly attention has been dedicated to interplay(s) 





#BringBackOurGirls is representative of a relatively unexamined grouping: third 
world women. There has been minimal academic attention given to third world women, 
particularly concerning their conceptions of feminism (Mohanty et al., 1991). 
#BringBackOurGirls represented a feminist movement born out of the third world and 
embraced by the first world (Khoja-Moolji, 2015). As such, this research aimed to 
examine how such diffusion influenced the movement and impacted its core subjects – 
third world women.  
 
Research Questions 
1) How did interaction between mainstream media and social media shape the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement? 
 
This research hypothesised social media was responsible for the mainstream media’s 
(MSM) coverage of the #BringBackOurGirls movement. Such a result would signal a 
shift in MSM agenda-setting. 
 
2) Were there differences in attitudes/sentiments between mainstream media and 
social media coverage of the #BringBackOurGirls movement? What do such 
differences, or similarities, indicate? 
 
If social media were responsible for setting MSM’s agenda, presumably the 
attitudes/sentiments expressed in MSM would be in alignment with those of social 
media. Again, such a result would indicate a shift in media agenda-setting.  
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3) What contributed to making the #BringBackOurGirls movement so globally 
relevant? 
 
This research posited that audiences engaged with #BringBackOurGirls to such a 
degree due to the way it was presented. This research hypothesised that 
#BringBackOurGirls was presented through a lens of humanitarian communication that 
was counterproductive to the adoption of cosmopolitan identities. This approach made 
participants’ involvement simple, but ultimately of little benefit.  
 
4) What were the incentives behind people’s involvement in the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement? Were participants acting in solidarity or self-
interest? 
 
This research hypothesised that individuals were incentivised to act in the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement for self-serving reasons, as per Ironic Solidarity. The 
research suggested that participant’s actions were not solidary but instead propelled by 
self-interest. 
 
5) What role, if any, did the inclusion of western first world feminism play in the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement? In what way(s) might this impact upon third 
world women? 
 
Despite its global south origins, this research posited the #BringBackOurGirls’ 
movement did not carry feminist traits from the third. Rather, those traits were replaced 
with first world feminism as the movement moved to an international audience. Thus, 
this research hypothesised that western first world feminism played an enormous role in 
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The primary mode of analysis for this research was Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) influenced by Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) three-step framework. A sample of 
Twitter tweets and newspaper articles concerning the Chibok abduction and 
#BringBackOurGirls were analysed to identify the overarching discourses. CDA reveals 
how language is used and also abused in society – essentially, how language is used to 
create meaning (Widdowson, 1998). In the context of #BringBackOurGirls, a movement 
conducted online, and in MSM, the in-depth view CDA provides was beneficial in 
addressing the research questions. CDA is interested in how language contributes to, or 
perpetuates, power dynamics in society; as such, hegemonic forces are a key 
consideration for critical discourse analysts. Given this research followed a movement 
from the global south that spread to the west, CDA’s ability to reveal and explain power 
dynamics was of great value. An additional quantitative analysis was employed to track 
the hashtag’s trajectory and MSM coverage.  
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter Two, Literature Review, provides a review of the literature associated 
with this research. The chapter begins with how Boko Haram rose to power in Nigeria, 
and then examines the associated impacts of their reign of terror. #BringBackOurGirls is 
then discussed in-depth, with particular attention paid to its feminist undertones. A 
section on feminism explores feminism’s history and defines two branches that are 
significant in this research: western first world feminism, and third world feminism. 
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Online Social Movements (OSMs) are then examined; particularly social media’s rise and 
the impact(s) this might render within humanitarian communication. MSM’s response to 
a more technologised and globalised media sphere is also considered. The final section 
introduces solidarity and its importance within humanitarian communication. Presenting 
cosmopolitanism and its relevance, before addressing the Politics of Pity and Ironic 
Solidarity.  
 
Chapter Three, Methodology, outlines the methodological approach of this 
research. CDA is discussed in greater depth, and its selection justified. What is to be 
analysed, and how it was collected and selected, is also addressed. A background of the 
selected MSM outlets is provided, and the Twitter data explained. A timeframe for this 
research is established, with four key periods selected for analysis. The manner the 
analysis will be performed is detailed, with the three-step framework proposed by 
Fairclough (1992; 1995; 2003) adopted in this research. 
 
Chapter Four, Results, presents the results of this research. The results are 
presented per the time periods selected for analysis. The overarching discourses are 
introduced and explained.  
 
Chapter Five, Discussion, interprets and discusses the results. This chapter 
directly references the research questions and seeks to answer them entirely. The relevant 
literature is revisited to contextualise the results. This chapter refers to the hypotheses of 




Chapter Six, Conclusion, concludes this research and provides an overview of all 
discussed. This chapter seeks to identify any research limitations and offers suggestions 
for further research in this area.  
 
This thesis aimed to study the #BringBackOurGirls movement to identify 
potential patterns within humanitarian communication as a result of widespread social 
media use. Particularly of interest were the impacts this movement might have on 
feminism, especially in the global south where feminism is traditionally comprised of 
broader aims. MSM’s convergence with social media texts was examined to observe how 
traditional media might be adjusting in response to the new media dawn. However, the 
overarching goal of this research is to identify how individuals participated within 
#BringBackOurGirls and whether their actions can be considered solidarity or self-
interest. In addressing this question, this research will be empowered to offer suggestions 
that might dissuade the future conduction of humanitarian action through OSMs or, in 








A tumultuous history 
Marred by decades of ethnic, religious, and economic tension, Nigeria is a nation 
with a complex history (Comolli, 2015: 23; Salaam, 2012). An outsider’s perspective 
might attribute Nigeria’s history of communal conflicts, and ethnoreligious violence, to 
tensions between citizens who are separated by their differences (Joy, 2015: 8). However, 
Walker (2012: 2) argues, much, if not all, of Nigeria’s difficulties, stem from inherent 
weaknesses within political institutions and security services. According to the Failed 
States Index, an annual report published by the Fund for Peace, Nigeria is a nation “on 
the brink of total collapse” (Maiangwa et al., 2012: 43). The ghosts of Nigeria’s colonial 
past and a huge rift between the North and South serve to intensify Nigeria’s struggles 
(Salaam, 2012: 147).  
 
In response to the variety of endemic issues within Nigeria, uprisings have 
become commonplace (Adesoji, 2010: 103). Particularly in northern Nigeria, where the 
widespread mobilisation of faith-based identities often erupts into violence (Warner, 
2012). Serving to highlight differences further and encourage communal violence, such 
religious groupings are especially popular with youth. Not only do they bring similar 
peoples together, they provide an ostensible explanation for the failures within Nigeria, 
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and offer alternatives (Zenn, 2014: 113). Such religious uprisings provide what Nigeria’s 
government has failed to, and, as a result, the nation’s “nascent democracy” is being 
tested (Anyadike, 2013: 21). With corruption rife, infrastructure decrepit, and economic 
opportunity stagnant, Nigeria is in a state of disrepair (Walker, 2012). This position has 
made Nigeria susceptible to criminal and terrorist activity, with perhaps the most notable 
example being the Islamic militant group, Boko Haram (Mainagwa et al., 2012: 43; 
Salaam, 2012).  
 
Formation of Boko Haram 
 Boko Haram is a terrorist organisation, which self-identifies as a “religious 
revolution” (Voll, 2015: 1183). The name Boko Haram, translated as “the sacrilegious 
book” (Joy, 2015: 4), reflects the group’s stance against western education; although the 
organisation officially calls itself Jama ‘atu Ahlis Sunna await wal-jihad, meaning “People 
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Joy, 2015: 4). 
Founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric, the group was initially only 
active in Borno state; however, it has since spread throughout much of northern Nigeria 
(Salaam, 2012: 148). 
 
 Yusuf rose to notoriety in Borno state due to his literal and puritanic 
interpretations of the Qur’an; and through his popularity, he became a religious scholar 
of sorts (Voll, 2015: 1183). The initial intentions of Boko Haram were simply for the 
group to preach and teach Islam, however, under Yusuf’s leadership, Boko Haram 
became extremist in nature (Khan & Hamidu, 2015: 23). Yusuf’s teaching was captivating 
to audiences, as he reinforced beliefs western education was corrupting Islamic morals, 
and perpetuating inequality over Muslims (Zenn, 2014: 104). In placing blame on the 
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Nigerian government, and offering solutions to the social, political, and economic 
troubles plaguing northern Nigeria, Yusuf amassed a large following (Zenn, 2014).  
 
Boko Haram’s agenda is composed of four key features: opposition to western 
education; the use of jihad to create change; opposition to the modern statehood of 
Nigeria; and the desire to establish an Islamic caliphate (Azumah, 2015: 34; 42). Boko 
Haram resolved to establish an ideal Islamic society, a true caliphate, to combat the 
“moral and social decadence” they perceived to plague Nigerian society (Maiangwa et al., 
2012: 45; Voll, 2015: 1191). However, Boko Haram’s envisioned society could only be 
achieved through the “establishment of unadulterated Sharia law” (Maiangwa, 2012: 42). 
While Sharia law was implemented in twelve Nigerian states in 1999, Boko Haram 
deemed it “insufficient” (Pham, 2012: 2) and sought to install a “pure” version of Sharia 
law (Comolli, 2015: 42). In the meantime, however, the group used the government-
mandated version of sharia law to propagate their ideology; in some instances publically 
stoning and flogging individuals they accused to have violated moral, religious, and legal 
norms (Joy, 2015: 6).  
 
Boko Haram justifies their violence through a “narrow, literalist interpretation of 
Islam” (Voll, 2015: 1190). While Boko Haram is considered to be a sectarian 
organisation, as the group’s ideology stems from elements of the Qur’an, numerous 
Islamic leaders and scholars have chastised the group (Joy, 2015: 4). However, Boko 
Haram readily attacks decriers and has claimed responsibility for more Muslim deaths 
than Christian deaths (Walker, 2012: 2). The group has even murdered “venerated 
Islamic figures” (Siollun, 2015: n.p), such as emirs; an action Siollun (2015) claims would 
be “the equivalent of a Christian rebel killing a priest” (n.p). It is clear the group’s 
ideology is not representative of the view of the majority of Muslims in Nigeria, and the 
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majority of Nigerian citizen’s religious views do not align with those of Boko Haram 
(Rheault & Tortora, 2012).  
 
 While Boko Haram’s interpretations of Islam and jihad differ immensely from 
historical Muslim understandings, Voll (2015) argues the group’s actions are nothing new 
and are recognisable amongst “the long traditions of militant jihad in West and Central 
Africa” (1190). Umar (2012: 119) claims Boko Haram’s rise to power is inextricably 
linked to religious fanaticism. According to Umar (2012), it is only under the particular 
‘brand’ of Islam that Yusuf promoted that Boko Haram drew significant support. Salaam 
(2012) counters this view, arguing Boko Haram’s insurgency cannot solely be blamed on 
religious fanaticism. Instead, it can be attributed to: 
the combination of dynamic risk factors in the absence of protective factors, which make 
vulnerable young people turn into religious radicals or fanatics when seeking answers to 
the inadequacies in the polity and society at large (Salaam, 2012: 160). 
With a host of issues present in Nigeria, such as abject poverty, formal education 
deficiency, unemployment, and corruption, feelings of frustration and alienation have 
emerged within the populous (Joy, 2015: 8-9). Boko Haram seemingly emerged at the 
right time and profited from these failures (The Economist, 2011). As such, Boko Haram’s 
recruits have not simply been swayed by religious fanaticism, but by a combination of 
forces that have made violent extremism an attractive option. Pürçek (2014: 7) explains, 
while Boko Haram might describe themselves as a solely religious movement, political 
and economic motivations are interwoven in their campaign. To attribute Boko Haram’s 
uprising to merely one factor would be simplistic. Elements of Nigeria’s economic and 
political conditions, a colonial past, and Islamic history have all played a role in shaping 




Death & regeneration 
 In spite of their radical ideology and accompanying violence, Boko Haram was 
said to have existed in a state of relative calm within Nigeria; however, this came to an 
end after riots in 2009 (Pham, 2012: 3). The riots began after a security raid on a Boko 
Haram compound, and in response, Boko Haram led a series of “reprisal attacks” against 
police, spanning four Nigerian states (Pham, 2012; Aliyu et al., 2015). Police reacted 
aggressively, storming Boko Haram strongholds, and capturing important members of 
the group, including Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf (Adesoji, 2010; Pham, 
2012).  
 
 Under police custody, Yusuf was subjected to beatings and interrogations, before 
being shot while “attempting to escape” (Pham, 2012: 3). Evidence later contradicted the 
police version of events. Yusuf was found to have been handcuffed at the time of his 
death, making his demise an “extrajudicial execution” (Maiangwa, 2012: 47) by Nigerian 
security forces. With their leader murdered, alongside several other prominent figures 
within the group, Boko Haram appeared defeated (Campbell, 2011; Thomson, 2012). 
Following the riots, Boko Haram receded from public attention; many believed the 
group was hopelessly fractured, and probably finished (Pham, 2012). As the group’s 
defeat was celebrated, Boko Haram was undergoing a major transformation, with the 
notoriously militant Abubakar Shekau now at the helm (Zenn, 2014: 107). A man feared, 
even by fellow Boko Haram members, due to his unpredictable temper and creative 
methods of torture (Smith, 2015). Far from being the final nail in Boko Haram’s coffin, 
Yusuf’s death proved to be “the trigger that enabled Shekau to mobilize his mentor’s 
followers to wage an insurgency” (Zenn, 2014: 113). The brazen murders of Boko 
Haram’s elite gave the movement their “martyrs” (Campbell, 2011: n.p), and intensified 
the belief the Nigerian state systematically victimised Muslims (Thurston, 2016: 17). In 
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the wake of 2009’s harsh reprisals against Boko Haram, the group re-emerged in 2010, 
with greater reach and unprecedented levels of violence (Pham, 2012: 7).  
 
Boko Haram Today 
 In 2010 Boko Haram sought to avenge the killing of their leader by subjecting 
northern Nigeria to a “campaign of terror” (Azumah, 2015: 42). The attacks were more 
daring and lethal than Boko Haram’s previous modus operandi (Thomson, 2012). Boko 
Haram now resembled a terror cell, more than simply an armed militant movement. 
Implementing tactics, such as direct armed confrontation; drive-by shootings; targeted 
assassination; use of improvised explosive devices; suicide bombings; mass abduction; 
and sexual violence against women, enabled Boko Haram to gain momentum, and secure 
territory in northern Nigeria (Aliyu et al., 2015: 312-313; Azumah, 2015: 42). Boko 
Haram’s sudden strength and confidence struck fear into the populations of northern 
Nigeria. An attack on a fortified United Nations compound in 2011 resulted in the loss 
of 20 lives and cemented Boko Haram as a serious threat (Thomson, 2012: 47). In 2015 
Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Thurston, 2016), the so-called 
“poster boys of extremism and radicalisation” (Voll, 2015: 1183). As of early 2016, Boko 
Haram has taken responsibility for over 15,000 deaths in Nigeria and the surrounding 
countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon (Thurston, 2016: 5). The sheer quantity of 
death and suffering Boko Haram has caused over the past five years is “mind-boggling” 
(Siollun, 2015: n.p). Clearly, the group is resilient and adaptive (Thurston, 2016), yet the 
Nigerian government is reluctant to recognise Boko Haram as both a national and 




Response of Nigerian Government 
 In their attempts to weaken and destroy Boko Haram over the past few years, the 
Nigerian government has, ironically, helped the insurgency to flourish (Siollun, 2015). 
What began as a small, isolated, and poorly armed group of religious fanatics has since 
grown into “a perpetrator of death and destruction” (Comolli, 2015: 5). The tactics 
employed by the Nigerian government to combat the insurgency have proven to be 
counterproductive (Aliyu et al., 2015: 315); with some attributing this to policymakers’ 
tendencies to treat Boko Haram solely as a security threat, and not acknowledge the 
group’s other dimensions (Thurston, 2016: 5; Solomon, 2012: 94). Zenn (2014: 114) 
agrees, claiming even if the Nigerian government can overpower Boko Haram militarily, 
without addressing the ideology that led to the group’s growth, another incarnation is 
likely to emerge. Indeed, it is possible that Nigeria can quash Boko Haram through 
military might alone, but, as evidenced by the death of Mohammed Yusuf, “state 
violence fuels [Boko Haram’s] narrative of victimhood” (Thurston, 2016: 28). Former 
Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, undertook “an exclusively security-driven 
strategy for dealing with Boko Haram” (Campbell, 2011: n.p) from the outset of his 
term, commencing in April 2011. This was a move in alignment with the general tone of 
the Nigerian government, who, as Siollun (2015) puts it “have been looking for a silver 
bullet solution to crush the insurgency with a single blow” (n.p). However, Boko Haram, 
like all insurgencies, cannot be solved with mere military action. It is a terrorist group 
representative of social, political, and economic issues, and, as such, will not be 
overcome until these issues are addressed (Siollun, 2015). Economic liberation of the 
population is crucial in overcoming the Boko Haram insurgency. It is through “drip-fed 
investments on tangible projects” (Siollun, 2015: n.p) that young people will be 
disincentivised from joining the group, and Boko Haram will be undermined.  





 Rising out of a fractured nation, Boko Haram initially appeared an innocuous 
religious movement. Relegated to a few northern Nigerian regions, bearing crude arms, 
and composed of small numbers, the threat level the group posed was minimal. 
However, the extreme religious views of the sect, paired with seemingly unsolvable 
social, political, and economic issues within the nation, saw Boko Haram grow before 
transitioning towards violence (Loimeier, 2012). The inappropriate responses of the 
Nigerian government and security forces aided the group in this transition towards 
unprecedented levels of violence (Voll, 2015). Though driven by Islamic extremism, 
Boko Haram is not merely a religious uprising; the group provides a case study of what 
governments should not do when faced with an insurgency (Siollun, 2015). While Boko 
Haram has become a significant threat in Nigeria, in contrast to other major terror cells 
known the world over, this insurgency has flown somewhat under the global radar. 
However, this all changed on 14 April 2014, when Boko Haram abducted 276 female 






Close to midnight on 15 April 2014, the students of the Government Girls 
Secondary School, in Chibok, northeastern Nigeria, had turned in for the night (Smith, 
2015: 173; Pendergrass, 2015: 63). The school for teenage girls was comprised of both 
Christian and Muslim pupils, who had spent the day studying for their upcoming exams 
(Oyewole, 2016). As the students lay sleeping in their dormitory, men from the militant 
group Boko Haram made their way towards the town, dressed in military uniforms, and 
brandishing weapons (Smith, 2015). Overwhelming government soldiers with a sudden 
onset of shooting, the members of Boko Haram first targeted Chibok’s government 
buildings, before arriving at the boarding school (Smith, 2015: 175). Boko Haram 
gathered students under a deceptive guise; witnesses claimed “They [said] to us, ‘Don’t 
worry, don’t worry, come. We are security, we are soldiers, nothing can happen to you. 
We are here’” (Smith, 2015: 180). After gathering over 300 students, Boko Haram left 
Chibok, guns blazing, alerting their victims to the fact they were not in safe hands. While 
some of the kidnapped managed to escape, by jumping from trucks as Boko Haram sped 
away, 276 students were not as fortunate (Pendergrass, 2015: 63). 
 
 As Smith (2015) states, there are numerous explanations behind why Boko 
Haram conducted the mass abduction. The group is opposed to western education, 
especially for women. However, from a strategic perspective, the abduction also served 
as a way to embarrass the Nigerian government and demonstrate Boko Haram’s 
newfound strength (183). By 5 May, with the students still missing, and little known 
about their abduction, the first claims of responsibility arrived (186). Boko Haram’s 
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leader since 2009, Abubakar Shekau, released a video message detailing the students’ 
abduction. In the message, Shekau referred to the kidnapped students as “slaves” (186) 
and threatened to sell them. Condemnation of western education by Shekau was also 
prominent in the video message (187). The Nigerian community was shocked, not only 
by Boko Haram’s threats but by their government, who appeared indifferent to the entire 
situation (Pendergrass, 2015: 64). Blatant misinformation and limited resources devoted 
to the rescue mission showcased the government’s lacklustre response (Smith, 2015).  
 
Outrage & action 
The Chibok abduction sent shockwaves through the Nigerian populous. The 
threat of Boko Haram now loomed larger than ever before, particularly in northern 
Nigeria. However, the Nigerian government had not responded in the manner that it had 
been expected to, and the abduction had “barely registered on the world’s radar” (Smith, 
2015: 183). The government seemed reluctant to launch a full-scale search for the 
missing students; the whole situation reeked of mismanagement, without even reliable 
estimations as to the number of abductees (183). The lacklustre response prompted 
outrage, and at a 4 May public address regarding the abduction, a Nigerian lawyer, 
Ibrahim Abdullahi, began tweeting the quotes of speakers (Maxfield, 2015). Abdullahi 
included the phrase “Bring Back Our Girls” (Maxfield, 2015: n.p) in hashtag form. 
#BringBackOurGirls started to gain notoriety in Nigeria, as more people became aware 
of the situation. As the hashtag spread across national borders, it reached viral status 
(Carter Olson, 2016). No longer relegated to the sidelines of Nigerian public discourse, 




Within two weeks of its creation, Abdullahi’s #BringBackOurGirls had been 
tweeted more than 1.3 million times (Oyewole, 2016: 27). The hashtag ignited a cyber-
activism that brought the issue of the abduction, and Boko Haram, to international 
attention. #BringBackOurGirls became a rallying cry for the kidnapped students, with 
prominent celebrities and political figures tweeting the hashtag (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015: 
268; Dixon, 2014: 35). The Washington Post reported that the hashtag had “now spread 
into a truly global social media phenomenon” (Taylor, 2014 cited in Carter Olson, 2016: 
772-773). The plight of the kidnapped students and Boko Haram’s violence was now 
prominent on the international political agenda, and the Nigerian government could no 
longer stand idle (Carter Olson, 2016: 773).  
 
On the back of national and international pressure, the Nigerian government 
launched a rescue mission. Security agencies deployed search parties in the form of “a 
special forces team, the air force and local vigilante groups” (Oyewole, 2016: 27). The 
government efforts, however, appeared to be too little, too late (Smith, 2015). With no 
sign of the missing students and a shortage of assets to aid in locating them, the search 
bore few results. The futile pursuit continued, and while some of the missing students 
did emerge, their freedom was attributed to “lucky escapes” (Maxfield, 2015: n.p), not 
the rescue mission. Survivor testimonies shed light on the fate of the students still in 
Boko Haram’s clutches, indicating many had “been married, radicalised and conscripted 
by the insurgents” (Oyewole, 2016: 28). Some of the abductees were used as instruments 
of suicide warfare, while the many Christian abductees had been forced to embrace Islam 
(28). While the “directionless” (Maxfield, 2015: n.p) search continued, hope for the 
students began to fade, with some members of the Nigerian community claiming, “the 
insurgents will never free all the girls” (Oyewole, 2016: 28). 
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Transition to a Feminist movement 
 While #BringBackOurGirls alerted the international community to the plight of 
the Chibok students, it simultaneously sparked a discussion surrounding women’s rights. 
The kidnapped students came to symbolise the struggles of women the world over, and 
the hashtag saw the kidnapping evolve into a “broader rhetoric about girls’ education and 
rights in the global south” (Khoja-Moolji, 2015: 348).  
 
Access to formal education in northeastern Nigeria is scarce, particularly for 
females, with only one in ten being considered literate (Smith, 2015: 175). The 
international community was disgusted with Boko Haram’s blatant opposition to, and 
admonishment of, women’s rights to education (Cristaldi & Pampanini, 2016: 580). 
Thus, the hashtag developed into a dual cause, to locate the kidnapped students, and also 
to draw attention to the barriers to formal education for girls (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015: 
268).  
 
 At their core, the causes #BringBackOurGirls came to represent were undeniably 
feminist in nature. The hashtag made issues that had historically been important to the 
international women’s movement prominent, such as “the exploitation of women and 
girls around the world, education for girls, and equal opportunities for women and girls 
in developing countries” (Carter Olson, 2016: 779). #BringBackOurGirls gave a face and 
a story to the ongoing struggles of females throughout the world, especially those in third 
world nations. The hashtag had begun as a way to aid in the safe return of the kidnapped 
students, but it soon became far more than merely a rescue based movement; it had 




 Khoja-Moolji (2015) and Dixon (2014) consider #BringBackOurGirls to be an 
example of hashtag feminism in action. While feminism is often relegated to the sidelines of 
public discourse, through online activism, so-called hashtag feminism is emerging and 
becoming a crucial part of present day society (Dixon, 2014: 34). Hashtag feminism 
provides “a virtual space where victims of inequality can coexist together in a space that 
acknowledges their pain, narrative, and isolation” (Dixon, 2014: 34). Khoja-Moolji (2015) 
claims it is the transition towards hashtag feminism that aided in #BringBackOurGirls 
gaining notoriety on a global scale. Through hashtag feminism, the movement developed 
greater intentions and came to represent not only the Chibok students but also females 
who suffer under systems which “promote violence […] and denial of formal education 
for girls” (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015: 268). The hashtag had brought overlooked issues to 
the surface, consequently developing discussions of feminism on a global scale, and 
placing pressure on governments to take action (Khoja-Moolji, 2015: 348).  
 
#BringBackOurGirls as an Online Social Movement 
 From an outsider’s perspective, #BringBackOurGirls appears to have been a 
positive and successful OSM. The hashtag galvanised an online community, making a 
seemingly obscure issue a matter of international importance (Carter Olson, 2016). It is 
argued the hashtag was responsible for political change, with Carter Olson (2016: 775) 
claiming #BringBackOurGirls played a role in Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, 
losing his re-election campaign in 2015. #BringBackOurGirls is also considered to have 
generated MSM coverage of the issue, in essence, “guiding the mainstream media’s 
attention and mobilizing public conversation” about the kidnapping (Carter Olson, 2016: 
12). Additionally, women’s rights to education were propelled to the front of media and 
policy-makers’ agendas as a result of #BringBackOurGirls (13). In spite of these 
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supposed successes, however, critics argue this OSM cannot be considered entirely 
positive. Like any other social or political activism, OSMs have limitations. 
 
 According to Maxfield (2015), the biggest issue within #BringBackOurGirls is 
the presumption the campaign “maintained a single, stable meaning across contexts of 
race and nation” (n.p). Maxfield (2015) claims while the hashtag began as a “home-grown 
effort” (n.p), designed by Nigerian citizens on their behalf; it was essentially usurped by 
what he refers to as the “global north” (n.p). The global north represents a society of 
typically white, western, first world peoples. When the hashtag gained notoriety, Maxfield 
(2015) believes the campaign was undermined, and became a vehicle for archaic 
representations of peoples in the global south, as tropes of colonialism and imperialism 
emerged. Through western understandings of the hashtag, women in the global south 
were represented as “perpetual victims who lack agency and subject status” (Maxfield, 
2015: n.p), positioned as in need of protection after suffering abuse at the hands of 
“dangerous, violent African men” (n.p). These reactions mirror the argument of Chiluwa 
and Ifukor (2015), who claim those in the west feel they have a responsibility to protect 
vulnerable women and girls from violence and oppression (283). However, this can often 
mean suffering is exaggerated, and the forces that have led to the issue are overlooked 
(283).  
 
 Maxfield (2015) deems the very language present within the hashtag itself, such 
as “our” and “girls”, to enforce an uneven power structure, and distort its original aim(s). 
The word “our” sees the outsider claim the Chibok students as their own; thereby, 
assuming a sense of ownership and duty. Loken (2014) attributes this to a type of rights 
rhetoric, through which women’s needs are conceptualised as valid due to their 
relationship to other, more privileged agents. However, positioning women as worthy of 
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recognition and protection because “[they] could be someone’s daughter, sister, friend or 
mother” (Loken, 2014: 1100), completely undermines the feminist intentions of the 
hashtag, as it enforces a belief that women are only valuable through their potential to be 
someone else’s property (1100). Loken (2014) further explains, by claiming the Chibok 
students as “our girls” (1101), the west overlooked the intersections of race, class, and 
colonialism present within the OSM. The fact the kidnapped students were teenagers and 
young women, was also obscured through the use of the term “girls”. Such a term 
infantilises the students and portrays them as additionally vulnerable and weak (Chiluwa 
& Ifukor, 2015: 283). Again, this asserts the western actors’ position of authority. While 
the African victim is perceived as helpless and childlike, the westerner, in contrast, 
appears powerful and civilised (Maxfield, 2015: n.p).  
 
 According to Loken (2014: 1101) the manner in which westerners engaged with 
the hashtag, occurred in such a way that they failed to consider their imperial dynamics. 
While the hashtag began with third world understandings of feminism at its core, as it 
gained momentum in the first world, these values were seemingly overlooked. Maxfield 
(2015) reminds us that first world feminism has long been critiqued for employing 
iterations of feminism that “erase other women’s experiences, needs, and goals” (n.p). In 
Maxfield’s (2015) opinion, #BringBackOurGirls is no different. While the Nigerian 
community’s campaign recognised the kidnapped students “were individuals, young 
people with names, families, and futures” (n.p), Maxfield (2015) believes western 
activists, for the most part, saw the students as symbols. In their minds, the victims were 
a new recreation of a timeworn picture “the poor African, the oppressed woman of 
colour” (n.p). Maxfield (2015) argues that this perspective is embedded with racism and 
colonialism. Khoja-Moolji (2015) further explains western reactions to 
#BringBackOurGirls seemed to enact a narrative of “liberal feminist salvation” (347). 
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This is hardly a new phenomenon, and Ahmed (2010) attributes it to “prior affective 
situation” (40 cited in Khoja-Moolji, 2015: 348). That is, the claim individuals cannot be 
considered neutral bodies, and instead approach situations with their impressions of 
history, experiences, and prejudices. Thus, they act in accordance when approaching a 
situation such as #BringBackOurGirls. In ignoring third world feminist responses to the 
students’ kidnapping, westerners, arguably inadvertently, “rearticulate long-standing 
colonial and imperial conceptualisations” (Khoja-Moolji, 2015: 349). 
 
 Chiluwa and Ifukor (2015) urge that issues of bandwagoning, concerning the 
hashtag, are important to consider. While #BringBackOurGirls soared in popularity, 
assumedly many of those using the phrase in a show of solidarity were ignorant of the 
complexities of the Nigerian situation (275). While demanding action to rescue the 
victims through using the hashtag seemed simple and potentially effective, many of these 
activists lacked knowledge of Nigeria’s political problems, ethnic divides, details 
surrounding Boko Haram’s rise to power, and the other multitudes of issues facing the 
nation that played a role in the students’ disappearance. As such, the little effort some 
took seems inadequate. Many campaigners were firm in the belief that their contribution 
to the condemnation of Boko Haram, alongside their calls for the students’ freedom, had 
the potential to achieve positive results (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015: 269). Still, their social 
media activism, in spite of probable pure intent, can be considered slacktivism. Through 
their low-risk, low-cost action they have been granted emotional satisfaction, even 
though their action may have only consisted of clicking ‘retweet.’ 
 
 In addition to Chiluwa and Ifukor’s (2015) claims of slacktivism present in 
#BringBackOurGirls, Carter Olson (2016) indicates the OSM displays features of “time-
bound activism” (13). This is a form of activism that demands great attention for a small 
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amount time before those involved shift their attention to “the next big thing” (13). 
While #BringBackOurGirls soared in popularity for weeks, with over one million tweets 
featuring the hashtag published in the first week (Oyewole, 2016: 27), attention gradually 
waned as focus shifted towards other trending issues. The crucial issue within time-
bound activism is the fact that an online movement can drop in popularity before palpable 
results are achieved. This is what Maxfield (2015) believes happened with 
#BringBackOurGirls. While it initially soared in popularity, eventually something else 
commanded the attention of the Twittersphere, and this happened before the students 
were rescued. With this knowledge, Maxfield (2015) argues the movement cannot be 
considered successful, as it failed in reaching its penultimate goal. 
 
Conclusion 
 Through the abduction of 276 female students, Boko Haram displayed their non-
tolerance for western education and women’s rights. Simultaneously, the militant group 
cemented themselves as a powerful insurgent threat within Nigeria. The Nigerian 
government’s subsequent response to the abduction drew outrage and disbelief in the 
nation. #BringBackOurGirls was developed in response, and amassed global attention. 
As the international community drove the hashtag to viral status, it came to represent 
more than merely the plight of the missing students; taking on a dual cause by 
highlighting the barriers to women’s education and rights (Carter Olson, 2016: 773). 
Despite global relevance, critics are reluctant to label the OSM a success. Maxfield (2015) 
is particularly sceptical of the hashtag, claiming the west overtook the movement. He 
argues, western participants failed to recognise the forces behind the abduction and 
approached the situation with the same tired, old frames, leading to issues of colonialism, 
imperialism, and stereotyping emerging in the movement. Other scholars remain critical 
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of western motivations for participation, noting the presence of slacktivist behaviour 
within the movement, as well as time-bound activism (Khoja-Moolji, 2015; Chiluwa & 
Ifukor, 2015). Opinions surrounding #BringBackOurGirls success differ significantly. 





Feminism is a complex, constantly evolving field, which makes the term itself an 
unstable label (Dorer & Hipfl, 2013). However, in its most basic form, one can define 
feminism as the belief that women, solely because of their gender, are treated inequitably, 
as society tends to prioritise males. In a patriarchal system women become everything 
men supposedly are not: while men are seen as strong, women are weak; where men are 
active, women are passive (Gamble, 2001: vii). Feminism seeks to change this situation, 
and overcome the injustices of gender inequality (Gamble, 2001; Dorer & Hipfl, 2013). 
While feminism’s core feature involves women acting in solidarity to overcome 
patriarchal oppression, feminism is not restricted to a female focus (Gamble, 2001). 
Instead, contemporary feminist concepts claim to be underpinned by themes of 
continuity, inclusivity, and multiplicity (Evans & Chamberlain, 2015: 396) and stress that 
all societal asymmetries should be of concern to feminists (Dorer & Hipfl, 2013).  
 
Due to a long history, feminism is often cast in a series of waves. The wave 
metaphor alludes to the way efforts for social change tends to come in cycles (Rejer, 
2014: 45). Scholars suggest the first wave began in 1860’s and was hallmarked by the 
women’s suffrage movement. In the late 1960’s the second wave emerged. This wave 
stressed equal pay for equal work, introduced concepts of gender privilege, and led to the 
legalisation of abortion in many nations (Biklen et al., 2008: 451). Despite 
acknowledgement of the many positive impacts second-wave feminism had upon 
women, it was critiqued for the way it “forced many women to choose between their 
racial and gendered identities” (Biklen et al., 2008: 451). The blind spots and disinterest 
surrounding homosexuality within second-wave feminism, as well as a marginalisation of 
non-white women, saw scholars label second-wave feminism as “white feminism” 
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(Biklen et al., 2008: 460). Third-wave feminism emerged in 1990’s as an apparent remedy 
to the insufficiencies of previous waves; this was a theory aiming to expand the narrow 
features of second-wave activism (Rejer, 2014). In turning attention to varied women, 
this was a feminism that sought to be more inclusive and diverse (Lotz, 2003 cited in Yu, 
2009; Rejer, 2014). However, Evans and Chamberlain (2015: 403) maintain while third-
wave feminism claims to address the inadequacies of previous feminist waves, it does 
little to rectify them actively. McRobbie (2009) claims third wave feminism has created a 
divide of sorts between older and younger feminists, leading to disillusion with third 
wave feminism. In its place, McRobbie (2009) and Gens (2006) say is post-feminism, 
where the Internet facilitates communication, and the emergence of feminist voices in 
online spaces is occurring. Some commentators argue this can be considered a fourth-
wave of feminism.  However, whether online feminist activity constitutes a new wave is 
still debated (Munro, 2013: 23).  
 
Regardless of which feminist wave we are said to be in, many disagree with wave 
discourse entirely and fail to identify with any wave (Evans & Chamberlain, 2015). 
Despite attempts to broaden feminist perspectives, the wave metaphor is said to be 
inherently exclusionary due to its US origins, and the way it highlights the role(s) of 
white, middle-class, heterosexual women (Rejer, 2014: 45). Transnational feminist 
practices, which transcend such divisions and see beyond western perspectives, are 
considered more appropriate today. Mohanty (2003) describes such practices as 
“feminism without borders” (n.p). 
 
For this study, two broad forms of feminism will be defined. These two forms of 
feminist thought are considered crucial to this research; they are western first world 
feminism, and third world feminism. While the terms ‘first’ and ‘third’ world stir up some 
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political and philosophical discomfort, they are used to demonstrate the manner in which 
different feminist identities regard one another (Riley, 2013: 58). They also serve to 
recognise hegemony and privilege differences, which Mansoor (2016) stresses must be 
acknowledged within contemporary feminist discussion. In this instance, ‘first’ is a label 
indicating developed nations, the west, while ‘third’ is indicative of developing nations, 
the global south. Riley (2013: 58) points out, there are additional associations in play, 
namely ‘first’ being linked to ‘white’, and ‘third’ to ‘non-white’. ‘First’ and ‘third’ are 
terms enabled their existence as a result of politically asymmetric relationships, built 
upon histories of colonialism (Ram, 1991: 91). While the ‘third world’ is indicative of a 
particular geographic location, in the context of what is referred to as ‘third world 
feminism’, it also incorporates minority peoples of the west (Mohanty et al., 1991). 
 
Western First World Feminism 
The classification of western first world feminism is an amalgamation of the 
feminisms dominant in the west. In defining this form of feminism, third-wave 
feminism, liberal feminism, and concepts of ‘universal sisterhood’ were drawn from. Due 
to its first world perspectives, and foundations in western society, this form of feminism 
is the most well-studied and mediatised feminism. Western first world feminism is 
supported by activists who are typically white, middle-class, and heterosexual. In contrast 
to feminisms that strive for justice on a grander scale, western first world feminism 
considers sex the most salient social category, and places gender equality as its central 
goal (Rejer, 2014: 47).  
 
Western first world feminism is a version of feminism that critics claim obscures 
the participation of diverse voices. Evans and Chamberlain (2015) claim western 
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feminism operates under a form of exclusionary politics that place a focus on “the 
interests of white, middle-class, well-educated women” (405). Activists that do not fit the 
mould provided by western first world feminism, such as those who are non-white, non-
middle-class, or non-heterosexual, struggle to identify with and to find a place within this 
form of feminism (Rejer, 2012: 21). Rejer (2012) claims the unacknowledged privilege 
and exclusion rife in this western first world feminism sees racism, classism, and 
homophobia ironically become hallmarks of a campaign for equality. With oppressive 
characteristics inherent within western first world feminism, the equality it seeks to 
achieve is realised only for those who adhere to the movement’s apparent ideal (Evans & 
Chamberlain, 2015); those outside this archetype are further oppressed. As a result, 
people not represented or respected by western first world feminism struggle to identify 
with this movement, as they perceive it to be trapped within the confines of western 
perspectives and experiences (Yu, 2009: 12). This is further supported by the ideology of 
‘universal sisterhood’ that hallmarks western first world feminism. 
 
Universal sisterhood places gender at its core and promotes itself as uniting 
women in a common struggle for their rights (Rejer, 2014: 47). However, while intended 
as a way to bring women together, critics argue universal sisterhood is, in fact, 
exclusionary (Rejer, 2014: 47). In grouping diverse women under the same umbrella, by 
using sex as their commonality, western first world feminism’s use of universal 
sisterhood neglects the many other dominant injustices that may be present. The claim 
that gender inequality is the single most important prejudice women can face does not 
resonate with everyone. Therefore, universal sisterhood evidences the inherent prejudices 




Western first world feminism claims, to overcome patriarchal oppression, 
activists must work together and provide one another with mutual support (Gamble, 
2001). However, in this effort to secure equality between the sexes, this concept of 
feminism has, in fact, created exclusionary barriers of its own. Neglecting to 
acknowledge “the efforts of women of colour, lesbian, and poor and working-class 
women” (Rejer, 2014: 45), it stresses the importance of feminist achievements by white, 
middle-class women. Despite an abundance of evidence that it lacks an inclusive outlook, 
this form of feminism considers itself to be the ‘right’ one. As a result, it is often 
inappropriately hailed as the solution to issues of women’s rights, even in non-western, 
non-first world settings. For example, while advocating for abortion rights is a mainstay 
of western first world feminism, Njoroge (2016) claims this does not resonate with 
African women, “many of whom are still grappling with issues of survival in a highly 
gendered context” (314). While western first world feminism seeks to address patriarchal 
inequities, such as the gender-pay gap, feminisms in the global south strive to address 
other struggles for gender equity. These struggles arise not primarily from patriarchal 
forces but other forms of oppressions, such “slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
poverty, illiteracy and disease” (Guy-Sheftall, 2003 cited in Njoroge, 2016: 314) This 
thesis seeks to prove that this incarnation of feminism was inappropriately offered to 
Nigerian society through the #BringBackOurGirls movement. 
 
Third World Feminism 
Third world feminisms offer a stark contrast to the ideals of western first world 
feminism. These are iterations of feminism grounded upon the ideology of justice for all. 
In breaking out of the confines of a ‘universal sisterhood’ approach to feminism, third 
world feminisms favour an approach that works to better the entire community. Third 
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world feminists object to feminisms that portray men as the primary source of 
oppression (McEwan, 2001). Within third world feminisms “there is no single source of 
oppression; gender oppression is inextricably bound up with ‘race’ and class” (McEwan, 
2001: 98). With notable differences to western first world feminism, it is no surprise that 
third world feminisms have developed in direct opposition to the western feminist ideals 
that are considered inadequate and inappropriate for the global south. While various 
perspectives and understandings surround feminism in the third world (Mohanty et al., 
1991), here applied to one mode, made up of the perceived integral features, is a version 
that will henceforth be referred to as third world feminism. 
 
Within third world feminism, regarding oneself as a feminist or womanist does 
not exclude one from working alongside men, or aiding the male populous. Third world 
feminism believes in partnership between the sexes (Eisenstein, 2004). Through a focus 
on education, and working to combat hunger, poverty, and disease, third world feminism 
believes the entirety of society can benefit (Eistenstein, 2004: 207). Eistenstein (2004) 
regards third world feminism as feminism for humanity, one that strengthens and 
empowers women, through doing the same for their communities.  
 
Third world feminism addresses what western feminism tends to overlook. 
Through the belief that women face complex and multiple oppressions, not simply 
universal patriarchy, third world feminism promotes the idea that methods of combating 
oppression must be developed to suit specific situations. There is an understanding that 
what works for some, may not work for all. Third world feminists tend to analyse the 
different oppression and resistance faced by women in the third world, in a manner 
attentive to “intersection[s] of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nation pertaining to their 
locations” (Herr, 2014: 4). Such a response has been developed in clear opposition to 
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western first world feminism, which third world feminists claim cannot see beyond its 
viewpoint, making it an ill fit for third world feminist sensitivities (McEwan, 2001). 
 
Third world feminism’s opposition to what some may consider the ‘traditional’ 
mode of feminism represented by the western first world, stems from a chronic 
victimisation of women in the global south by western feminists (McEwan, 2001: 99). 
Western feminists have long been criticised for considering their limited, localised 
perspectives as the ‘norm’, thereby claiming “women in the South as tradition-bound 
victims of timeless, patriarchal cultures” (McEwan, 2001: 99). There is inherent irony in 
such opinion, as it is at odds with the inclusive intentions of feminism, and it fails to 
acknowledge the role of western society in creating and maintaining the oppressive 
conditions present in the global south. Such disregard of third world women’s agency, 
and complex histories, have led scholars to critique western first world feminism as a 
“facet of imperialism”, due the way it “imposes the Western perspective while failing to 
recognize the adverse affects of imperialism and colonialism [in the third world]” (Herr, 
2014: 8). Western first world feminism is charged with denying African women’s power 
within indigenous relational worlds (Chilisa & Ntseane, 2010). In contrast, third world 
feminism is defined by Mekgwe (2003, 7 cited in Chilisa & Ntseane, 2010: 618) as a 
discourse that “take cares to delineate those concerns that are peculiar to the African 
situation”. In doing so, third world feminism “promotes the thinking and working 
together and interdependence between men and women that is necessary to address 
gender inequalities” (Chilisa & Ntseane, 2010: 630). Additionally, third world feminism 
covers expansive territory geographically, and in response consciously works to expand 
and accommodate for diverse feminist understandings throughout the global south. The 
result is a diverse form of feminism that actively advocates for women in a myriad of 
contexts (Njoroge, 2016: 315). Unlike the narrowly defined western first world feminism, 
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which insufficiently redresses oppression in the global south, third world feminism is a 
philosophy of social justice that promotes women as equal participants in struggles 
against racism, imperialism, and economic exploitation (Mohanty et al., 1991: 315, 316).  
 
Conclusion 
Third world feminism has not been explored in as much depth as western 
feminisms. Western matters take precedence in academic research, relegating the global 
south to the sidelines, thereby enforcing colonial and imperial tropes. Mohanty et al. 
(1991: 3-4) explain while a large body of research regarding third world women exists, 
such female oriented study in a third world context fails to engage with feminist ideals in 
the region. In failing to dedicate adequate research to the feminist experiences of third 
world women, countless feminist discourses have been neglected. This has served to 
unintentionally strengthen the assertion that western feminist ideals are the only ones 
that matter. Confirming what Kurian (2001) believes to be the ‘grand narrative’ of 
feminism as “the story of western endeavour [which] relegates the experience of non-
western women to the margins of feminist discourse” (66). The core intention of 
feminism, to strengthen and empower women, should have brought western women 
closer to women in the third world (Rehman & Hernandez, 2002: xxii cited in Yu, 2009: 
11); instead, critics claim it has served to magnify differences. Rather than recognising the 
factors that have shaped third world women, western feminism condenses them to 
“symbol[s] of oppression, subordination, and victimhood” (Yu, 2009: 9). In ignoring the 
abilities of women in the global south, and their feminist histories, (Dosekun, 2015), 
western feminisms have perpetuated the “self/other, coloniser/colonised dichotomy” 





 The advent of the Internet, and the virtual spaces it provides changed the 
modern world immeasurably. The answer to any question, interaction with almost any 
individual, and the ability to voice opinions, now lies at one’s fingertips. However, in this 
era of information and communications technology, where Web 2.0 reigns supreme, how 
have social movements and social activism adapted? While a transition towards online 
engagement may appear positive, shortcomings become apparent when holding a 
magnifying lens to activism in digital spaces.  
 
Online Social Movements 
Social movements can be described as informal networks, forged upon shared 
ideologies, which mobilise, through various methods of protest, to effect change (Porta 
& Diani, 2009 cited in Ahmed et al., 2016). In discussing OSMs, the same definition 
essentially holds, although OSM activists have moved into the virtual world by 
conducting activism through the Internet (Loader, 2003 cited in Ahmed et al., 2016). 
OSMs essentially display the same features as offline collective action – both involve a 
crowd sharing their outrage, opinions, and beliefs about a certain topic, before uniting 
into a social movement prepared for action, and eager to spark change (Ahmed et al., 
2016: 2). Differences do emerge though when considering the scale that online activism 
can attain. Aided by the Internet, online activism’s reach enables a globalism that offline 
activism can seldom achieve (Breindl & Francq, 2008).  
 
Online activism is reliant upon the Internet and utilises social media as its point 
of departure. With social media’s ability to spread messages, and organise diverse publics, 
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it is an invaluable protest tool (Harlow, 2011: 227). Harlow (2011) notes that social 
media’s role within OSMs is two-fold, as it “facilitate[s] traditional offline activism, 
enhancing a movement’s existing repertoire […] or it actually can create new forms of 
activism and resistance” (229). The latter change is perhaps most notable, as social media 
and various social networking sites are now the most common entrance to online 
activism (Harlow: 2011: 229). As a result, citizens are enabled greater participation in 
political processes (Breindl & Francq, 2008).  
 
Much of the success of OSMs can be attributed to the creation of 
counterpublics. The notion of a counterpublic stems from the belief that society is 
composed of multiple and diverse publics, and as such, some publics are excluded from, 
or considered subordinate to, mainstream society (Leung & Lee, 2014: 343). Social 
media, in cooperation with OSMs, provide a space where counterpublics can thrive. 
Unlike in mainstream society, in the virtual world users are not limited to the information 
they are presented with; instead they “can actively construct the content they wish to 
receive or diffuse” (Breindl & Francq, 2008: 16-17). In this sense, OSMs become more 
than simply vehicles for protest, but a form of alternative media, wherein the voices of 
the marginalised can be heard (Castells, 2015). Social media and social networks are great 
tools for mobilising and organising; however, their discussion should not solely focus on 
such instrumentality. Castells (2015: 258) believes the real triumph of OSMs stems from 
the protection against repression, unhindered communication, and social progress 
enabled by the Internet. In facilitating a space for collective action and promoting 
counterpublics, the Internet facilitated a new era of activism. OSMs are not achieving 
reach due to the viral diffusion of their messages, but instead because they are triggering 





 Social networking sites and other forms of social media are the most typical 
avenues through which OSMs gain momentum. The ease of access social media 
provides, and the seemingly limitless number of individuals contactable at the click of a 
mouse makes the creation of online communities simple (Castells, 2015: 2). There are 
numerous successful social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, 
and Twitter, meaning the chance for engagement is never far away. However, Twitter is 
perhaps the most notable social media network concerning its facilitation of OSMs.  
 
 Twitter is a microblogging website established in 2006. Microblogging, defined as 
blogging on a smaller scale, is marked by three main characteristics: the dissemination of 
short text messages; instantaneous delivery; and subscriptions to receive updates (Jansen 
et al., 2009: 3861 cited in Small, 2011: 874). Twitter enables users to send out status 
updates of 140 characters called ‘tweets’, in response to the question: ‘What’s 
happening?’ (Small, 2011: 874). Twitter boasts over 190 million individual users, and 
these users are more ethnically and racially diverse than the entire U.S. population 
(Papacharissi, 2012: 1993). Due to this, Twitter is heralded as “a platform that affords 
visibility to marginalised points of view” (Papacharissi, 2012: 1990). The great diversity 
and high number of users on Twitter have seen the site become a breeding ground of 
sorts for OSMs (Small, 2011). Bonilla and Rosa (2015) claim while older media forms 
enable audiences to experience social movements, the dialogicality of Twitter constructs 
feelings of direct participation, even when one is geographically or culturally distanced 
from an event (7). In enabling the presentation of so many diverse experiences and 
points of view, “Twitter does not just allow you to peer through a window; it allows you 
to look through manifold windows at once” (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015: 7).  
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 Each day over 50 million tweets are published on Twitter; to organise this huge 
amount of information, Twitter encourages its users to use “hashtags” (Small, 2011: 874). 
Hashtags are Twitter’s version of a tag, designated by the hash (#) symbol. A hashtag is 
essentially a keyword that describes the content of a tweet and thus aids in searching 
(Small, 2011: 874). Hashtags are present on a variety of social networks, but their 
common adoption can be traced to the prominence Twitter initially placed on them 
(Brock, 2012: 538). Twitter provides tools to track hashtags, enabling users to identify 
what is trending, and encouraging them to join these conversations. Bruns and Burgess 
(2011) discuss, following or contributing to a hashtag conversation enables Twitter users 
to “communicate with a community of interest […] without needing to go through the 
process of establishing a mutual follower/followee relationship” (2). In contrast to social 
media networks typically premised on communicating with people already known to 
users, Twitter has always encouraged interaction with strangers, and it is through 
hashtags that the majority of this interaction is initiated (Papacharissi, 2012). Moscato 
(2016: 5) believes hashtags play a prominent role in reaching out to people, deepening 
ties, and mobilising support. Due in part to the fact that hashtags are always embedded 
with discourse; therefore, by mere virtue of sending a tweet with a hashtag, the user 
invites a particular kind of audience attention (Moscato, 2016: 5).  
 
The notability of hashtags, particularly in OSMs, has led to the coining of the 
phrase ‘hashtag activism.’ Hashtag activism sees Twitter users become social activists 
through sharing a hashtag related to a certain political or social movement. Hashtag 
activism is perhaps one of the easiest methods of displaying solidarity in an online space 
(Skoric, 2012: 83). Latina and Docherty (2014) discuss, thanks to hashtag activism, MSM 
is now appropriating hashtags as “news stories in their own right” (1104). Through 
hashtags, OSMs have the ability to expand from digital communities to the “real world”; 
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as they create an identifiable slogan, are easily tracked, and can be used on a multitude of 
social networks (Stache, 2015: 162). However, concerns have been raised about the 
impact of hashtag activism. Bonilla and Rosa (2015) caution that hashtag activism may be 
a poor substitute for “real activism” (8), as it may not encourage sustained action, and 
therefore cannot have a long-lasting impact. This argument is at odds with Castells 
(2015) claims, regarding online activism’s potential for real-world change. Begging the 
question: is hashtag activism slacktivism? 
 
Slacktivism 
 The term slacktivism is a combination of the words “slacker” and “activism” 
(Glenn, 2015: 81). Slacktivism can be defined as a willingness to participate in a relatively 
costless form of support for a social cause while displaying an unwillingness to devote 
significant effort to said social cause (Kristofferson et al., 2014: 1149). Though primarily 
concerning engagement with social movements through social media, slacktivism can be 
applied to any low-cost form of activism (Kristofferson et al., 2014). Slacktivism is 
premised on the idea that citizens are more inclined to participate in activism when 
involvement is easily accomplished, and there is a benefit for them personally (Skoric, 
2012: 77). The usual benefit for the participant is the satisfaction derived “from having 
done something good for society” (Skoric, 2012: 78). Slacktivists receive the ‘feel-good’ 
feeling almost immediately after participating, and as such, the social cause that drew 
them to participate does not linger in their minds (Kristofferson et al., 2014). The online 
action taken by the slacktivist, although at a much lower cost than traditional civic action, 
has been performed, and they are free to enjoy the satisfaction that comes with it (Lee & 
Hsieh, 2013). Meanwhile, the social cause they have participated in has received no real, 
meaningful contribution (Kristofferson et al., 2014).  




 Kristofferson et al. (2014) refer to slacktivist behaviour as a show of “token 
support” (1150). Token support enables participants to affiliate with a cause through 
action often conducted by the click of a mouse. When support does not require a 
significant cost, effort or change in behaviour Kristofferson et al. (2014) consider it to 
make no significant contribution to the cause. According to McCafferty (2011: 17), the 
critical goals of social activist movements involve changing the hearts and minds of the 
public and impacting upon tangible change. Activism with the power to create change is 
organised in strong, robust structures. However, activism associated with social media is 
dependent upon so-called “weak tie” relationships (McCafferty, 2011: 18). Through 
slacktivist action, participants receive praise and social acknowledgement within their 
online circles, without performing any substantiative feat (Skoric, 2012: 78, 79).  
 
 While it might be easy to criticise slacktivists for taking the easy route and failing 
to contribute to social movements properly, Landman (2008 cited in Skoric, 2012: 80) 
encourages understanding towards slacktivists. For the most part, Landman (2008) 
believes, slacktivists are genuine, well-meaning people, their downfall is their attraction to 
tasks that require minimal effort. Skoric (2012: 80) relates slacktivist action online to 
minimal action in the ‘real’ world. This minimal action includes slapping on a bumper 
sticker or wearing a wristband. These acts essentially share the motivations and benefits 
of tweeting a hashtag or clicking ‘like,’ those incentives being to impress others and 
fashion an identity for oneself. But social media enables this on a grander scale. Through 
slacktivist participation, Skoric (2012) notes the emergence of “hoped-for possible 




 The projection of an identity that differs from one’s true self is referred to as a 
hoped-for possible self. Skoric (2012) claims via the Internet this can progress to the 
projection of an unrealistic ideal self. Through the use of social media platforms, 
individuals are enabled to “actualize the identities they hope to establish, but are not able 
to do so in offline, face-to-face situations” (Skoric, 2012: 81). In fact, as social networks 
develop, participants are saturated with ever-expanding networks of people, greater 
opportunities for relationships, and new ‘stages’ for performance (Papacharissi, 2012: 
1992). Participation in slacktivist action can help to forge such ideal selves and empower 
individuals to present OSMs on their social media accounts (McCafferty, 2011). 
Coulding-Jorgensen (2009 cited in Skoric, 2012: 81) explains that in the same manner 
individuals require certain items to furnish their homes, on social media individuals 
require cultural objects to aid in projecting the version of themselves they would prefer 
the public to see. This construction of identity through the guise of social activism 
signifies narcissism and draws into question an individual’s motivation(s) for participating 
in OSMs. When slacktivism and the curation of an idealised identity appear present in 
these digital forms of engagement, one cannot help but ponder the consequences of 
these actions (Skoric, 2012: 77). 
 
 Slacktivism has led to significant levels of participation within social movements 
(Glenn, 2015: 82); however, slacktivist action is critiqued for having no real impact on 
social change, with some claiming it could perhaps weaken future civil action (Lee & 
Hsieh, 2013: 811). While participating in slacktivist action is simple and rewarding, these 
are the very attributes that may see participants fulfilled enough that they do not feel the 
need to take further social action (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Thus, slacktivism may serve to 
play a role in eroding the quality of civic and political engagement (Skoric, 2012: 78).  
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Mainstream Media & New Forms of Media 
 Historically, MSM such as newspapers, radio, and television have represented 
platforms for debate and influenced public agenda (Rogstad, 2016: 142). While MSM has 
historically been the source through which most individuals get their information (Kenix, 
2011: 26), it is typically regarded in a negative sense. Atton (2002) explains, “there is a 
widespread, implicit assertion that the organizational and professional routines of the 
mainstream media produce a media system that is monolithic and inflexible” (492). 
Within this media system, representations of diverse or dissident voices are rarely 
present, and if they are, “such voices will be demonized and marginalized” (Atton, 2002: 
492). Shaped by corporate forces, capitalism, consumerism, and patriarchy, MSM is 
motivated primarily by fiscal goals (Kenix, 2011: 19). Such economic motivations result 
in so-called “pack journalism” designed to maximise audiences, by creating formulaic 
content which does little for the marginalised groups in society (Kenix, 2011: 8, 19; 
Atton, 2002). MSM function as “gatekeepers” to the public agenda; meaning audiences 
learn about issues, and perceive their importance, based on how much attention, or lack 
thereof, an issue receives within MSM (Rogstad, 2016: 143). This example serves to 
illuminate MSM’s “hierarchies of access” (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976: 245 
cited in Atton, 2002: 493), which until recently have prevailed unchallenged. Throughout 
the last decade, greater technologisation has disrupted typical journalism practices, and 
therefore, MSM (Farinosi & Treré, 2014).  
 
Today, alternative forms of media are enabled through social networking sites 
and the proliferation of the Internet as a tool for communication. These spaces allow 
ordinary people to bypass, and potentially influence, traditional media flows (Mare, 
2013). Enabling opportunities for drawing public attention to issues without having to 
pass through traditional MSM “gatekeepers” (Rogstad, 2016: 153). This development is 
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considered by some to be negative, with Mare (2013) claiming social media sites “[live] 
parasitically off the quality content produced by mainstream media” (87-88). Conversely, 
Rogstad (2016) argues MSM utilise social media sites to bolster their news coverage and 
interact with elite and nonelite sources on social media to pick up breaking news or 
uncover trends (143, 144). 
 
The potential the emergence of new media has, regarding placing limits on 
MSM’s ability to set public agenda, is an issue of great debate (Dearing & Rogers, 1996 
cited in Rogstad, 2016). Rogstad (2016) claims the new media landscape may have shifted 
towards an “aggregated agenda” (143; emphasis in original) through which journalism can 
be considered more reflective and interactive (Mare, 2013). This aggregated agenda may 
even see MSM develop a reliance of sorts upon new media forms. In contrast, Asur et al. 
(2011) claim social media simply filters and amplifies interesting news from MSM, thus 
further disseminating MSM agendas.  Furthermore, in Rogstad’s (2016) study of Twitter 
and MSM outlets, the results revealed, “Twitter is highly concerned with mainstream 
media content […] however, mainstream media is not very consumed with social media” 
(148). In a show of further conflict, the same study pointed to an instance where MSM 
shifted its focus after being criticised on Twitter. While Rogstad (2016) was reluctant to 
credit Twitter as the cause of this agenda shift, she commented, if this were the case, “we 
might be observing a change in the relationship between mainstream media and their 
audiences” (153).  
 
There is much discontent regarding the emerging changes within media systems 
and agenda. While it is clear MSM’s grasp on audiences is loosening, due to more choice 
and representation for audiences, it remains a firm fixture of the media landscape. There 
also remains clear evidence, for both camps, pointing to MSM impacting new media 
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agenda, and new media impacting MSM agenda. Clearly, greater research into these MSM 
and social media interplays are crucial, particularly relating to agenda-setting. 
 
Feminism & Online Social Movements 
 The feminist movement has especially benefitted from the rise of OSMs. 
Feminism has latched onto online activism, drawing on the opportunities the Internet 
presents for creating new understandings of community, activism, and even feminism 
itself (Keller, 2012: 430). OFMs have “unleashed a multiplicity of voices” demanding 
recognition of all facets of feminism (Clark, 2014: 1109). In particular, OFMs have 
appropriated hashtags as vehicles for expanding conversation (Clark, 2014). While 
traditional feminist movements have suffered criticism for their exclusionary traits, 
hashtag feminism serves to open up new spaces for groups silenced or those otherwise 
marginalised in conventional feminist movements (Clark, 2016: 2). No longer limited by 
the boundaries of space, OFMs transcend borders, thus creating global networks for 
feminist discussion and development (Keller, 2012: 443).  Through the viral nature of 
various feminist hashtags, the collective action that online activism can facilitate has been 
made apparent. Clark (2016) claims, “social media enables active audience participation 
as opposed to passive consumption” (11); and within hashtag feminism’s discursive 
power, this is obvious. The 2017 International Women’s March, a protest facilitated by 
social networking and hashtag feminism, provides a great example of this power 
(Jamieson et al., 2017).  
 
While scholars praise feminism for utilising online activism as a space for the 
broadening of civil society and progress (Fotopoulou, 2016: 991), Tuczu (2016: 155) 
warns of the inherent, often inescapable borders that can dictate online engagement. 
 
 44 
While digital platforms are praised for “being borderless by nature” (Tuczu, 2016: 150), 
Keller (2012) points to the different kinds of borders that may be created. Tuczu (2016) 
explains, OFMs were quick to praise online activism as a space for all facets of feminist 
thought, however, in reality, the exclusionary practices of the offline world do not 
disappear in the online world (155, 157). Rhetoric regarding the globalisation of the 
feminist movement elides the social inequalities that can dictate access to technology, 
meaning those without Internet access cannot participate in OFMs, and as such, a 
plethora of significant voices remains silent (Keller, 2012: 444; Clark, 2016: 2). Despite 
hopes for more inclusionary feminist action through the Internet, OFMs may have 
unwittingly “preserved a Eurocentric logic of feminist politics” (Tuczu, 2016: 155). While 
many groups, particularly the feminist movement, have heralded the move to online 
platforms as the “great equaliser”, Tuczu (2016) stresses OSMs should be treated not as a 
magic cure, but instead as another opportunity to raise awareness.  
 
Conclusion 
 The way OSMs utilise social media can have great influence. With the broad 
reach OSMs can achieve, through the interactivity and globalisation of social networking, 
social movements that are larger, more diverse, and better able to facilitate collective 
action are emerging. However, OSMs are not wholly positive; through the shift from 
traditional methods of action towards networked action, numerous issues have arisen. 
The ease of participation enabled by OSMs has seen online activism criticised as ‘feel-
good’ activism and termed slacktivism. When action becomes simple and is broadcast in a 
public realm, it can become a performance of sorts. As a result, online activism can 
detract from issues at hand, leaving audiences more concerned about self-projection than 
focusing their action on a particular social issue. While OSMs may appear as the perfect 
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method through which to disseminate messages further, it is important to consider their 
imperfections. Though more diverse, and capable of generating greater engagement and 
participation, OSMs are limited in many respects. As online activism takes a more 
prominent place in the modern world, it is crucial that its influence is monitored and 





Solidarity can be broadly understood as one type of communal relatedness; a 
social cohesion that draws from the moral obligations associated with belonging to a 
community (Derpmann, 2009: 305). When certain attributes are shared, a bond between 
members is established. Such identification between individuals consequently sees group 
members “feel obliged to promote the well-being of other members, even [at the risk of] 
incurring significant sacrifices for themselves” (Derpmann, 2009: 305). Chouliaraki 
(2011) claims the core feature of solidarity, the imperative to act towards vulnerable 
others without the expectation of reciprocation, is the “humanitarian claim par excellence” 
(364). There are numerous modes of solidarity, but they are all premised upon the 
promises people make to one another, promises which bind them together (Kennedy, 
2006: 82). Derpmann (2009) believes the bond enabled through solidary action to be 
central to the success of modern democratic societies (305). 
 
In discussing solidarity, it is important to note there can be different forms of 
solidary action. This discussion will touch on two, cosmopolitan and communitarian. A 
cosmopolitan solidarity involves the disposition to act towards vulnerable others in a 
manner “shaped by the moral imperative to act not only on people close to ‘us’ but also 
on distant others” (Chouliaraki, 2013a: 3). While a communitarian perspective of 
solidarity emphasises “a feeling in common” (Chouliaraki, 2008: 373 cited in Madianou, 
2013: 252) with those whose suffering is depicted. Absent from this ‘common feeling’ 
may be an orientation to the distant other (Madianou, 2013). Contrastingly, cosmopolitan 
solidary action recognises and acts upon vulnerability solely because of a shared 
humanity (Chouliaraki, 2013b: 111, 112). Due to the lack of reflexivity and responsibility 
inherent to the communitarian view of solidarity, this research chooses to focus on the 
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Cosmopolitanism, meaning “citizen of the world” (Ainley, 2008: 57), is forged 
upon the belief that all human beings belong to a single moral community. Through 
emphasising a need to protect fellow humans from universal vulnerabilities, 
cosmopolitanism promotes identification with distant strangers, (Chouliaraki, 2008: 387), 
whom we are encouraged to embrace due to our shared humanity (Linklater, 2007: 23, 
27). Such identification and inclusion draw from Immanuel Kant’s belief that through 
our human existence we are all intimately connected, therefore “a violation of rights in 
one part of the world is felt everywhere” (Kant, 1991: 107-8 cited in Brown, 2009: 1; 
emphasis in original). To see beyond local perspectives, cosmopolitanism incorporates 
the concerns of various publics, thus creating an alternative non-communitarian public 
(Chouliaraki, 2008: 387). 
 
Inherent to cosmopolitan thought is the notion that every person must be 
considered worthy of rights, simply by virtue of their humanity (Fine, 2007: 27). 
Cosmopolitans believe this commitment to human rights is central to a healthy, 
functioning global civil society (Derpmann, 2009: 310). As such, cosmopolitanism can be 
understood as the formation of a relationship between a spectator and a distant other 
(Chouliaraki, 2008: 374). Corpus Ong (2009) refers to this relationship as a “welcoming 
of difference” (449). However, he goes on to note, referencing the works of Chouliaraki 
(2006) and Silverstone (2002), that only some forms of cosmopolitanism enact the 
“moral turn” in this manner. As such, when a spectator witnesses the suffering of a 
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vulnerable other and is compelled to act to lessen their suffering, purely for virtue of 
their shared humanity, they are performing the ideal form of cosmopolitan solidarity. 
However, such cosmopolitan sensibilities cannot simply be adopted; their proliferation 
rests upon “the symbolic recognition of vulnerable others [and] the cultivation of our 
imaginative capacity to engage with the ‘otherness’ of their vulnerability” (Chouliaraki, 
2013b: 112).  
 
 Some regard globalisation as a way of arousing cosmopolitan sensibilities on a 
global scale. Through globalisation, the boundaries of the community are extended, and 
distant suffering is brought into the lives of onlookers (Linklater, 2007: 22). With our 
world increasingly interconnected, interactions between peoples, and the facilitation of 
relationships are changing. Cosmopolitan thinkers welcome this change as 
cosmopolitanism is premised on the theory “the world is an interconnected and 
independent community…where our moral responsibility toward all humanity should be 
understood as being a universal and globalized concern” (Brown, 2009: 1). 
Contemporary cosmopolitan theorists claim through globalisation the ability to recognise 
suffering on a grander, global scale and react via cosmopolitan dispositions is enabled 
(Linklater, 2007: 27; Brown, 2009: 9-10). Brown (2009) dismisses this view as “morally 
utopian” (14) and “overly universal” (15), claiming instead cosmopolitan thought fails to 
acknowledge diversity and is “attempting world conquest” (15) given that aspirations of 
cosmopolitanism and globalisation work in tandem. While globalisation may have made 
spectators more aware of distant suffering, whether this awareness can stimulate feelings 
of obligation that will then translate into tangible action(s) remains problematic 
(Linklater, 2007: 24, 26). For example, globalisation, and social media alerted many to the 
progressive neurodegenerative disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), through a 
viral online campaign known the ‘Ice Bucket Challenge’. The challenge saw participants 
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film, and upload to social media, a video of themselves being doused with ice-cold water, 
pledging to donate to ALS charities, and nominating others to do the same (Adisesh et 
al., 2014). The funds raised through the campaign are credited with funding research that 
led to the discovery of a gene that contributes to the disease (“Ice Bucket Challenge 
funds gene discovery,” 2016). The Ice Bucket Challenge provides evidence of 
globalisation’s success in alerting people to distant suffering, stimulating a sense of 
obligation, and actively incurring tangible action; however, its achievement alone does 
not denote globalisation’s triumphs.  
 
What Corpus Ong (2009: 461) refers to, as the “penultimate expression of 
cosmopolitan identity”, is Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism. While there are various forms of 
cosmopolitan action, it is Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism that this research also considers the 
ideal type of cosmopolitan expression. It is premised on appropriately communicating 
the predicament of the ‘other’ in a manner that fosters compassion, and advocates for 
what Silverstone (2002) refers to as “proper distance” between the viewer and the ‘other’. 
Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism recognises the asymmetrical power distributions inherent in 
media coverage and humanitarian action(s) and aims to eliminate these through accurate 
depictions of distant others (Corpus Ong, 2009). Through Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism’s 
ability to recognise difference it is possible to see how it might stimulate solidary action. 
Whether the adoption of Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism or similar solidary efforts, is 
achievable, especially in the realm of humanitarian communication, remains debated in 
academia. 
 
 Cosmopolitanism is often criticised as too idealistic and optimistic (Brown, 
2009). The claim that humans will act to defend or protect their fellow man purely due to 
a moral obligation seems more fantastical than realistic (Chouliaraki, 2008). Chouliaraki 
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(2008) stresses, “the possibility of cosmopolitanism lies in the impossibility of 
representing the condition of distant suffering as suffering proper” (382). Publics are 
routinely bombarded with images of distant suffering, and this overburdening of misery 
does not always translate into cosmopolitan behaviour. The spectacle of suffering can, in 
fact, become unimportant, as “each piece of news on suffering is yet another story that 
reaches our screen, only to disappear into oblivion as soon as we zap to another 
channel” (Chouliaraki, 2008: 373). Such an occurrence, hailed as compassion fatigue, leaves 
audiences ambivalent to the suffering of distant others, and most move on (Linklater, 
2007). Chouliaraki (2006) discusses the role of the type of news one views has in shaping 
their moral identity and response. What she terms “adventure news” and “ecstatic news” 
see the viewer engage a communitarian solidary response, as subjects are displayed in a 
manner that positions viewers to pity them. However, “emergency news” holds the 
potential for better representation of the other, enabling cosmopolitan bonds to form 
(Chouliaraki, 2006: 196). The most common forms of news are the ecstatic and 
adventure types; and due to their prominence, the likelihood of cosmopolitan 
engagement is diminished. Unfortunately, when suffering is represented so commonly 
there is no chance for identification, and spectators render the suffering unimportant.  
 
 Cosmopolitanism incorporates a near perfect view of humanity. The belief that 
humans can support one another, without expectation of reciprocity, simply due to 
moral bonds and obligations, conjures up an incredible mental image (Derpmann, 2009: 
307). However, presently this is all cosmopolitanism can claim to be: an idealistic vision 
for humanity. Without representing suffering adequately, in a manner that reminds 
spectators of the inherent humanity of the vulnerable other, the obligation to ease their 
suffering lies dormant. As such, the utopian vision of a single, global community 
premised on shared humanity is yet to be realised (Held, 2010: 5).  




Otherness / The Politics of Pity 
 In representing the suffering of vulnerable others, the goal must not solely be an 
attempt for the audience to identify with the sufferer. Instead, humanitarian 
communication should intend to give justice to the moral claim of suffering (Chouliaraki, 
2010: 107). However humanitarian communication is often built on a foundation of pity, 
where the so-called victim is cast as an “object of contemplation” (Chouliaraki, 2010: 
110) for the spectator. Through such representation, the Politics of Pity essentially 
disempowers the sufferer by appropriating them within western discourses. As a result, 
the distance between victim and spectator is exacerbated, and tropes of colonialism and 
imperialism emerge (Littler, 2008; Chouliaraki, 2010: 110, 113).  
 
There is difficulty involved with recognising unfamiliar others as distant others 
with humanity (Chouliaraki & Orgad, 2011: 341). Chouliaraki and Orgad (2011) highlight 
the importance of recognising the “irreparable distance between self and other” (342) 
that hinders the formation of moral bonds. Silverstone (2002) proposes a scheme of 
“proper distance”, a striking of a balance between separateness and connection with 
distant others. Through proper distance one is enabled to act ethically and morally, but 
the basis of these actions is respect. Even if so-called ‘proper distance’ is achieved, there 
lies impossibility in being able to imagine or represent the other in their terms 
(Chouliaraki & Orgad, 2011). Even in finding a way to mend these representations, 
humanitarian communication grounded in a Politics of Pity, where it is reliant upon on 
the cultural proximity of common humanity (Chouliaraki & Orgad, 2011), would still 
represent suffering in a manner that sees it become the “white man’s burden” 
(Chouliaraki, 2012: 4). This is due to how suffering is showcased through “heartbreaking 
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spectacles of human suffering”, where western audiences are invited to alleviate the 
depicted misery of the ‘other’ (Chouliaraki, 2012: 2). Littler (2008) refers to this as the “I 
feel your pain” (n.p) paradox and believes it serves only to reinforce unequal power 
dynamics. While Orgad (2011) claims such representations are a result of “the ritualistic 
orientation of the news” which plays a “fundamental role [in] creating and nourishing 
distance” (404; emphasis in original). Therefore when news represents suffering through 
the Politics of Pity, there is little hope of encouraging common humanity (Silverstone, 
2005; Orgad, 2011). Instead, such representation serves to reflect and reproduce 
inequality, and emphasise difference (Chouliaraki, 2010: 109; Silverstone, 2007). The 
suffering other becomes an object of judgement (Chouliaraki, 2011: 364), with the 
spectator invited to decide whether their plight is worthy of recognition (Sontag, 2003: 
109). 
 
 When solidarity is represented through the lens of pity, it becomes difficult for 
audiences to find reasons to ignite their empathetic responses (Chouliaraki & Orgad, 
2011: 342). Pity takes a lot of energy, it is not rewarding, and nor is it enjoyable. This 
emotion has limited use, both to the sufferer and to the audience because it relies on a 
hierarchy of the grievability of life, and constrains possible action to a mere charitable 
response, serving to inhibit responses premised on the preferable politics of justice 
(Fenton, 2008). While the vulnerable other has no recourse to combat the Politics of 
Pity, the audience typically responds by no longer being moved by such depictions of 
suffering (Chouliaraki, 2012). They develop compassion fatigue, meaning humanitarian 
communication grounded in pity, fails to ignite their conscience (Sontag, 2003; 
Chouliaraki, 2011). When there is no moral outrage, there can be no moral response. 
Through the Politics of Pity, audiences are confronted with imagery designed to conjure 
up sympathy, and that is typically their first response, but when they are continually 
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exposed to depictions of marginalisation, the imagery becomes less shocking (Moeller, 
1999; Chouliaraki, 2008: 373). This is compassion fatigue, or what Moeller (1999: 2) 
terms “I’ve seen this before” syndrome, in action. While spectators may have previously 
contributed and felt subsequent relief after fulfilling their perceived humanitarian 
obligation (Calhoun, 2008: 78) when the images keep coming in a steady stream, they 
begin to feel helpless (Chouliaraki, 2010: 108). The audience assumes their action was not 
valuable, and in response to their helplessness, they move on.  
 
Ironic Solidarity 
Chouliaraki (2013a: 20) believes humanitarian communication is shifting towards 
a paradigm of solidarity as irony. She considers this development to be a direct reaction 
to the Politics of Pity. Ironic Solidarity is anchored on the spectacle of others like us, 
making the suffering of others more interesting through an invitation for self-reflection 
(Chouliaraki, 2013a: 20).  
 
Humanitarian communication’s movement from pity, towards irony, casts the 
typically western onlooker as a specific kind of public actor: an ironic spectator of 
vulnerable others (Chouliaraki, 2013a). According to Chouliaraki (2011), ironic spectators 
no longer perceive suffering and vulnerability as a “politics of injustice” (364), but 
instead as a “politics of the self” (364). Ironic spectators have the power to alleviate 
suffering, but act only if the action will benefit them (Fenton, 2008: 51). Such behaviour 
mimics slacktivism’s ‘feel-good’ feeling (Skoric, 2012; Kristofferson et al., 2014). 
Hallmarks of the Politics of Pity remain within Ironic Solidarity, as vulnerable others are 
still represented as “annihilated figures who have no voice of their own” (Chouliaraki, 
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2011: 372); thus enforcing and maintaining the unequal relationship between the west 
and the global south.  
 
Within Ironic Solidarity, the pure intentions of solidary action are ignored. When 
solidarity is presented as optional, and vulnerable others are stripped of their humanity, 
humanitarian communication is no longer about “habituating western publics into 
dispositions of care and responsibility to the world beyond our own” (Chouliaraki, 2011: 
371). Ironic Solidarity is a movement away from the challenges of compassion fatigue. It 
replaces the “ethos of conviction” with a “closer-to-life altruism” of the everyday 
(Chouliaraki, 2011: 369); in what Eagleton (2009) claims to be “the banality of goodness” 
(273). Two properties are said to define this banal morality of Ironic Solidarity: self-
distance and self-empowerment (Chouliaraki, 2011; Eagleton, 2009). Self-distance 
involves solidary action being enacted publically, and questions why one should act on 
suffering privately. Through self-empowerment, the individual taking action realises their 
humanity, while the “humanity of sufferer [remains] outside the remit of [their] 
empathetic imagination” (Chouliaraki, 2011: 369). This mode of solidarity has been 
termed ironic because of the way it perpetuates the injustices it aimed to eliminate. Ironic 
Solidarity fails to foster cosmopolitanism, as instead of acting without expectation of 
reciprocation, that is, acting without benefit to the self, the motivation for action within 
Ironic Solidarity is not for the other, but for the self (Fenton, 2008; Chouliaraki, 2013a). 
Humanitarian communication enacting Ironic Solidarity directs audiences towards 
engagement with vulnerable others, through a focus on the way humanitarian action can 
stimulate the humanity of the self. As a result, vulnerable others become not fellow 
humans in unjust predicaments, but vehicles for the self-empowerment of audiences 
(Chouliaraki, 2011). Vulnerable others may no longer be subject to the unethical gaze of 
the Politics of Pity. However, their struggle is still not being engaged with appropriately. 




The paradigmatic shift within humanitarian communication, from pity to post-
humanitarian irony, occurred not simply due to compassion fatigue and other limitations 
within the Politics of Pity, but also due to what audiences demand from all forms of 
communication today: self-expression (Chouliaraki, 2013a: 16). With the advent of digital 
technologies, media users now have the infrastructure to become producers of public 
communication, not merely consumers (Chouliaraki, 2013a). The strong desire of 
audiences to produce media content, to shape conversations in online spaces, and to 
promote their preferred identity online has in part led to the arrival of Ironic Solidarity 
within humanitarian communication. The technologisation of solidarity means 
supporting vulnerable others is now as easy as “tweeting personal emotion […] clicking 
on the donation link […] or clicking ‘like’ on a Facebook wall” (Chouliaraki, 2013a: 16). 
Chouliaraki (2013a) claims the way audiences engage with new media has brought about 
never before seen forms of public self-presentation; she brings our attention to 
dramaturgical consciousness, that is “the consciousness of our capacity to act ourselves out in 
front of unknown others” (16). Dramaturgical consciousness posits that the whole world 
might be a stage; as such, the persona that audiences project through new media 
becomes vital. Through Ironic Solidarity audiences not only believe they are acting 
appropriately, but they are doing this publically (Chouliaraki, 2013a). In keeping with 
Skoric’s (2012) aforementioned curation of idealised selves. As such, the online 
community these audiences interact with becomes aware of their inherent ‘goodness’ and 
humanity. As with other forms of humanitarian communication that do little to benefit 
the sufferer, Ironic Solidarity does not come at a sacrifice to the audience. Audiences 
may share a link, or retweet a statement of support, and feel fulfilled; their humanity has 
been acknowledged, not only by themselves but also by countless others (Sontag, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the vulnerable others’ plight remains tended to through a limited politics of 
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fleeting practices, whereby the spectator’s “grant emotions”, and the foundation of 
justice claims, are dispensed with.  
 
Solidarity in Online Spaces 
 Digital media has connected the world in a manner it has never been before. 
With opportunities for global interaction now so easy, the possibilities for solidarity on a 
grand scale seem almost infinite. With little need for resources or bureaucracy, Internet-
based movements appear limitless, and while many embrace their arrival (Melucci, 1996), 
Tarrow (1998 cited in Fenton, 2007: 236) warns of the dangers associated with 
constructing global solidarity online.  
 
 Tarrow’s (1996 cited in Fenton, 2007: 236) concern stems from the speed with 
which audiences can engage with OSMs. With so many issues being presented online, it 
can become difficult to forge long-standing commitment(s). Instead, audiences can jump 
on any bandwagon and shift between issues, losing interest when an issue is no longer 
prominent. There is no doubt that OSMs can empower those who participate in them, 
through encouraging the formation of communities and developing a new public sphere 
grounded in alternative media (Bennett, 2003: 20, 35). Melucci (1996) claims solidarity 
expressed through new communication technologies can transcend boundaries and 
promote political consciousness. The Black Lives Matter campaign serves as a great 
example of a sustained campaign facilitated by social media. This racially driven 
movement gathered support on social media, through the use of the hashtag 
#BlackLivesMatter. The campaign drew attention to racial divisions in the U.S., sparked 
mass protests, and garnered global support (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). However, heightened 
levels of support and the empowerment of participants should not be the main priority 
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when it comes to achieving tangible solidarity (Bennett, 2003). Through focusing on the 
benefit to the audience, and enabling them to move on to the next hip crisis as they 
please, the solidarity of OSMs is decidedly ironic (Fenton, 2008; Chouliaraki, 2013a).  
  
Despite hopes that the formation of solidarity online could achieve real change 
on a global scale (Melucci, 1996; Bennett, 2003), the same issues associated with 
solidarity on smaller scales remain. Again, the opportunity for difference in the lives of 
sufferers is not met, and the differences between audience and other are exacerbated. 
Fenton (2008: 52) reminds us, solidarity is about engaging beyond the click of a mouse. 
With OSMs struggling to facilitate adequate, meaningful engagement, their very purpose 
becomes questionable.  
 
Conclusion 
 The forms of solidarity existing within humanitarian communication presently, 
such as Ironic Solidarity, and solidarity marked by a Politics of Pity, do little to ease the 
suffering of the vulnerable. These are modes of solidarity not built upon a bond of 
mutual commitment (Chouliaraki, 2008), but instead, are approaches that cement the 
audience as a saviour of sorts. Achieved through placing the audience’s humanity at the 
forefront, therefore neglecting the already marginalised and enforcing difference. With 
such conceptions of solidarity at the core of contemporary humanitarian communication, 
there is little opportunity for the adoption of cosmopolitan sensibilities (Linklater, 2007). 
Negative forms of solidarity occur when suffering is represented improperly, meaning 
the chance to engage with others distant from our community is inaccessible. At present, 
engaging with humanitarian appeals has become more about showcasing an ideal form of 
oneself and imitating, rather than enacting, humanity (Chouliaraki & Orgad, 2011). Both 
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solidarity and cosmopolitanism describe ideals of human thought and action; they focus 
on the ways one should care, and demonstrate moral responsibility for the rights and 
welfare of fellow human beings (Derpmann, 2009). Only through representing suffering 
properly will appropriate solidarity and cosmopolitanism be achieved.  






Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDA will be implemented as the primary method of analysis through which to 
address the research aims of this thesis. CDA seeks to reveal how language is used to 
create meaning, exercise power, and accomplish other kinds of communicative aims 
(Widdowson, 1998; Hansen & Machin, 2013). The mode of CDA drawn from is 
primarily influenced by the works of Fairclough (1992; 1995; 2003; 2006). 
 
CDA takes a critical stance towards language and society (Hansen & Machin, 
2013: 116), positing that there are always ulterior motives behind text choices, and 
through revealing these, one might influence social change (Hansen & Machin, 2013). 
CDA refers to these motives as discourses. Fairclough (2003) explains discourses are 
ways of representing aspects of the world, such as “the processes, relations, and 
structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so 
forth, and the social world” (124). Discourse is something produced, circulated, 
distributed, and consumed in society. Such a discussion is incomplete without reference 
to the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a feature 
(Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000).  
 
Hegemony refers to the power achieved through the unequal construction of 
alliances. Agnew (2005) defines hegemony as the “enrolment of others in the exercise of 
 
 60 
your power by convincing, cajoling, and coercing them that they should want what you 
want” (1-2). Hegemony is useful in describing the inequalities that exist between the west 
and the global south. These inequalities can be attributed to hegemony’s role in “binding 
together people, objects, and institutions around cultural norms and standards that 
emanate over time and space from seats of power occupied by authoritative actors” 
(Agnew, 2005: 2). Gramsci (1971) further expands on hegemony, claiming it appears as 
the “common sense” that guides one’s mundane understanding of the world and can 
lead to a “moral and political passivity” (333).  In this theory of hegemony, “power can 
never be maintained by force or repression alone”, instead it is dependent upon coercion 
and consensus (Montesano Montessori, 2011: 171; Gramsci, 1992). The Gramscian view 
of hegemony sees it as operating primarily through language; and facilitated by 
prominent ideologies that originate in culture and through the will of the people 
(Montesano Montessori, 2011). This view involves the relocation of power from the 
traditional state institutions, to cultural industries such as education, the media, religious 
organisations, and arts (Glapka, 2010: 54; Gramsci, 1992: 91). Therefore, hegemony must 
be a central consideration within CDA, as the “social action of everyday life produces 
hegemonic effects” (Stoddart, 2007: 201).  
 
The importance of power and hegemony within discourse is echoed by van Dijk 
(1993) and Titscher et al. (2000: 151; cited in Richardson, 2007: 29), who argue that in 
undertaking CDA, power should be a fundamental consideration, since power and 
ideologies affect each of the contextual levels of production, consumption, and 
understandings of discourse. CDA analyses discourses in relation to socio-historical 
context, and co-text; the “linguistic environment that surrounds a concrete text location” 
(Montesano Montessori, 2011: 174). Making it a method of textual analysis concerned 
with all forms of social inequality and injustice (Lazar, 2005: 2). As such, CDA can 
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provide insight into how powerful, or otherwise dominant, groups within society 
determine meaning, and the impact(s) this might yield.  
 
Richardson (2007) claims critical discourse analysts “offer interpretations of the 
meanings of texts” (15; emphasis in original); text does not adhere to one static 
understanding, but rather its meaning is constructed through the interactions between 
producer, text, and consumer. As such, when language is examined via CDA these 
meanings are revealed. Such examination consists of relating texts to their conditions of 
production and consumption (Widdowson, 1998: 142). Regarding this study, one can 
expect this to be conducted by examining who has said what, as well as scrutinising the 
wider language choices utilised to create this meaning. As discussed, CDA’s focus 
involves identifying and interpreting dynamics of power. As such, van Dijk (1993) 
contends the most obvious discourse structures to be made up of “negative evaluations 
of them, or positive ones of us” (264; emphasis in original). In van Dijk’s (1993) example, 
“them” refers to the disempowered, and “us” indicates the producers, or primary 
consumers, of said discourse structures. The “us” and “them” dichotomy provides an 
example of the presence of hegemonic practices within discourse structures. This 
example also supports claims MSM and social media texts can be analysed for hegemonic 
elements, through identifying any structures of opposition and deciphering what these 
represent (Abalo, 2012; Susanti, 2016).  
 
Essentially, hegemony within mediated texts is revealed through applying the 
methods of CDA. Indicating the theoretical premises of CDA align with Gramsci’s 
(1971; 1992) theory of hegemony (Glapka, 2010: 56). In applying this methodologically, 
one must scrutinise texts for their ideological underpinnings by studying argumentation; 
rhetorical figures; lexical style; storytelling elements; the structural emphasis of negative 
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action(s); and the selection and presentation of sources (van Dijk, 1993: 264; Glapka, 
2010: 56).  The thorough examination of such choices, as well as relating them back to 
the context(s) they were developed, can, in the context of this research, serve to reveal 
whether a text exhibits either a response of appropriate solidarity or self-interest. Is a text 
approaching the abduction through a gaze of shared humanity, or instead for self-serving 
reasons? For example, if a text within this research stated, “I feel bad for those 
kidnapped students. My heart is breaking”, one can recognise an emphasis placed on the 
self. Through the use of “I” and “my”, first person singular nominative pronouns, the 
text’s author becomes the main priority, despite the text appearing to be about the 
Chibok students. This portrayal of self-interest can be considered evidence of Ironic 
Solidarity, as it does little to alleviate the suffering of the kidnapped students, but casts 
the author in a positive light (Chouliaraki, 2013a). It is the lexical style, and the 
presentation of figures within this example, that draws one to this conclusion. Torfing 
(1999) states, cognitions and speech-acts “only become meaningful within a certain pre-
established discourse” (84), and, like text, discourse is made up of an ensemble of 
signifying sequences through which meaning is continuously renegotiated (85). It is 
through the study of societal texts that one can decipher their meanings. In the context 
of this research, one can observe how CDA’s ability to identify such hegemonic 
processes and ideological elements can be of benefit.  
 
Justification 
In embarking upon critical social research, Fairclough (2003) urges one keep in 
mind the overarching aim of such an endeavour, presenting this aim as providing a:  
better understanding of how societies work and produce both beneficial and detrimental 
effects, and of how the detrimental effects can be mitigated, if not eliminated (202-203) 
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Fairclough’s (2003) suggestion was considered in selecting a method of analysis. Also 
helpful was the work of Bouvier (2015), who presents discourse approaches as the 
greatest modes of analysis in conducting social media research (150). Like Fairclough 
(2003), Bouvier (2015) places the comprehension of the social world as the central 
motivation of such research. The myriad of questions raised within critical social 
research, as a result of social media engagement, demonstrate the need for further 
research. Bouvier (2015: 150) encourages research that uncovers the manner through 
which values are shared, as well as the linguistic tools they are shared through, while 
simultaneously engaging with wider issues of power. As such, Bouvier’s (2015) 
suggestion for those undertaking critical social research with a focus on social media, is 
to implement CDA. In considering the best manner to deepen one’s understanding of 
social responses, and the connotations of such responses, CDA was revealed as the 
logical selection.  
 
 In examining the research questions of this study, it is evident they are mostly 
premised on deciphering attitudes, and analysing the societal impact of these. However, 
Research Question 1, which seeks to decipher how the interaction between MSM and 
social media shaped #BringBackOurGirls, will benefit more from a quantitative analysis, 
rather than CDA. Except Research Question 1, each of the research questions within this 
study requires a method of textual analysis and interpretation. Research Question 2 aims 
to investigate the differences in attitudes across mediums; Research Question 3 seeks to 
understand #BringBackOurGirls’ global relevance; Research Question 4 addresses the 
motives for participation; and Research Question 5 examines the potential presence of 
modes of feminism within the movement, and the implications of that presence. This 




Seeking to understand the #BringBackOurGirls movement on a level beyond the 
hashtag, requires analysis of the relevant texts, what they project, and the implications of 
said projections. The best way to determine the attitudes or sentiments within texts is to 
draw out the discourses (Fairclough, 2003). In examining what cemented 
#BringBackOurGirls as an event of global significance, identifying and interpreting the 
underlying ideologies of the event is crucial. This study posits that engagement in OSMs 
is premised on ideals of either solidarity or self-interest; in determining which ideals 
underpinned #BringBackOurGirls, drawing out the discourses projected through 
engagement is of crucial importance. #BringBackOurGirls was heralded as an example 
of hashtag feminism, and an OFM. However, as noted in Chapter Two, western first 
world feminist ideals are often an improper fit for third world women. Examining the 
feminist perspectives, or lack thereof, within this movement, and the implications for 
those at the centre of this event, cannot occur without discourse analysis. Determining 
the manner in which people have engaged with an event, is reliant upon recognising the 
discourses they have projected through their engagement. Finally, deciphering the 
implications of feminist attitudes hinges upon properly understanding the attitudes, again 
through the discourses embedded within them. For these reasons, Research Questions 2 
through 5 will be addressed through the use of CDA. 
 
Hansen and Machin (2013) claim language is crucial to how we constitute the 
social world. The manner “we talk about the world influences the society we create, the 
knowledge we celebrate and despise, and the institutions we build” (113). As such, the 
salience of language cannot be underestimated. To understand social development, 
Fairclough (2003: 203) urges that text must be a central consideration. CDA is regarded 
as a great tool within textual analysis, as it provides a “multifunctional view of text” 
(Fairclough, 1995: 6). In considering the Chibok abduction and the accompanying 
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#BringBackOurGirls movement, one cannot overlook the fact that coverage was text-
based. From global media attention to an internationally trending hashtag, language was 
crucial in defining and maintaining this event. Therefore, researching the intricacies of 
the texts pertinent to this event is necessary. The use of CDA can be described as 
holding a magnifying glass to #BringBackOurGirls, through which the underlying 
ideologies and hegemonic structures can be made visible (Hansen & Machin, 2013: 119). 
CDA is a form of analysis that enables great transparency (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000), 
and when approaching an event of such magnitude, CDA presents itself as the premier 




 The content to be analysed through CDA was sourced from Twitter tweets and 
online newspaper articles. Twitter was selected as it was the primary medium through 
which #BringBackOurGirls gained momentum. Furthermore, as a renowned 
microblogging website, which has widespread popularity around the world; it is 
inherently valuable in this study, as it contains the worldviews of many people (Zimmer 
& Proferes, 2014). Lippizzi et al. (2016) explain, while tweets may lack the richness and 
complexity of more structured messages, such as newspaper articles, the social 
commentary and diversity they provide makes them an invaluable research tool.  As 
evidenced by the way Twitter has emerged as a powerful channel for measuring public 
behaviour and attitudes (Zimmer & Proferes, 2014: 250). Zimmer and Proferes (2014) 
claim academics have recognised Twitter’s value as a research tool, and Twitter data is 
now routinely utilised “to gain a better understanding of its users, uses, and impacts on 
society and culture from a variety of perspectives” (251). In contrast, newspaper articles 
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are a more traditional and mainstream form of media and are typically perceived as more 
credible news sources than social media. However, newspapers are often heralded as 
representing the elite voices of society, due to ownership and vested political interests. 
Therefore, performing a tandem analysis of two distinct, yet crucially important, media 
forms can provide great insight into this event. Through analysing these sources, the 
dominant discourses will be revealed, allowing determinations to be made regarding the 
sentiments displayed on social media and in MSM. Comparing these media forms is a key 
element of Research Question 2. The comparison of social media and MSM may provide 
insight into whether the one influenced the other, regarding levels of coverage or the 
attitudes of coverage. 
 
Key Dates 
 Research for this thesis began in early 2016, just weeks before the second 
anniversary of the Chibok abduction. The timeframe for this research begins with the 
date of abduction on 15 April 2014, and ends at the second anniversary on 15 April 
2016. To investigate how coverage of, and sentiment related to, the incident developed 
over time, four time periods during these two years were selected, with each period 
lasting five days. All of the articles, by three selected newspapers, published during these 
four time periods, and a randomly selected sample of 400 tweets, 100 per period, posted 
within the dates, were analysed. The sample was a purposive one; as the periods selected 
each represent periods of high engagement with the issue. The four dates are as follows: 
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15 – 20 APRIL 2014 
 Starting from the date the Chibok abduction occurred, this period was selected as 
it provides valuable insight into mainstream and online coverage of the incident before the 
creation of #BringBackOurGirls. 
 
04 – 09 MAY 2014 
 This period marks the creation of #BringBackOurGirls. The period was a time 
of immense coverage in every media sphere. Analysis of this period may provide an 
understanding of the initial hopes for the hashtag and public reactions to it. Research 
suggests people engage with hashtags most significantly, regarding participant numbers, 
immediately following their inception (Bruns & Burgess, 2011). If #BringBackOurGirls 
adheres to this trend, this period should represent the point of peak coverage, both on 
Twitter and in MSM.  
 
10 – 15 APRIL 2015 
 Representing the first anniversary of the abduction, analysis of articles and tweets 
from this period may convey perceptions regarding the still-missing students.  
 
10 – 15 APRIL 2016 
 This period marks the second anniversary of the Chibok abduction. Exploring 
sentiment and coverage at this point is perhaps the best indication of how the story of 
the abduction and accompanying hashtag campaign have changed, or perhaps remained 




Selection Criteria & Collection Method 
Twitter 
Collecting retrospective Twitter data is an arduous task given the large amount of 
data one has to trawl through. Additional complications arise due to Twitter’s policy on 
data retrieval, which imposes barriers to collecting past data using public freeware (Cho 
& Shin, 2014: 70). In dealing with a hashtag used so often, as is the case with 
#BringBackOurGirls, it is nearly impossible to gather the data necessary to perform a 
CDA, especially when working with specific dates. Recruiting a Twitter analytics 
company seemed the logical solution; however, this can be highly expensive. Fortunately, 
the Twitter data required for this study was kindly gifted by a fellow academic, who is 
also researching #BringBackOurGirls. They employed the Twitter analytics company, 
Crimson Hexagon, to gather a sample of tweets that met the criteria required for this 
research.  
 
Crimson Hexagon gathers tweets using an Application Program Interface and 
Python scripts, designed to locate tweets using certain hashtags (Lippizzi et al., 2016: 783; 
Kwon et al., 2016: 206). The tweets do not simply contain the content of the tweet, but a 
significant amount of metadata including a user information, timestamp, location, and 
language (Lippizzi et al., 2016: 786). Crimson Hexagon further searches through this 
information to locate the tweets matching additionally requested criteria, before 
providing a sample of the tweets, or all, depending on research needs. 
 
 When researching a hashtag, the research criteria are simplified into the keywords 
of said hashtag. As the purpose of this study involves #BringBackOurGirls, for the three 
selected periods that came after the creation of the hashtag, the hashtag itself was an 
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adequate search tool. However, the one selected period occurring before the creation of 
#BringBackOurGirls posed a problem. It was decided to source tweets from this period 
simply using #Chibok, as tweets throughout this period, using this hashtag, would more 
than likely reference the abduction. The selection criteria requested from Crimson 
Hexagon was simply that the tweets be in English language. Other criteria were not 
imposed, as the CDA of the tweets intended to identify overarching global discourse(s), 
not wholly specific sentiment. 
 
 The data from Crimson Hexagon provided a random sample of 400 total tweets; 
100 tweets from each of the predetermined key periods of the study. These tweets, in 
their entirety, were then analysed via CDA. Tweets were not limited to exhibiting one 




 Three prominent online newspapers were selected to source articles from. It was 
theorised that through this ‘triangulation of sources’ the research would be provided with 
a broad selection of MSM voices. In selecting these outlets, diversity and prominence 
was aimed for. This criterion led to the selection of the online editions of the United 
States’ The New York Times (TNYT), the United Kingdom’s The Guardian (TG), and 
Qatar’s Al Jazeera (AJ).  
 
 TNYT was selected as it is heralded as “the US national newspaper of record” 
(Roy, 2012: 558). Founded in 1851, TNYT is regarded as pivotal in shaping political 
discussion and considered to provide substantive reporting both nationally and 
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internationally (Usher, 2014). TNYT’s large readership, consisting of over 2 million daily 
readers both in the United States and abroad (The New York Times Company, 2015), 
warranted its selection for this study.  
 
 TG was selected due to the large audience it commands both at home and 
abroad. Having four times been named Newspaper of the Year at the British Press 
Awards, TG’s critical acclaim was also a contributing factor (Rawlinson, 2014). The 
newspaper prides itself on upholding core journalistic values, claiming “newspapers have 
a moral as well as a material existence” (Singer & Ashman, 2009: 4). TG’s reputation as 
“one of the UK’s most influential newspapers” (Singer & Ashman, 2009: 4) further 
justified its inclusion in this study.  
 
 AJ, the predominantly Arabic-language news conglomerate, was selected as the 
final newspaper in this study. Since its inception nearly 20 years ago AJ has “pledged to 
present all viewpoints” (Miles, 2006: 20). The newspaper is considered to be a model of 
professionalism and objectivity in the Middle East (Miles, 2006). With scholars praising 
AJ for its encouragement of, and commitment to, free speech in the Middle East. With a 
large and ever-growing readership, making it the most visited website in the Arab world 
(Al Jazeera, 2012), AJ’s English-language online newspaper merited inclusion.  
 
 Articles selected for analysis from these news outlets were sourced via the online 
editions of each newspaper. The term ‘article’ is utilised in this study to represent all that 
was published by an outlet in their coverage of the Chibok abduction and 
#BringBackOurGirls. As such, this research consists not only of news articles, but also 
feature articles, editorials, columns, and opinion pieces. Such a breadth of inclusion is 
justified as this study is attempting to develop a comprehensive overview of how MSM 
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presented this event, meaning all manner of coverage is relevant. Articles within the 
study’s set timeframe, and adhering to the selection criteria of certain key words, were 
chosen. Articles had to focus on explicitly, and not simply reference, the Chibok 
abduction to meet the criteria for inclusion. As such, key words and phrases seen as 
representative of the abduction were used as search terms. These included: Chibok; 
Nigeria Abduction; Nigeria Schoolgirl; Schoolgirl Abduction; Boko Haram; Bring Back 
Our Girls; and #BringBackOurGirls.  
 
 Articles from all three newspapers that met the criteria were catalogued by date, 
to provide data regarding the rate of coverage over the set two-year timeframe. Articles 
published during the four key periods of the two-year timeframe were then compiled, 
before being examined through CDA. A total of 79 articles matched these criteria: 22 
were published by TNYT, 35 by TG, and 22 by AJ. Regarding a unit of analysis, that is, 
how much will be measured; the entire article was examined. As with the CDA of 
Twitter tweets, an article was not expected to exhibit just one discourse, although this 
result was acceptable, as a variety of discourses may be present within a text.  
 
This study’s primary concern involved examining the differences or similarities of 
discourse and rates of coverage between MSM and social media. Therefore, a contrasting 
of different outlets’ coverage of this event was not performed. The selection of three, 
distinct online newspapers served to provide an amalgamation of MSM voices for this 
study. As such, the discourses within the articles and editorials of TNYT, TG, and AJ 





 In performing CDA, one is scanning texts for traces of ideologically contentious 
elements, which might otherwise escape notice (Widdowson, 1998: 144). Such 
ideologically contentious elements may be the in the form of hegemonic practices, such 
as the support or projection of one worldview while opposing or ignoring others 
(Glapka, 2010). Widdowson (1998) claims through CDA one is looking for “the subtlety 
of covert significance, […] and this might be found lurking in the slightest linguistic 
nuance” (144). This study’s CDA begins with the most basic examination of the selected 
texts – simply reading them. As the analyser first reads a tweet or article, they begin to 
form an idea of the frames that text projects. Understanding these frames further and 
identifying concrete evidence of their presence, a process that sees them develop from 
basic frames to distinct discourses, is achieved through CDA. The initial examination 
provides valuable direction to an analyser, but essentially skims the surface of a text’s 
meaning(s). CDA provides the tools to look beyond the surface of text, and explore the 
obscured meanings; thus, providing conclusive findings. The CDA approach of this 
research was influenced by Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) three-dimensional framework 
for conceiving of and analysing discourse.  
 
The first dimension studies the patterns and choices of vocabulary. It begins with 
what Fairclough (2003) terms discourse-as-text, the descriptive stage of CDA concerned 
with the formal properties of text. Through looking closely at language and grammar, 
one can reveal how such processes shape our understandings of events and persons 
(Hansen & Machin, 2013: 116). Richardson (2007) stresses the analysis of particular 
words should be the first stage of any discourse analysis, as it is the words that convey 
“the imprint of society and of value judgements” (47). As discussed in Chapter Two, 
Maxfield (2015) considers the very language within #BringBackOurGirls to be 
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representative of an unequal power structure, due to inherent ownership and 
authoritative elements. Words such as “girls” in reference to the Chibok students, and 
further descriptive tendencies that serve to impose such a hegemonic relationship, such 
as “extremist”, “helpless”, “corrupt”, and “duty”, would be of particular interest in this 
study’s CDA. These words depict an unequal relationship between the west and Nigeria 
in the global south. As such, their presence would be indicative of an ongoing hegemonic 
relationship, and evidence of narratives enforcing African ineptness and western 
obligation. This is in keeping with Fairclough’s (2003) first dimension of CDA that aims 
to recognise certain linguistic features prominent in text passages, picking up on 
instances of metaphor, modality, schemata, structure, and more (448). For example, the 
presence of metaphoric language such as “floundering in their response”, would indicate 
a disdain for the responders and signify their perceived ineptness. “Floundering”, 
meaning, of course, to falter or stumble, but also serves to stir up imagery of a wet fish 
of dry land. In this example, the response by those tasked with the students’ rescue is 
critiqued. Those carrying out this mission were primarily Nigerian government security 
forces; therefore, this language is indicative of an unequal power relationship. As it 
laments the actions of those in the global south from a western perspective. Thus, if a 
text analysed for this research was found to exhibit similar language features, one could 
deem the text to be ideologically contentious through its harmful representation(s).  
 
The second dimension of Fairclough’s (2003) framework is discourse-as-discursive 
practice, whereby the analyst studies the linguistic objects of the text and ascertains the 
discourse(s) they intend to distribute (448). The second dimension seeks to interpret 
what the author intended to convey through the text. Regarding this thesis, the presence 
of attitudes counteractive to the adoption of appropriate solidary responses, or the 
advocating of western first world feminism, would be of particular interest. For example, 
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the presence of a western first world feminism ideology, within texts discussing 
#BringBackOurGirls, might be identified through content acknowledging the patriarchy 
as an oppressive tool, while simultaneously neglecting to consider the role of colonialism 
in contributing to instability within the African region. This may manifest through the 
attribution of the lack of progress, in locating the students, solely to Nigerian 
government inaction, without knowledge of the political climate within Nigeria. Or, 
through the directing of hatred towards Boko Haram, without consideration of the 
factors that have led to the rise of religious extremism in the region. Elements such as 
these would demonstrate western first world feminist ideals, as they would serve to cast 
the abduction solely as a result of patriarchy. Essentially, discourse-as-discursive practice is 
hinged upon reading the text, beyond the words, identifying the message(s) within, and 
dismantling those messages in such a way that the intended purpose of the text, the 
embedded ideology, is revealed. 
 
The third and final dimension is discourse-as-social-practice which involves 
considering “the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a 
feature” (Fairclough, 2003: 449). This dimension requires the analyst to provide 
explanations for and make sense of, the implications the text may render; essentially, 
what may the embedded discourse achieve in society? In referring to the previous 
example, concerning western first world feminism, the presence of this ideology, and not 
the arguably more appropriate third world feminism, could have damaging 
consequences. #BringBackOurGirls has been heralded as a feminist movement, and it is 
born out of Africa, where, as discussed in Chapter Two, third world feminism is the 
most appropriate representation of African feminist ideals. The overwhelming presence 
of a western first world feminist discourse could undermine the aims and objectives of a 
third world feminist movement. Potentially disabling the movement from achieving the 
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change it so desires. In recognising the presence of particular discourses through CDA, 
this third dimension of Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) framework urges the analyst to 
consider the societal ramifications of their presence.  
 
Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) three-dimensional framework is the most 
appropriate approach for this study, as it involves numerous points of analysis. It 
encourages the analyst first to uncover various patterns, then to decipher their meaning, 
and finally, to explain their relevance. When conducting CDA on such a large amount of 
different texts, from tweets with limited characters to extensive newspaper articles, a 
coherent analytical framework is invaluable. Significance cannot be read straight off texts; 
texts must instead be related to their historical contexts and social relations (Widdowson, 
1998); this is why CDA seeks to uncover the use, as well the exploitation, of language. 
However, it is through Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) framework, that one is provided 
with the means of conducting CDA comprehensively.  
 
Additional Data Collection 
 The incorporation of quantitative data is necessary to bolster the CDA findings 
of this study. In addition to a qualitative analysis, this research examines the rates of 
coverage from selected MSM outlets and the quantitative trajectory of 
#BringBackOurGirls online. Research Question 1 will be addressed through these 
quantitative findings. 
 
The newspapers utilised in this research (TNYT; TG; AJ) and their coverage, 
concerning Boko Haram and Nigeria, during the six months before the abduction was 
reviewed and collated. This data provides averages concerning typical coverage patterns 
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for each outlet and enables comparison. The same process was then attributed to articles 
by said outlets, which fall within the aforementioned two-year period, which serves as the 
timeframe for this research. Articles that made explicit reference to Boko Haram; 
terrorism in Nigeria; Nigerian politics; Nigerian religious tension; and education in 
Nigeria, met the criteria for inclusion. This data might provide insights concerning the 
rise and fall of coverage surrounding the Chibok abduction amongst the selected MSM 
outlets. Furthermore, it enables comparison, concerning levels of coverage, between the 
newspapers.  
 
 The global trend of #BringBackOurGirls was also measured. While this study is 
primarily concerned with the hashtag as it behaved on Twitter, Twitter data related to the 
hashtag was unable to be used. This inability was due in part to financial constraints, as 
well as the discussed constraints on data collection imposed by Twitter (Cho & Shin, 
2014). However, Google Trend data provided an adequate substitute. Google Trends 
offers free, globally accessible information relating to Google searches worldwide, either 
in real-time or retrospectively (Blakeman, 2013). Google’s extraordinary levels of Internet 
penetration make it the most used search engine globally (Blakeman, 2013). Therefore, 
the data provides an adequate substitute through which to measure the hashtag’s trend. 
Google Trends presents a search term’s interest over time and as such was used to 
demonstrate the peaks and pits of the #BringBackOurGirls movement. To address 
Research Question 1, the ability to track #BringBackOurGirls’ trajectory was invaluable.  
 
Conclusion 
 Bouvier (2015) stresses text is crucial to better understanding issues of power, 
social order, and value sharing. As such CDA is useful because it “seeks to reveal how 
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language is used and abused in the exercise of power” (Widdowson, 1998: 136), and 
relates texts to their conditions of production and consumption. The selection of CDA 
as the primary method of analysis appeared logical when considering what was to be 
sampled. CDA has been routinely used a method of drawing out the attitudes within 
MSM (Richardson, 2007), and, more recently, social media texts (Zimmer & Proferes, 
2014). This research is premised upon deciphering the sentiments within Twitter and 
online newspapers, two distinct, yet pervasive, media forms. Given the enormous role 
each plays in our current society, their significance cannot be underestimated. In the 
selection of MSM voices, diversity was aimed for, and this was achieved through 
choosing TNYT, TG, and AJ, newspapers representative of many perspectives. The 
decision to limit the sample to four distinct time periods was deliberate. Not only is such 
a sample size easier to manage, but it also allowed sentiment to be measured at different 
points of the event. Finally, by conducting CDA through Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) 
three-dimensional framework, this research will be bolstered by the provision of tools 






The following chapter presents the results of this research and the outcome of 
the CDA of newspaper articles and tweets. The trends in coverage will first be presented, 
followed by the CDA. The purpose of this chapter is to present the key results of this 
research; Chapter Five will tend to the interpretation of said results. 
 
Trends in Coverage 
 
 
Figure 1 - Comparison of coverage prior to abduction 
 
To appropriately measure a potential change in media coverage as a result of the 
Chibok abduction, it was necessary to look back at coverage before the incident. In this 
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case, the newspapers utilised in this research and their coverage, concerning Boko Haram 
and Nigeria, during the six months before the abduction, was collated.  
 
AJ was the outlet that most frequently covered matters that met this criterion, 
with an average of 4.8 articles per month (Figure 1). Meanwhile, TNYT and TG averaged 
2.16 and 2.5 articles per month, respectively. For the most part, these low averages 
demonstrate all outlets had little interest and considered Nigeria’s matters to be of minor 
importance. In an interesting aside, the month immediately before the abduction, March 
2014, saw a spike in coverage for all outlets. While this spike is minimal, when 
considering the total number of articles these newspapers produce each month, it 
remains notable. Thus, despite relatively low levels of coverage, in the six months before 
the abduction, each outlet was still covering matters related to Nigeria and Boko Haram. 
While representing perhaps a mere ‘blip’ on the news radar of these newspapers, Nigeria 
and Boko Haram were on the radar. 
 




The amount of abduction coverage, between chosen outlets, was examined over 
a two-year period (Figure 2). This period begins at the abduction in April 2014 and ends 
at the second anniversary in April 2016. The abduction occurred in April 2014, and 
coverage from each outlet for this month was minimal (Figure 2). TG produced ten 
articles about the abduction in April 2014, while TNYT published three, and AJ four. In 
contrast, May 2014 – the month after the abduction – saw a surge from all outlets in 
their coverage. TG led the coverage with 58 articles. TNYT published 47, and AJ 
produced 26 pieces. Coverage related to the abduction rose 670 percent in the month of 
May 2014 when compared to April 2014. 
 
In the following months, coverage dropped off, and rates of coverage between 
the newspapers increasingly equalised. A further spike in coverage occurred at the first 
anniversary mark in April 2015, before dropping off again. This scarcity of coverage 
continued until the second anniversary of the abduction; while this represents a period of 
greater coverage, it did not meet the heights of the previous year. April 2015 saw a total 
of 27 articles published, while April 2016 accrued a total of ten articles. Over the two-
year period, no month came close to rivalling the rate of coverage amassed in May 2014. 
The prolific MSM coverage of May 2014 is particularly notable when considering the 
abduction occurred the previous month. The fact the abduction garnered such immense 
coverage in May 2014 after initial nonchalance in April 2014, could indicate other factors 
influenced MSM’s coverage.  
 




Figure 3 - #BringBackOurGirls trend globally 
 
In examining the trajectory of #BringBackOurGirls globally, over the 
aforementioned two-year period, one notices stark similarities between MSM coverage of 
the abduction and online searches for #BringBackOurGirls (Figure 3). While Twitter 
data was unable to be used to map this trend from solely Twitter usage, Google Trends 
data provided a comparative substitute. Google Trends is based on Google searches and 
shows how often a search-term is entered, relative to the total search volume. Google 
Trends presents interest in #BringBackOurGirls as a search term over time and reveals 
that the hashtag was most searched for in May 2014. May 2014 represents the peak of 
searches and is assigned a value of 100. The assigned values represent the search interest 
relative to the highest point on the graph (Figure 3). Thus, with 100 as the peak set in 
May 2014, a search interest of 50 would indicate the search term was half as popular. 
Likewise, a score of zero would indicate the search term was less than one percent as 
popular as it was at the peak. Ergo, #BringBackOurGirls’ development from a search 
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interest of zero in April 2014 to a surge to the peak 100 in May 2014, followed by a rapid 
descent to the value of seven in June 2014, represents the rise and fall of this particular 
hashtag spectacularly. #BringBackOurGirls was met with a sudden flurry of activity at its 
creation in May 2014. However, immediately following this, interest diminished and 
searches waned. This descent into obscurity continued until April 2015, when the first 
anniversary occurred, and interest was briefly reignited. With a humble value of five 
attributed to this month, it is obvious the hashtag was not commanding the interest it did 
at its peak. A similar spike occurred on the second anniversary of the abduction; again, 
this revitalisation of activity was minor when compared to the peak in May 2014. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
As previously noted, four time periods were selected for CDA. The first period 
covers the initial abduction of the Chibok students in April 2014, the second follows the 
creation of #BringBackOurGirls in May 2014, while the third and fourth periods 
concern the first and second anniversaries of the abduction in April 2015 and 2016, 
respectively. Articles pertaining to these time periods from TNYT, TG, and AJ, were 
examined through CDA, with the results combined to form an overview of MSM 
discourse. Also, a selection of tweets featuring either #Chibok or #BringBackOurGirls 
during the same four periods were examined through CDA. As discussed, multiple 
discourses may be present in an article or tweet, the presence of one discourse does not 
elide another’s. Discourses are not mutually exclusive and can bear similarities; 
concerning how they are identified or the impact(s) they might have. The nature of 
discourse is such that the overarching themes and identifying features of discourse do 
not change as a result of the text a discourse is located within. 
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ABDUCTION: 10 – 20 APRIL 2014 
Mainstream Media: 
The MSM outlets together published a total of nine articles during the Abduction 
Period. TNYT published two, TG three, and AJ four. CDA of all nine articles revealed 
the presence of four discourses.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Article Discourses: Abduction Period 
 
‘Backwards’ Africa 
 The ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse was present in six articles during the Abduction 
Period, making it the most featured discourse of this period. The ‘Backwards’ Africa 
discourse was characterised by a reliance on tropes of the “dark continent” (Bassil, 2011); 
the representation of violence as commonplace in Africa; and expectations of 
incompetence in response to the abduction. Patterns of over lexicalisation, the use of 
many synonymous terms when describing an issue, an effect that points to an intense 
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preoccupation, or problem, with said issue on behalf of the author (Fairclough, 2003), 
indicate the presence of this discourse. The ‘Backwards’ Africa is also identified through 
the presence of hyperbolic speech and negative adjectives (Hansen & Machin, 2013: 
121). In an article in TG titled “Students Kidnapped” (2014), language such as “in a 
statement that gave no details”; “the military claims that they have cornered insurgents”; 
serve to signify African ineptness. The language features in these examples implore 
readers to make a value judgement about the subject(s) at the centre of the article, and 
position readers to regard the subject(s), in this case, Nigerians, as untrustworthy and 
incompetent. The article, “88 Nigeria schoolgirls abducted,” (2014) further enforces the 
‘Backwards’ Africa discourse, through demonstrating the unreliability of government 
officials. Immediately following a quote from the Nigerian defence ministry spokesman 
that claimed all by eight of the abducted students had been freed, TG stated, “He 
retracted that statement on Thursday” (“88 Nigeria schoolgirls abducted,” 2014). The 
article ends at this point, and it is this impression of Nigerian governmental forces 
readers are left with. The Nigerian defence ministry spokesman presented unverified 
information as truth but later retracted the information. Obviously, TG was aware of 
inaccuracies in the initial statement at the time of publication, yet, the statement was 
published anyway; accompanied by a retraction notice. This action demonstrates the 
‘Backwards’ Africa discourse, as it highlights the ineptness of a Nigerian in a position of 
power. TG article titled “Nigeria students’ fate uncertain” (2014) states similarly, “The 
attacks undermine government and military claims that security forces are containing the 
uprising”. When closing an article, one leaves their audience with a final view of the 
event, and as the examples above represent, this final impression is negative when 
finalising the text with the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse. This discourse emanates 
ideological tropes of colonialism and imperialism. It is through these tropes that Bassil 
(2011) considers the negative, untrue perception of Africa, as a dark continent of 
      
 
 85 
“barbarity, backwardness, idleness, and inferiority” (377), to stem from. In projecting this 
ideology, MSM articles of the Abduction Period serve to contribute to a narrative of 
violent attacks as ordinary within African society. Particularly through the inclusion of 
death, and sexual assault statistics, which are presented matter-of-factly despite their 
sensitive subject matter(s). This is exemplified in the article titled, “Students kidnapped” 
(2014), through the statement “More than 1,500 people have been killed this year, 
compared to an estimated 3,600 between 2010 and 2013”. Inserting statistics without 
context other than the country, in which these travesties have occurred, indicates this is 
not uncommon news. This signals to readers that Nigeria is somewhere violence and 
tragedy is to be expected and exemplifies the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse.  
  
Insignificance 
The Insignificance discourse was identified in four articles during the Abduction 
Period. The Insignificance discourse is indicative of an unequal power relationship, one 
that marks the Chibok abduction, and all those affected by it, as of marginal importance. 
This power dynamic draws attention to the hegemonic elements inherent within the 
Insignificance discourse (Agnew, 2005; Gramsci, 1971); hegemony was discussed in-
depth in Chapter Three. One of the first features that point to the presence of the 
Insignificance discourse is the composition of the articles that adhered to the discourse. 
These articles were written in ‘press release’ format, where the article is of minimal length 
and minimal content, with authorship not attributed to a journalist, but a news 
organisation. Issues perceived to be important are covered in articles of significant 
length, and with coverage specifically attributed to a journalist. Articles in ‘press release’ 
format often include vague statements, with few details and little evidence of 
independent investigation. Therefore, ‘press release’ articles signify the event they 
address is not a high priority for the news outlet. Thus, MSM articles that adhere to this 
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description can be perceived as of minor importance, and this invokes the Insignificance 
discourse. TNYT article, “Nigeria: Dozens of Girls Kidnapped” (2014), includes 
language features pointing to uncertainty, such as “about 100 teenage girls”; “in what 
officials said”; “most of the teenage girls”. In this example, it appears the particulars of 
the event were not independently verified. This article is attributed to the Associated Press, 
and while common for major news outlets to utilise independent contractors, in this 
instance, it appears indicative of a lack of value being placed on the Nigerian region. The 
Insignificance discourse enforces a power dichotomy, which works to inform readers 
about who or what is of value. In this case, the Insignificance discourse positions an 
entire Africa region and its people, as a trivial aside, not worthy of significant coverage. 
From an ideological perspective, this enforces a hegemonic power dynamic. Such a 
dynamic is beneficial to the west and detrimental to the well-being of those in the global 
south (Agnew, 2005; Glapka, 2010). Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000) claim “discourse is 
an opaque power object in modern societies” (448), meaning it is obscured through 
established social conditions and norms. The presence of the Insignificance discourse 
within MSM reporting of a Nigerian event confirms this.  
 
Sympathy 
The Sympathy discourse was present in four articles during the Abduction Period. 
The Sympathy discourse was characterised by emotive language which directs audiences 
as to how they should respond; the inclusion of statistics that indicate a lower quality of 
life; and references to the young women at the heart of the abduction as “girls.” The 
Sympathy discourse works to orchestrate a reader’s emotional response(s) to an event. 
The use of language such as “unprecedented” and “slaughtered” (“88 Nigeria schoolgirls 
abducted,” 2014) serves to stir up pity for those who have endured the Chibok 
abduction. TG’s article, “Nigeria students’ fate still uncertain” (2014), involves a 
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discussion of the still-missing students. The article evokes emotive imagery within the 
statement, “The fate of more than 100 girls and young women abducted by Islamist 
extremists was thrown into uncertainty” (“Nigeria students’ fate uncertain,” 2014); such 
imagery serves to conjure up feelings of helplessness and sympathy. When accompanied 
by statements alluding to sexual assault and enslavement (“88 Nigeria schoolgirls 
abducted,” 2014), readers are left with no recourse but to pity the fate of these students. 
The Sympathy discourse works to create helpless, needy victims, and this is further 
developed in TG’s articles during this period, through references to the kidnapped 
students as “girls” or “schoolgirls.” This is despite the students being aged in their mid-
teens, making them, for all intents and purposes, young women. With additional 
youthfulness and naiveté, comes greater sympathy. The Sympathy discourse should not 
be confused with empathy. Empathy is an emotional response where a person can 
identify with the plight of another, through ‘putting themselves in their shoes.’ Sympathy 
stems not from identification or similarity, but instead a marking of difference and 
invoking of pity for another. As such, the Sympathy discourse is visible through the 
inclusion of statistics that indicate the stark contrasts of life between the presumably 
western readers and the Nigerian subjects of these articles. For example:  
Nigeria has Africa’s biggest economy but 70% of the population lives below the poverty 
line and the north-east suffers the most. Only 5% of children get to secondary school 
(“Students kidnapped,” 2014) 
This information serves to create a divide between western readers and the Nigerian 
subjects they are reading about. Through a focus on the poor quality of life in Nigeria, 
the readers are presented with a distinct difference between their realities and the 
Nigerian experience. The statistics are presented plainly; there is no way for a reader to 
identify with the subjects, as there is not enough information. Without a way to identify 
with the subject, an empathetic response cannot occur. However, the use of words such 
 
 88 
as “poverty” and “suffers”, alongside the bleak statistics, may invoke a pity response and 
therefore exemplifies the Sympathy discourse. Within this marking of difference, there 
are evident hegemonic elements, which solidify the west in a position of power while 
positioning the ‘victims’ as helpless Africans in need of sympathy (Glapka, 2010). Thus, 
the presence of the Sympathy discourse indicates the establishment, or enforcement, of 
unequal power distributions that work to benefit western actors while further 
disempowering non-westerners.  
 
Superiority 
 The Superiority discourse was present in two MSM articles during the Abduction 
Period. The Superiority discourse is demonstrated through language that serves to 
establish an unequal power relationship, the inclusion of negative ideological tropes, and 
speculation. The Superiority discourse and the Insignificance discourse bear similarities, 
as they are both recognised through the propelling of one subject over another. 
However, the Insignificance discourse is defined by features that seek to establish an 
event, or subject(s), as of little importance, and without weight or character. While 
similar, the Superiority discourse is primarily concerned with establishing a group or 
subject as higher in rank or greater than something else. Such differences may appear 
subtle, but this is the very nature of discourses; they are not mutually exclusive, as one 
discourse can appear in tandem with multiple others. Discourses flow into one another, 
especially when the ideologies they circulate are the same, or similar.  The two articles 
that exhibited the Superiority discourse reported the Chibok abduction as an 
unremarkable, unsurprising event. Phrases such as “a new attack by Muslim militants” 
(“Nigeria: Dozens of Girls Kidnapped,” 2014) reported the kidnapping as commonplace 
through the use of “new attack.” Additionally, there is speculation about who is to 
blame, here credited as “Muslim militants” despite the lack of confirmation surrounding 
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the responsible party at this point; this indicates such violent activity is routine in this 
part of the world. This perspective is evidenced through the use of the word “new” in 
the description of the attack (“Nigeria: Dozens of Girls Kidnapped,” 2014), which 
communicates to readers that this is not the first instance of such violence. TNYT’s 
coverage goes so far as to acknowledge their lack of proof regarding who is responsible, 
and therefore confirming their inherent speculation, stating “Meanwhile, other people 
suspected of being Islamic militants on Wednesday killed 20 people” (“Nigeria: 
Teenagers Are Freed,” 2014). The brazen manner in which this speculation was included 
reinforces the Superiority discourse. Such a lack of evidence in reporting this event can 
indicate the subject(s) of the event are not significant, as coverage concerning 
empowered and significant figures would be unlikely to contain presumptions. 
Therefore, this coverage is indicative of a lack of value being placed on the non-western 
subject(s) at the issue’s centre. Given the MSM outlets are predominantly western, this 
can be perceived as evidence of superiority and hegemony. The MSM is at liberty to 
speculate and give their version of events, with limited proof, in a manner that might 
potentially reinforce negative tropes. In considering the actions of MSM, one can 
consider the Superiority discourse to be enacting a certain relationship. Within this 
relationship, an actor from a position of power (MSM) compounds the denigration of a 
disempowered figure or figures (Muslims, Nigerians), in alignment with definitions of 
hegemony as discussed in the Chapter Three. Furthermore, violence and religious 
extremism is indicated as regular in Nigeria through seemingly evidentiary language, such 
as “All schools in Borno State were closed three weeks ago because of increased attacks 
that have killed hundreds of students in the past year” (“Nigeria: Dozens of Girls 
Kidnapped,” 2014), which again asserts violence and death as commonplace, and signals 
the presence of the Superiority discourse. MSM seem to regard these events as regular 
occurrences, and as such, they respond by reporting the event without significant context 
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and explanation. Such reporting signals to readers that those impacted by the event are 
unimportant, and therefore establishes the western reader in a position of superiority 
over the subject in the global south; this is the Superiority discourse in action. The 
presence of the Superiority discourse at the Abduction Period says: a horrific event has 
occurred in Nigeria, where events of nature usually do; therefore, there is no need for 
outrage or an empathetic response as this happens frequently. 
 
Twitter: 
CDA of the 100 sampled tweets featuring #Chibok for the Abduction Period 
identified seven prominent discourses. Some tweets from this period exhibited multiple 
discourses, while others failed to adhere to any specific discourse. What is most 
important to remember about this period is that it is before the creation of 
#BringBackOurGirls. Due to this, one can assume the #Chibok tweets to be made up of 
voices primarily from Nigeria, or other African nations, as this period comes before the 
international notoriety of the event.  
 
Notably, 63 percent of the sampled tweets were retweets, meaning these Twitter 
users republished another user’s tweet within their own (Zappavigna, 2012: 35). 
Nagarajan et al. explain, through retweeting, one marks the quoted text as notable and 
recommend it to their followers. However, while Twitter users who have retweeted the 
content might agree with the statement, one cannot completely consider this to be a true 
reflection of their sentiment(s), as they have not written the tweet themselves. The most 
prominent discourse within the tweets from the Abduction Period was the previously 
discussed ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse, with 58 percent of tweets fitting the criteria 
(Figure 5). The Sympathy discourse was present in 19 percent of these tweets, and the 
      
 
 91 
Superiority discourse was found to be in six percent. In addition to these discourses 
above, a number of discourses absent in MSM coverage were discovered in these tweets. 
Namely, Disgust, Distrust, Prayer, and Optimism. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Twitter Discourses: Abduction Period 
 
Disgust 
The Disgust discourse was present in 25 percent of sampled tweets from the 
Abduction Period. The Disgust discourse is an emotional response of revulsion to the 
issue at hand, in this case, the Chibok abduction. As such, harsh language that points to 
revulsion and disdain, concerning the abduction, indicate the Disgust discourse. Tweet 
A32 represents this well, stating “For the sake of all that is decent, can someone pls [sic] 
tell GEJ’s officials to stop lying on the fate of the #Chibok girls?” GEJ is an acronym for 
the Nigerian President of the time, Goodluck Jonathan. The language choices of this 
tweet, particularly “For the sake of all that is decent”, sought to undermine the Nigerian 
officials, in particular, those who represented President Jonathan, by taking aim at their 
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credibility. This tweet also bears similarities to the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse; through 
the way it points to incompetence within Nigerian authorities while expressing an 
absence of surprise at their action(s), or lack thereof. These discourses differ, as while the 
‘Backwards’ Africa discourse serves to disenfranchise African peoples, the Disgust 
discourse involves the recognition of inappropriate behaviour through an emotional 
response. In the example tweet A32 provides, the primary discourse exhibited is the 
Disgust discourse. This is evidenced through what the author considers “decent”. That 
is, the Nigerian officials’ actions are perceived by the author as indecent, as they believe 
them to have lied about “the fate of the #Chibok girls”. Similarly, tweet A13 poses the 
question, “Is it rocket science for #Nigeria to give the actual number and the names of 
the abducted girls in #chibok?” In doing so, representing the Disgust discourse, as well 
as the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse. The use of metaphor here enables the author to 
designate Nigeria as the root of the problem while emphasising their perception of the 
shortcomings within the search, through drawing the comparison with rocket science. 
Furthermore, utilising the term “actual” discredits Nigerian authorities, and indicates 
ineptitude, highlighting the author’s disdain at the handling of this situation. The author 
believes the compiling of accurate information, regarding the abduction, is a simple task; 
therefore, the Nigerian authorities’ inability to accomplish this revolts the author. The 
language features within these tweets, from the use of inflammatory adjectives to 
metaphor, criticise the handling of the abduction and the forces that have led to the 




The Distrust discourse was identified in 14 percent of tweets from this period. 
Characterised by a lack of faith in the services charged with the rescue mission, this 
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discourse bears striking similarities to the Disgust discourse. It too exhibited harsh 
language features, questioned commitment to the rescue mission, and was comprised 
with pseudo-threats. While the Disgust discourse is identifiable through an emotional 
response of revulsion, the Distrust discourse involves an erosion of faith which 
progresses into suspicion and distrust. Tweet A19 showcases the confusion and 
faithlessness of the Distrust discourse, stating “I don’t know who or what to believe 
again wallahi #chibok”. With “wallahi” translating to “I swear to God” (Parkinson & 
Farwaneh, 2003: 3). Tweet A64 also projects the Distrust discourse, by doubting the 
Nigerian government’s commitment to finding the girls, stating “#Nigerian government: 
you have to brink [sic] the kids back to their families in #chibok. Otherwise I won’t 
forgive you!” The attitudes expressed through these tweets demonstrate a lack of faith in 
the Nigerian government and security forces. Tweets adhering to the Distrust discourse 
share a sense of expectation regarding the missing students not being a priority for those 
who have the power to help them, as well as the belief those in positions of power will 
lie to them. The Distrust discourse features only in tweets critical of Nigerian, and wider 
African, security forces and government. This is important, as it is indicative of a targeted 
reaction. In taking aim at institutions and actors from the African region, and lamenting 
what is perceived as their inaction or mismanagement, a view of these actors as unworthy 
of trust emerges. This attack on credibility empowers other actors, such as those from 
the west, by marking them as more trustworthy by comparison. Therefore, there is an 
ideology present, steeped in the previously discussed hegemonic features, that works to 
empower one group over the other. Within this research, the west is the group 
continually instilled with power, while the disempowered are citizens of the global south. 
The Distrust discourse is obvious through language features that exhibit scepticism and 
target those tasked with the rescue mission. As a result of the Distrust discourse, an 





 The Prayer discourse was seen in 11 percent of tweets from the Abduction 
Period. Tweets featuring religious elements, whether explicit or otherwise, are classed as 
representative of the Prayer discourse. Regarding the abduction, those tweeting 
statements alluding to placing their faith in God/Allah, or simply stating they were 
‘praying for’ the missing students, expressed the Prayer discourse. Tweet A8 states, 
“Please pray for their safe return”, in reference to the missing students, exemplifying 
prayer, or reliance on religion as a method of action. Tweet A11 is another example of 
this, tweeting “all but 8 girls from chibok have been found!!!! Still praying for the 
remaining 8! #chibok #nigeria”. Tweets referencing religion, prayer, God, or Allah, 
exemplify the Prayer discourse. Tweet A94 showcases this once more, stating “God we 
pray for their safety and freedom from captors”. The Prayer discourse sees religious 
expression, which for this research is regarded as minimal action, celebrated and relied 
upon in the search for the missing students. This religious expression occurs without 
tangible impact(s). Therefore, the presence of the Prayer discourse within the 
#BringBackOurGirls tweets, even in this minor manner, is necessary to highlight given 
the context of this research. 
 
Optimism 
 The Optimism discourse was identified in nine percent of tweets from this 
period. The use of positive language features, hyperbole, and presupposition, alongside 
generalised statements, indicated the presence of this discourse. The Optimism discourse 
involved expectations of a good outcome in relation to the student abduction, and this 
was marked by an obliviousness of sorts to the seriousness of the situation. This 
obliviousness inherent to the Optimism discourse serves to exemplify the 
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misinformation or lack of information that surrounded the abduction. Tweet A21 
showcases this, stating “#GoodNews #Borno #Chibok”, believing the students to have 
been found. While tweet A94 remained ignorant to the gravity of the abduction, as well 
as the facts surrounding it, claiming “Most Of The Dozens Of Girls Abducted In 
Nigeria Are Free”, a statement as inaccurate as it was generalised. The Optimism 
discourse warrants discussion due to the way under-informed Twitter users discuss the 
event in question. With Twitter being heralded as a source for real-time news, such 
blatant falsities are certainly a cause for concern. The Optimism discourse removes the 
need for engagement with the abduction; obscuring it as ‘solved’ or otherwise tended to. 
For those directly impacted by the abduction, such misrepresentation and subsequent 
disengagement might prove detrimental to achieving their goals. 
 
HASHTAG BEGINS: 4 – 9 MAY 2014 
Mainstream Media: 
As already noted, the Hashtag Begins Period saw a stark increase in coverage of 
the Chibok abduction by all MSM outlets. MSM published a total of 46 articles during 
this period. TNYT published 15 articles, TG published 21, and AJ printed ten articles. 
CDA of each article revealed the presence of seven discourses. Some these discourses 
have been discussed previously; they are the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse present in 33 
articles; the Superiority discourse present in 26 articles; and the Insignificance discourse 
present in two articles (Figure 6). Four new discourses were identified: Western Saviour, 





Figure 6 - Article Discourses: Hashtag Begins Period 
 
Western Saviour 
 The Western Saviour discourse was revealed in 15 mainstream articles during 
Hashtag Begins Period. It bears similarities to both the Superiority discourse, through the 
way it also serves to elevate the actor above the perceived victim. In doing so, this 
discourse enacts hegemonic elements found within similar discourses, as it serves to 
empower one group above another. Within the Western Saviour discourse, the 
empowered group is the west, while the disempowered group is Nigeria and the wider 
African region, and the abducted students. The Western Saviour discourse is identifiable 
through suppression, and naming and reference features. Suppression, meaning what is 
purposely absent within a text that should be present. Through identifying suppression, 
one’s attention is drawn to what is missing from a text, which in turn indicates what the 
author is attempting to distract from (Hansen & Machin, 2013: 130). Naming and 
reference features refer to how a subject is described in a text, with such presentation 
having a great bearing on how a reader perceives said subject. The Western Saviour 
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discourse was apparent through the neglect of the role of African powers in the search 
for the abducted students, and the focus on the efforts, and supposed successes, of 
western powers instead. Such aspects of the Western Saviour discourse indicate 
hegemonic elements, which reinforce an unequal power distribution. In the context of 
the Western Saviour discourse such hegemonic elements serve to project an ideology of 
the global south as unenlightened and helpless, and the west as the great redeemer 
(Bassil, 2011). 
 
The role of suppression is central to the Western Saviour discourse. This is 
evidenced by the distinct absence of mentions of African nations and prominent African 
leaders within the articles. Such absence is odd when considering the event these articles 
discuss occurred on the African continent. Instead, what is most discussed is the role of 
Western powers in response to the event. TG article titled, “Nigeria president urges safe 
return” (2014), skimmed over the role of Nigerian authorities, and expressed disdain at 
their efforts, before focusing on the west, stating, “the US and Britain have promised 
unspecified help”. This is again showcased though the statement:  
[the abduction] has woken up the world to what is happening in the region, with pledges of 
help from the US and UK. […] Families have little faith in the Nigerian military, or the 
government, to find them (“Nigerian president urges safe return,” 2014)  
As this excerpt showcases, when TG says “world” what they are referring to is the west, 
and this demonstrates just whom the newspaper considers the important figure. Clearly, 
the Western Saviour discourse is present here; the focus placed on western nations 
pledging help demonstrates this, and arcs back to the discussion of ideology and 
hegemony, which sees the west enabled and the global south disempowered. 
Additionally, the Superiority discourse is present here also, as signified by the ‘good’ 
actions of the west in juxtaposition with the ‘bad’ actions of Nigerian authorities, whom, 
 
 98 
as TG claims, the families of the abducted students have little faith in. Although this was 
an event concerning the African region, the focus by MSM is the response from 
westerners. TG article by Mark (2014a) included a discussion, which revolved around 
outrage, not in Nigeria, but in major western cities, “the attacks have prompted 
international protests in New York and London”; and “the US viewed the abductions as 
an outrage”. While western actors are praised by MSM, when Nigeria or the African 
continent are mentioned, albeit rarely, the attitudes are less positive. Mark and Carroll’s 
(2014) article in TG further enforced the Western Saviour discourse, stating “In Chibok, 
desperate relatives welcomed news of assistance from the US and Britain”. The 
description of relatives as “desperate” serves here to enforce a narrative of westerners as 
heroic redeemers. Again, portraying Africans similarly to the ‘Backwards’ Africa 
discourse – as helpless figures in dire need. Through the Western Saviour discourse, 
African nations, or any regions that are not westernised, are depicted as in need of 
support, and their unwillingness to accept such support is considered idiotic. The 
Western Saviour discourse enforces colonial tropes and strengthens the hegemonic 
relationship between the west and the ‘rest’. 
 
Self-awareness 
 The Self-awareness discourse was present in eleven MSM articles during the 
Hashtag Begins Period. It is characterised by a reflexivity of sorts, which sees authors 
take a critical view towards the rise of #BringBackOurGirls. Articles that question 
motivations for participation in the hashtag, or criticise the ‘bandwagoning’ of sorts that 
saw this story develop into headline news, are classed as exhibiting the Self-awareness 
discourse. TNYT writer, Nossiter (2014a), comments that the students’ abduction has 
“attracted rare international attention”. Nossiter’s (2014a) statement essentially 
comments on the peculiarity of this issue sparking such levels of coverage, as usually 
      
 
 99 
matters of this kind, from this part of the world, are regarded unimportant by MSM. 
Additional comments in an editorial piece published by TNYT, alluded to MSM’s initial 
apathy regarding the abduction, stating, “we in the news media world were also largely 
indifferent” (Kristof, 2014). This statement also works to attribute the sudden 
embracement of this news story to its rise on social media. However, the Self-awareness 
discourse also involves the lamenting of social media’s role in highlighting this event, as 
Mackey’s (2014) article in TNYT demonstrated through the statement, “Twitter, where 
the captivity is the cause of the day”, about the rise of #BringBackOurGirls. Here, 
Mackey (2014) recognises social media’s tendency to embrace causes, yet through 
labelling #BringBackOurGirls as the “cause of the day”, simultaneously comments on 
the fact that online causes are typically not engaged with for significant periods of time. 
Furthermore, comments concerning OSMs, such as “too often, that kind of action helps 
no one so much as ourselves” (Dell’Antonia, 2014); and “[there are] limits to what 
hashtag activism, like bumper stickers and T-shirts, can achieve” (Mackey, 2014); 
recognise the limitations of online activism. The limitations suggested through MSM 
articles, discuss the tendency those engaging with OSMs have towards what this study 
regards to be Ironic Solidarity (Chouliaraki, 2013a). Ironically enough, the Self-awareness 
discourse also laments the discourses present in MSM coverage. An article by Brooks 
(2014), for the TNYT, takes aim at media representations of Africa that are untrue and 
unfounded, such as those maintained by the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse. Brooks (2014) 
laments coverage that implies “Africa is this dark and lawless place where monstrous 
things are bound to happen. Those poor people need our help.” Brooks’ (2014) article 
goes on to claim westerners should not observe the African continent and its people as a 
place for one’s fulfilment. That is, “[Africa] should not be seen as merely the basketcase 
continent where students, mission trips and celebrities can go to do good work” (Brooks, 
2014). An awareness of the hegemonic elements, which consistently empower the west 
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over those in the global south, is evident in this article (Agnew, 2005; Glapka, 2010). 
MSM’s recognition of their role in contributing to the perpetuation of colonial tropes, as 
well as a tendency to under-report issues in the global south, in tandem with the scrutiny 
of social media activism, demonstrates the Self-awareness discourse. The Self-awareness 
discourse involves a reflexive approach to media coverage and OSMs; it is inherently 
critical and examines the motivations for coverage and involvement. The Self-awareness 
discourse’s presence is a stark contrast from accompanying discourses within MSM 
coverage of the Chibok abduction.  
 
Accomplishment  
 The Accomplishment discourse was present in five articles during the Hashtag 
Begins Period. This discourse is identifiable through self-serving features; features that 
work to establish the actor(s) as of higher importance than those directly impacted. As 
such, the Accomplishment discourse is exhibited within claims that the suffering of 
abductees is over as a result of western intervention, and the celebration of 
#BringBackOurGirls as a ‘success’. TNYT’s Dell’Antonia (2014) poses the question, 
“What Can I Do to #BringBackOurGirls?” in her article’s headline. This serves to make 
the event about western actors, thus detracting from the students at the heart of the 
event. In doing so, this article ties in the Superiority discourse, leaving readers feeling 
that action is up to them. And what method of support does Dell’Antonia (2014) 
suggest? Further online activism and money; claiming, “[action] can come from our 
laptops, our raised voices and our wallets” (Dell’Antonia, 2014). The Accomplishment 
discourse is particularly evident in discussions surrounding the online activism 
surrounding this event. Although the abducted students were still missing, through the 
Accomplishment discourse the hashtag was championed for its role in focusing attention 
towards the abduction. TNYT’s article, “New Kidnapping Reported” (2014), states that 
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“It is heartening that with the help of social media, the crisis in Nigeria has finally 
captured international attention.” This statement points to such attention being the 
major goal and this being met a cause for celebration. Furthermore, Kristof (2014) of 
TNYT, refers to the hashtag as “grass-roots activism”, and praises it for “catapulting this 
news […] onto the global agenda” in his editorial. Such language makes it appear that the 
quest is over, but gaining notoriety is just one minor way to aid the abducted students. 
Through such coverage, the central subjects are neglected. The Accomplishment 
discourse promotes engagement with the hashtag as the most important aspect of the 
event. Perhaps the best example of the Accomplishment discourse and its self-serving 
elements in action rests in Gross and Schulten’s (2014) literal ‘how-to’ guide regarding 
teaching children about the importance of engaging in hashtag activism. The article 
“Skills and Strategies | Engaging in Causes Via ‘Hashtag Activism’” (Gross & Schulten, 
2014), highlights all forms of engagement with #BringBackOurGirls and urges children 
to participate, “submit a solidarity photo [to] tell the girls’ families that the thoughts of 
the world are with them”. Gross and Schulten’s (2014) article additionally claims 
“hashtag activism will save the kidnapped Nigerian girls”, and asks children to consider 
what other campaigns could be bolstered through the creating awareness online, “create 
your own social-media message […] in support of a cause you care about”. Gross and 
Schulten’s (2014) guide to hashtag activism hales #BringBackOurGirls as a success that 
will save the Chibok students, which is inaccurate as, at this point, the hashtag had only 
served to raise awareness. The article fails to present tangible impact(s) of the hashtag, as 
the students remained in captivity at this point. Instead, Gross and Schulten’s (2014) 
article praises the hashtag for making this issue popular, which establishes notoriety, not 
the achievement of the students’ freedom, as the overarching aim of OSMs. The 
Accomplishment discourse rests upon a fulfilment of sorts. It provides audiences with a 
‘good news’ spin of events, allowing them to feel less aggrieved. In their minds, the 
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situation might be awful, but westerners have taken action, and it is better now. 
Therefore, one need not dwell on it any longer. As the results indicate, where the 




 The Idealised Victim discourse was found in three articles from the Hashtag 
Begins Period. This discourse was identifiable through naming and reference features, 
and word choices, in particular, adjective selection. The Idealised Victim discourse seeks 
to present a certain impression of those impacted by an event, distilling them into a more 
attractive figure. However, doing so requires some condensing of the facts. As already 
discussed, referrals to the abducted students as “girls” or “schoolgirls” serve to neglect 
their maturity and instead positions them as naïve figures. In reality, these students were 
aged in their mid-teens and above. Considering there was little known about the 
abductees, other than their being female high school students, it would be wise not to 
make assumptions. However, as the prevalence of the Idealised Victim discourse 
showcases, MSM did not let a lack of information deter them from presenting a certain 
view of the students. Dell’Antonia’s (2014) article praised the students as “girls who 
risked much, knowingly, for education, and who were the stars of their families and 
villages.” Such a description paints the students as martyrs of sorts, who were aware of 
the horrors awaiting them, yet unwilling to let this stop them in their pursuit of 
education. Kristof’s (2014) editorial in TNYT also demonstrated this narrative, through 
the claim the abduction affected “several hundred girls whose only offense was to dream 
of becoming doctors, teachers or lawyers”. The emotive language within Kristof’s (2014) 
editorial positions readers to view the students as innocent and pure, and urges them to 
picture their dreams, which one has no way of verifying. References to the students as 
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“brave Nigerian girls” (Kristof, 2014) and “poor, frightened children” (Gladstone, 2014); 
implement colourful descriptions to help readers align themselves with their plight. The 
MSM has no way of knowing how the students were feeling, or what they had longed for 
before the abduction, so such descriptions served to provide readers with a pseudo-
representation. A problematic and unrealistic representation designed to have readers 
react in a certain manner. As the examples above have highlighted, such representation 
of the students’ experience was wholly idealised, and thus indicates the presence of the 
Idealised Victim discourse. 
 
Twitter: 
Of the sampled tweets from the Hashtag Begins Period, 66 percent were 
retweets. As discussed, this can cast doubt as to whether the tweets can be considered 
representative of the views of those who have shared them, as they are not the original 
authors (Zappavigna, 2012). This point in time also revealed an unseen phenomenon 
whereby tweets that only included the hashtag emerged. Here ten percent of sampled 
tweets consisted only of the text ‘#BringBackOurGirls’. The hashtag-only tweets reveal 
one in ten users, who participated in the hashtag at this point, felt the hashtag alone was 
enough to express their sentiment(s).  
 
The presence of nine discourses was revealed in the analysis of tweets from the 
Hashtag Begin Period. Five such discourses have previously been discussed in-depth, but 
this period marked the discovery of four new discourses. The aforementioned 
Superiority discourse was identified in 33 percent of tweets, ‘Backwards’ Africa was 
present in 27 percent, Self-awareness in six percent, the Prayer discourse in five percent, 
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and the Insignificance discourse present in one percent (Figure 7). The other discourses 
are as follows. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Twitter Discourses: Hashtag Begins Period 
 
Anger 
 The Anger discourse was exhibited in 28 percent of tweets from the Hashtag 
Begins Period. The Anger discourse is marked by emotive language, hyperbole, 
metaphor, and grammatical features such as capitalisation, all of which indicate an 
emotionally charged response. This discourse was the second most prominent discourse 
within tweets from this period. Tweet B22 exemplifies the impassioned sentiment of the 
Anger discourse with this expletive-ridden statement “#BRINGBACKOURGIRLS You 
crazy mothafuckers [sic]”. The expletive is not clearly directed to any one figure; it may 
have been intended for Boko Haram or perhaps Nigerian government officials. While 
the author appears to be tweeting to aid the students’ return, the inherent rage of their 
words detracts from the students’ plight. Instead, the author’s emotive response takes 
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precedence. The Anger discourse is also showcased in tweet B48, which demands action 
at any cost, stating, “Nigeria needs to take it v [sic] seriously and eliminate these animals. 
The quicker the better…#BringBackOurGirls”. Tweets displaying the Anger discourse 
appeared motivated by a lack of progress and perceived disinterest from those whom 
tweeters felt could be of help in locating the students. Tweet B28 showcases this by 
stating “What are you waiting for @BarackObama @David_Cameron? Do something! 
#BringBackOurGirls #NIGERIA”. Such aggrieved responses point to Twitter users’ 
feelings of helplessness and frustration at those who they feel have the power to act. 
However, the Anger discourse is grounded in emotion, and thus is considered as 
potentially self-serving; as its inherent passion detracts from the situation at hand, and 
arguably does little to aid the Chibok students. 
 
Self-Interest 
 The Self-interest discourse was present in 23 percent of tweets from this period. 
The Self-interest discourse is identifiable due to naming and reference features that 
establish the author as the central focus of the tweet. Thus, making the author’s 
experience and emotion the ‘main event’ of the tweet. This is a selfish act, although it 
may be subconscious, which detracts from the issue at hand. Tweet B71 displays the 
Self-interest discourse by switching the focus from the missing students, to their 
emotion(s), stating, “My heart aches for people who are caught in the wrong place @ [sic] 
the wrong time”. Tweet B7 again detracts from those directly impacted, by instead 
placing focus on those who are sharing the hashtag, stating, “It’s important […] that we 
keep up the pressure to find these girls. #BringBackOurGirls”. The Self-interest 
discourse bears similarities to that of the Anger discourse, as both lack evidence of 





 The Feminist discourse was present in 7 percent of tweets. This discourse’s low 
prevalence is surprising, given #BringBackOurGirls was heralded as an OFM and an 
example of hashtag feminism. As such, it was expected this research would reveal a high 
occurrence of Feminist discourse(s), especially within tweets. The Feminist discourse is 
marked by references to women’s rights, equality between the sexes, and discussions of 
female oppression. Use of emotive language, alongside empowering statements alluding 
to the need for change signifies its presence. Lexical analysis of these tweets saw the 
implementation of modality and narrative to project the feminist discourse. Tweet B26 
represents this discourse through of use key phrases, here in the form of hashtags, 
aiming to represent inequality between the sexes and the danger females face, 
“#BringBackOurGirls #RescueOurGirls #GirlRising #ChildNotBride 
#RealMenDoNotBuyGirls #Nigeria #BokoHaram”. Tweet B26’s unabashed support 
for women, identifiable through the use of emotive hashtags, such as “rescue” and 
“rising” about women, showcase the Feminist discourse. Also, tweet B57 encourages the 
education of females, stating, “Access to education is a basic right & an unconscionable 
reason to target innocent girls”. The intended narrative here, to draw attention to the 
issues facing women, when teamed with the modality of emotive wording, such as 
“unconscionable” and “innocent”, signifies the presence of the Feminist discourse. 
 
Anti-Islam 
 An Anti-Islam discourse was observed in five percent of tweets from this period. 
Negative references to Islam characterised the discourse; the enforcement of harmful 
stereotypes of Islam; and insinuations Islam was to blame for violence. The Anti-Islam 
discourse was recognisable through the use of metaphor, and presupposition alongside 
rhetorical tropes. Tweet B33 exemplifies the Anti-Islam discourse through the claim, 
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“also they should not read that part that Mohammed married a 6yr old & started having 
sex with her at 9yrs old! Perv [sic] #BringBackOurGirls”. The tweet insinuates the 
Prophet Mohammed, the central figure of the Islam religion (Knysh, 2016), was a sexual 
deviant, and claims it is through having “read that part” of, what can be assumed to be a 
reference to the Qur’an, Islam’s religious text, that those who have kidnapped the 
students were compelled to act. Within this discourse, hegemonic traits are again 
recognisable; they follow the designation previously noted, which sees the west acting to 
disempower the global south (Agnew, 2006; Gramsci, 1971). In the west, the dominant 
religion is Christianity, so in an event already premised upon difference, this religious 
element becomes yet another point of dissimilarity. Negative tropes of Islam are frequent 
within the west, and this, albeit minor, display of the Anti-Islam discourse serves to 
reinforce these, as well as to further establish a hegemonic relationship beneficial to the 
west. The Anti-Islam discourse’s presence in tweets featuring #BringBackOurGirls at the 
Hashtag Begins Period did little to highlight the plight of the kidnapped students; 
instead, it served to attack a religion many of the students follow.  
 
FIRST ANNIVERSARY: 10 – 15 APRIL 2015 
Mainstream Media: 
 During the First Anniversary Period, a total of 16 articles were published by 
MSM. TNYT published four articles, while both TG and AJ published six articles. CDA 
identified the presence of seven discourses, with six discourses having been previously 
discussed. The most prominent discourse was the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse which 
featured in 11 articles (Figure 8). The Feminist discourse and Western Saviour discourse 
were both present in eight articles. The Self-awareness discourse and Accomplishment 
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discourse were both found in four articles. The Sympathy discourse was identified in 
three articles. This period marked the first instance of the Victimisation discourse.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Article Discourses: First Anniversary Period 
 
Victimisation 
 The Victimisation discourse was present in two MSM articles. The Victimisation 
discourse serves to reinforce the suffering of abductees through establishing a narrative 
about their ordeal. Through the use of graphic language, alongside naming and reference 
features, the Victimisation discourse is evident. Shetty’s (2015) article in TNYT provides 
an example of this discourse in action, through discussing the probable circumstances 
abductees are in, where “Life in captivity consists of repeated rapes, sometimes by 
groups of up to six fighters”; “girls will be taught to use firearms, detonate bombs and 
attack villages”. The described events make for uneasy reading. The probable purpose of 
the Victimisation discourse is to make the reader feel for the fate of the abducted 
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students, and this is achieved through statements such as, “the suffering of these women 
and girls […] is beyond comprehension”. Again, the use of “girls” to reference the 
Chibok students, who in reality are mature, young women, occurs here. This labelling 
serves to create a narrative of helplessness and victimisation; thereby obscuring any 
agency of the abducted students through this needy representation. The Victimisation 
discourse cements the abducted students as symbols of suffering, it does not represent 
them accurately but instead serving to contribute to a narrative of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. 
Through such discourse, ideologies benefitting the west can prevail.  
 
Twitter: 
CDA of tweets during the First Anniversary Period revealed the presence of ten 
discourses. Eight were discourses previously examined, with the Sympathy discourse 
present in 37 percent of tweets; Self-interest in 25 percent; Superiority in 23 percent; 17 
percent adhering to the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse; ten percent exhibiting Self-
awareness; the Feminist discourse present in seven percent; Insignificance in four 
percent; and the Prayer discourse featuring in three percent of tweets (Figure 9). The 
most prominent discourse of this period, accounting for 40 percent of tweets, was that 
of Frustration. While the Race discourse debuted marginally, with two percent of tweets 
exhibiting this discourse, making it the least prevalent tweet discourse of this period. 
 
Tweets from the first anniversary also marked the emergence of a hashtag to 
accompany #BringBackOurGirls, that of #NeverToBeForgotten. This new hashtag, 
while not gaining as much momentum as the original #BringBackOurGirls, featured in 
15 percent of tweets from this period. The number of tweets consisting solely of 
#BringBackOurGirls, as first recorded at the Hashtag Begins Period, dropped to two 
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percent at this point. The number of retweets – the republishing of another’s statement –
however, rose to 72 percent. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Twitter Discourses: First Anniversary Period 
 
Frustration 
 The Frustration discourse was present in 40 percent of tweets from the First 
Anniversary Period. The Frustration discourse was exhibited through tweets expressing 
exasperation with the elapsed time and lack of progress surrounding the Chibok 
abduction. Tweets that utilised language features such as metaphor, and emotive features 
indicative of disappointment, or uncertainty regarding how to act, signified the presence 
of this discourse. The Frustration discourse had not been seen up until this point, the 
first anniversary of the abduction, and it marked a stark shift in attitudes. The Frustration 
discourse was the most prominent Twitter discourse for this period, and this showcased 
a public struggling to understand a lack of progress, as well as a diminishment of resolve 
in locating the missing students. Tweet C26 exemplifies the Frustration discourse, in a 
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strongly worded, yet solemn statement, “Not d [sic] kind of anniversary we need. This 
wind of change won’t be complete until of [sic] girls are back. #bringbackourgirls 
#nevertobeforgotten”. The Frustration discourse was frequently found in tandem with 
the Self-awareness discourse, demonstrated by tweet C52, stating “Almost a year since 
the 200 Nigerian girls were kidnapped … And still nothing. Just a hashtag. Wow. So 
heavy. #BringBackOurGirls”. The shock and dismay inherent in this tweet showcase 
frustration not only with the security forces who have failed to find the missing students, 
but with those who embraced #BringBackOurGirls on a social media level, but 
seemingly failed to act beyond this. While this is an example of the Self-awareness 
discourse, through recognising the limits of OSMs, the Frustration discourse is most 
evident here. The grammatical features of tweet C52 reinforce the Frustration discourse. 
Through the use of short, impactful sentences, with included periods (‘.’), there has been 
an attempt to mimic speech patterns; the tweet urges readers to read the tweet with the 
incorporated pauses, resulting in the “Wow.” and “So heavy.” resounding in readers’ 
minds. As such, tweet C52’s message is accentuated, and its inherent frustration is 
recognised. The author’s consideration of #BringBackOurGirls as accomplishing 
“nothing” and instead being “Just a hashtag” represents the emotion inherent in the 
Frustration discourse, but also potentially demonstrates elements of awareness at hashtag 
activism’s inability, in this case, to accomplish what it set out to do – rescue the students. 
The Frustration discourse is further exemplified through tweet C26’s statement; “this 
wind of change won’t be complete until the girls are back”. The wind of change is a 
metaphoric representation of #BringBackOurGirls as a whole. Through this statement, 
the author laments the fact the hashtag had not achieved its major goal. The Frustration 
discourse’s debut, and prevalence, at the First Anniversary Period, demonstrated the 
dismay of the public. The Frustration discourse’s prevalence was most probably due to a 
realisation of, and reaction to, the limits of online activism. However, in the same 
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manner, as the other emotionally charged discourses, the Frustration discourse also 
detracted from the plight of the missing students. The Frustration discourse did not 
highlight the students who had, at this point, been missing for an entire year, but instead 
focused on a public recoiling in the knowledge their hashtagging of #BringBackOurGirls 
had achieved very little. 
 
Race 
 The Race discourse was found in two percent of tweets from the First 
Anniversary Period. While not resoundingly prominent during this period, the Race 
discourse’s presence demands discussion. The Race discourse was signified through 
tweets that highlighted racial elements and likened the abduction to prominent race-
related topics. Often this was achieved ironically, through teaming #BringBackOurGirls, 
which at this point was being seen as a failure of sorts, with other activist hashtags. One 
prominent OSM during this time was the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement, brought about 
by the deaths of unarmed black civilians at the hands of U.S. police officers (Rickford, 
2016). In tweet C20, sarcasm and racial undertones are evident through the use of a 
happy face emoticon, followed by hashtags representing tragic deaths and events, all of 
which involve black civilians. Tweet C20 states, “Good Saturday, y’all. J 
#BringBackOurGirls #MichaelBrown #EricGarner #TamirRice #AiyanaJones”. This 
clear display of sarcasm, as demonstrated through the cheery statement “Good Saturday, 
ya’ll”, teamed with the hashtagged names, indicates a race driven motive, and therefore 
the Race discourse. The author, who is showcasing the suffering of these black civilians, 
thus includes positive statements, in the form of “Good Saturday” and the happy face 
emoticon, to contrast between the following hashtags. The students 
#BringBackOurGirls represents have been missing for over a year, and the following 
names, in hashtag form, are all deceased, having been killed by police. Their names are 
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on social media to serve as a reminder of the prejudice black people still face and are 
linked to the Black Lives Matter movement (Rickford, 2016). The optimistic elements are 
at odds with the accompanying hashtags that signify violence and suffering. Through the 
tool of sarcasm, the author of tweet C20 has attempted to draw salience to the issue of 
violence against blacks. Tweet C74 steers away from sarcasm as a tool to express racial 
sentiment, instead outwardly stating “#BlackLivesMatter” in their tweet. The inclusion 
of this statement alongside the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag, ties these events together, 
thus indicating that the author perceived the lack of progress surrounding the abduction 
to be racially motivated. While not incredibly widespread, the fact this discourse is 
present, even mildly, is indicative of a different conversation concerning the abduction, 
one absent in MSM coverage. 
 
SECOND ANNIVERSARY: 10 – 15 APRIL 2016 
Mainstream Media: 
 MSM published eight articles during the Second Anniversary Period. TNYT 
published one, TG printed five, and AJ published two. Five discourses were identified in 
these articles, with all five having been previously discussed. The “Backwards” Africa 
discourse was the most prevalent discourse again; identified in six articles. The Western 
Saviour discourse was present in five articles, and the Self-awareness discourse identified 
in two articles. The Accomplishment discourse and Sympathy discourse both featured in 






Figure 10 - Article Discourses: Second Anniversary Period 
 
Twitter: 
In tweets from the Second Anniversary Period, ten discourses were identified. All 
were discourses featured in previous coverage, with the Sympathy discourse being the 
most prominent, present in 40 percent of tweets; ‘Backwards’ Africa featured in 27 
percent; Self-interest accounted for 26 percent; the Frustration discourse was identified 
in 24 percent; the Feminist discourse in 12 percent; Superiority in 12 percent; Self-
awareness in seven percent; Insignificance seven percent; Optimism seven percent; and 
the Prayer discourse accounting for just one percent (Figure 11). 
 
 #NeverToBeForgotten, the hashtag which emerged on Twitter during the First 
Anniversary Period was present again at this point. However, it was not as prominent. 
#NeverToBeForgotten was found in three percent of tweets, while #HopeEndures was 
introduced during this time. #HopeEndures was created in direct reference to the 
second anniversary of the Chibok abduction, as a means of continuing support for the 
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students’ return in the same vein as #BringBackOurGirls originally had. However, it only 
featured in five percent of tweets. The number of hashtag-only tweets was six percent, 
while the largest proportion of retweets to date was revealed during this period, with 76 
percent of tweets being retweets. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Twitter Discourses: Second Anniversary Period 
 
Conclusion 
 These results suggest the Chibok abduction was a news event propelled by social 
media through the #BringBackOurGirls; and comprised of a variety of distinct views. 
Before the abduction, MSM coverage of Nigeria and the Chibok region was minimal. 
Each MSM outlet demonstrated the same trend in this period – minimal coverage at the 
time of abduction; followed by immense attention during the month 
#BringBackOurGirls attained virality; before a rapid descent which saw coverage then 
occur only at the yearly anniversaries. As these results demonstrate, the focus the event 
received, following initial MSM apathy, is linked to the rise of #BringBackOurGirls on 
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Twitter. #BringBackOurGirls’ trajectory is similar to the MSM outlets featured in this 
study; with massive growth and engagement in May 2014, before minimal engagement 
over the next two years, again featuring flurries of activity at the yearly anniversaries. 
Given MSM’s initial apathy, and coverage of the abduction coming weeks after the event 
itself, at a time when #BringBackOurGirls was a dominant social media trend, this 
research posits #BringBackOurGirls influenced MSM coverage.  
 
 During the Abduction Period, the discourses revealed to be present in MSM 
were similar. For the most part, the discourses were those that served to enforce or 
encourage the hegemonic relationship between the west and the global south. That is 
discourses such as ‘Backwards’ Africa, Superiority, and Insignificance. However, analysis 
of Twitter tweets from the same period revealed the presence of a greater variety of 
discourse. In spite of this diversity, these discourses also served to reinforce stereotypes 
of the global south, and inscribed the west with power As such, the discourses of the 
Abduction Period from both MSM and Twitter, are considered ‘power dynamic’ 
discourses, through the way they operate to disempower vulnerable groups while further 
promoting privileged groups. 
 
 The introduction of #BringBackOurGirls marked the beginning of a new period, 
one that saw the Chibok abduction develop into a major news event within MSM. 
However, this sudden increase in coverage did not see the discourses within MSM 
develop beyond the pre-discussed power dynamic discourses. While new discourses 
emerged, namely the Victimisation and Western Saviour discourses, these served to 
enforce the hegemonic relationship between the west and global south further. A notable 
exception was the emergence of the Self-awareness discourse. This was the only instance 
of a discourse within MSM not adhering to the power dynamic. Notably, despite this 
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period representing the beginning of #BringBackOurGirls, considered an OFM, there 
was no Feminist discourse present within MSM during this period. Meanwhile, on 
Twitter, #BringBackOurGirls was its peak of popularity, with widespread engagement 
globally. The variety of discourse found in tweets from the Hashtag Begins Period, 
exemplify the hashtag’s popularity at this point. While the power dynamic discourses, 
present at the previous period, remained prominent; this period also marked the first, 
albeit minor, emergence of the Self-awareness discourse within online sentiment. The 
prevalence of emotionally grounded discourses, such as Anger and Self-interest, also 
grew at this point. It is important to note that the Hashtag Begins Period saw the 
emergence of the Feminist discourse in tweets, but only minimally.  
  
 The First Anniversary Period revealed the first presence of the Feminist 
discourse within MSM. However, the Feminist discourse was not as prominent as the 
ever-present discourses of ‘Backwards’ Africa and Western Saviour. The perceived 
achievements of #BringBackOurGirls were a major focus of MSM reporting for this 
period, as evidenced by the Accomplishment discourse. Tweets similarly exhibited the 
power dynamic discourses, yet in a more emotionally charged manner than previous 
periods, through the prevalence of the Frustration and Sympathy discourses. At this 
point, the Feminist discourse on Twitter stagnated. 
 
 The Second Anniversary Period once again saw MSM discourses remain 
grounded within larger, geo-political, power dynamics. Aside from the minor presence of 
Self-awareness, all MSM discourses were western serving. CDA of Twitter tweets at this 
period revealed the Feminist discourse’s peak, and the Sympathy discourse became the 




As these results demonstrate, MSM discourses primarily served to enforce 
unequal power dynamics. Power dynamics are evident through discourses focused on the 
west, and their actions, while positioning the global south as needy, inept, and wild. 
Twitter discourse bore similarities, with the power dynamic discourses continually being 
most prominent. However, the variety of voices provided by Twitter also yielded a 
greater assortment of responses, and thus, greater discourse diversity.  






 The following chapter seeks to interpret the results of the CDA and quantitative 
analysis. In addressing the five research questions posed in Chapter One, such 
interpretation aims to align with the core research objectives of this thesis. 
 
Research Question 1 
How did interaction between mainstream media and 
social media shape the #BringBackOurGirls movement? 
 
#BringBackOurGirls involved both social media and MSM attention on a grand 
scale. However, initial MSM attention of the abduction was lacklustre (Figure 2). This 
lack of coverage echoed the trend of minimal reporting of the Nigerian region set by the 
three sampled mainstream news outlets in the six months before the abduction (Figure 
1). In May 2014, MSM coverage skyrocketed, before plummeting the following month. 
Coincidentally, #BringBackOurGirls followed the same trend (Figure 3). It is not 
unusual for a news story to elicit high levels of coverage before returning to obscurity; 
although it is odd to see a news story command such extraordinary levels of coverage in 
the weeks after the incident occurred. Clearly, something compelled MSM outlets to 
dedicate coverage to the abduction in May 2014, following their minimal reporting 
during the previous month. As the results indicate, it is evident that something was the 




Did social media set the mainstream media agenda? 
Scholars differ regarding social media’s ability to set MSM’s agenda. Rogstad 
(2016) revealed MSM to have a greater influence on social media than the reverse. 
However, the same study found journalists integrate social media into their news 
reporting (Rogstad, 2016: 143), and indicated a correlation between negative Twitter 
sentiment and a shift of MSM’s focus (153). Carter Olson (2016) claims, “social media 
undeniably influence public opinion and traditional media sources” (777). Furthermore, 
hashtag activism, which the #BringBackOurGirls movement is an example of, has been 
praised for its strength in moving issues from the margins of public discourse, and onto 
the MSM agenda (Carter Olson, 2016: 776; Atton, 2002). The MSM’s sudden interest in 
the abduction in May 2014, followed by their subsequent indifference, provides evidence 
of this. Furthermore, this trend mirrors the hashtag’s arc on social media. Therefore, in 
this case, social media has influenced MSM’s news agenda.  
 
This research revealed MSM coverage, regarding the Chibok abduction, rose by 
670 percent in the month of May 2014 when compared to April 2014 (Figure 2). The rise 
in coverage occurred not at the time of the students’ abduction, but at the point at which 
the hashtag designed to draw attention to their plight was gaining virality globally 
(Njoroge, 2016; Figure 3). In keeping with Hermida’s (2012: 662) argument, which claims 
MSM relies on social networking sites, as reliable news outlets in their own right, and 
accurate reflections of society’s interests. MSM was once heralded as the dominant 
influence on public concern, in keeping with McComb and Shaw’s (1972) agenda-setting 
hypothesis, however social media now appears to have an independent agenda. Social 
media possesses the ability to draw public attention to issues that fall outside of the MSM 
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agenda; in a direct challenge to the “hierarchy of access” MSM have maintained 
(Glasgow University Media Group, 1976: 245 cited in Atton, 2002: 493). As this research 
indicates, social media have redirected the MSM focus. The virality of 
#BringBackOurGirls triggered a sudden and dramatic change concerning what the 
surveyed MSM outlets determined to be newsworthy. This is in keeping with 
Zappavigna’s (2015: 274-175) argument that hashtags are converging with mediated 
texts. It also lends weight to Latina and Docherty’s (2014) claim hashtags are “being 
appropriated by the established news media as new stories in themselves” (1104). What 
#BringBackOurGirls exemplifies is MSM’s loosening grip on public agenda-setting, and 
in fact, a shift towards the public setting MSM agendas through their social media 
engagement. 
 
Mainstream media reacts to social media’s influence 
In examining the ways this interaction between MSM and social media shaped 
#BringBackOurGirls, one cannot overlook the role MSM itself played in propelling this 
issue to further notoriety. #BringBackOurGirls’ media coverage was initially situated 
only on social media platforms, but MSM’s embracement of the issue enabled it to 
spread further. This growth is in alignment with Kenix’s (2011) claim, “media coverage is 
central to the very existence of social movements” (42). The possibility of a social 
movement’s success is significantly harmed without widespread media attention (Kenix, 
2011: 43). While engagement with social media is high and ever growing, there is a 
distinct public reliance on MSM (Kenix, 2016: 26). Therefore, MSM’s coverage of 
#BringBackOurGirls may have garnered further attention for the cause, enabling it to 




Ahmed et al. (2016) discuss, while OSMs are born online and gradually travel to 
the offline, in what Zappavigna (2015) considers a convergence of sorts, their entry to 
the offline world is often unwelcomed. In fact, social media’s role in focusing attention 
towards matters or demographics that would otherwise receive little notice might be 
considered a nuisance by MSM. Convergence forces a change in traditional media 
coverage habits, broadening the often-insular MSM gaze (Williams, 2015). 
#BringBackOurGirls has demonstrated how social media can have immense reach 
without dependence on traditional media gatekeepers (Rogstad, 2016). MSM is 
somewhat forced to also dedicate coverage to events and issues represented by social 
media campaigns when campaigns achieve such heights. It is embedded within this 
“bringing to light [of] situations that might have previously remained concealed in the 
economy and values of the traditional news media” (Madianou, 2013: 250) that the 
problem lies. While social media can spark MSM coverage, the way MSM portray a story 
may remain out of social media’s grasp. 
 
In performing a discourse analysis of MSM articles from four distinct periods of 
this event, it appeared that social media was responsible for influencing MSM coverage 
of the Chibok abduction. However, this social media influence, essentially setting the 
MSM agenda(s), did not give social media complete power. The way MSM presented the 
issue was, for the most part, out of social media’s control. The results of the MSM CDA 
for the Abduction Period, demonstrate coverage was minimal. The prevalence of the 
discourses of Superiority, Insignificance, and ‘Backwards’ Africa served to enforce 
unequal power relations and cast the event as nothing out of the ordinary. The articles 
for the Abduction Period were of minimal length and substance, which pointed to the 
issue as unimportant. Furthermore, due to the event’s origins, this manner of coverage 
enforced the hegemonic practices that have come to underpin relations between the west 
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and the global south (Gramsci, 1971). Such lacklustre coverage suggested the event did 
not fit in with the agendas of MSM, and, as such, they may have had little desire to 
dedicate thorough coverage to the abduction.  
 
The next surveyed period, the Hashtag Begins Period, examined the point at 
which MSM began to dedicate greater coverage to the abduction, under the influence of 
the #BringBackOurGirls’ virality. The discourses serving to perpetuate the hegemonic 
relationship, through which the west exerts dominance over the global south, remained 
in place within coverage from this period; in the form of Superiority; ‘Backwards’ Africa; 
and the emergence of the Western Saviour discourse. However, most notably, another 
discourse arose during this period, the Self-awareness discourse. While only minor, the 
Self-awareness discourse is highlighted in this discussion due to the way it portrayed 
social media negatively, and was openly critical of MSM, despite featuring within this 
very medium. As discussed in the Results chapter, the Self-awareness discourse criticised 
the limits of hashtag activism and lamented MSM’s failure to dedicate coverage to the 
Chibok region at the time of the abduction. There was a definitive recognition of social 
media’s role in turning the MSM’s attention towards the event, and while this may appear 
positive for social media, MSM used the notoriety of #BringBackOurGirls to point out 
the shortcomings of the medium. The MSM was critical of social media trends doing 
little to help those that such activism aims to support; instead, MSM claimed those who 
reap the benefits are the activists themselves. In essence, MSM recognised the inherent 
Ironic Solidarity of contemporary OSMs. Hegemonic elements were rife within in 
MSM’s coverage, but despite this MSM highlighted misrepresentations of Africa. 
Through the Self-awareness discourse, MSM claimed social media’s representations of 
Africa as needy and primitive served to enforce difference between the west the global 
south. While the Self-awareness discourse also maintained a minor presence within the 
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sampled tweets, it is not as critical as it was in MSM. Concerning this research, such a 
finding indicates that while social media can influence MSM’s coverage of an event, it has 
little bearing on how MSM then portray said event. In fact, influencing the MSM’s 
agenda may even prove harmful for social media. MSM coverage of an issue, under the 
influence of social media trends, may propel an issue to further notoriety; as MSM 
audiences, some of whom are unaware of social media trends, are exposed to them 
(Rogstad, 2016). However, MSM can skew the intended narrative of a trend, which has 
the potential to erode the support of even the most dedicated activist.  
 
Trajectory as an indication of influence 
One of the most notable features of social media is its rapid dissemination of 
information. Such saturation online means issues or events can quickly become ‘old 
news.’ While in the traditional sphere of MSM, a news story might maintain headlines for 
weeks or even months, social media can see a trend quickly lose relevance, and be 
replaced. As such, if social media trends influence MSM, it will follow the same path 
(Mare, 2013). If MSM fails to respond, by not moving on to the next big thing, it is at 
risk of losing its audience. Social media, by comparison, provides a mix of news and 
information that is non-hierarchical and ever-changing (Hermida, 2012), making it an 
attractive alternative to MSM. van Laer and van Aelst (2010: 1163) note, regarding 
OSMs, growth in rapid support is almost always followed by an even faster decline in 
support. While it is somewhat easy to attract people to support online action, maintaining 
their attention within the fast-paced sphere of social media is not viable (van Laer & van 
Aelst, 2010). Regarding the #BringBackOurGirls movement, this means the hashtag’s 
sudden deterioration in support (Figure 3) is not unusual. To prove social media 
influenced MSM coverage, we would expect to see the same descent at the same time. 
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Notably, each of the three MSM outlets adhered to this trend. TNYT’s, TG’s, and AJ’s 
coverage related to the abduction and the popularity of #BringBackOurGirls declined in 
June 2014 (Figures 2, 3). Such a result suggests that MSM’s coverage, in this case, was 
linked to the trajectory of the social media movement. As the hashtag became a 
prominent topic on social media, the issue gained MSM attention, and when online 
support dwindled, the MSM’s coverage did too. This trend is maintained, by each of 
surveyed outlets, throughout the entire two-year period analysed; with peaks occurring at 
the anniversaries of the abduction, as social media interest was briefly reignited, followed 
by little to no coverage.  
 
Conclusion 
While #BringBackOurGirls initially emerged on the social media platform of 
Twitter, these results posit MSM coverage further bolstered the movement’s influence. 
Initial coverage of the Chibok abduction on MSM was minor, demonstrating that this 
was an event outside of the mainstream news agenda. Although social media’s ability to 
direct MSM coverage is contested (Rogstad, 2016), the results of this MSM’s sudden 
interest in May 2014. The heights of coverage #BringBackOurGirls reached on social 
media, in tandem with MSM levels of coverage, appear responsible for propelling this 
issue from the margins to the centre of public discourse. However, it is worth noting that 
this coverage was not sustained. The trajectory of #BringBackOurGirls and MSM’s 
coverage of the Chibok abduction both followed the same path: a sudden, prolific rise to 
notoriety, followed by an abrupt descent into minimal use and coverage. Hashtags have 
been heralded as news stories in their own right, and social media regarded as a new hub 
for news. The abduction exemplifies this. This story was plucked from obscurity, 
propelled forward on social media through a hashtag, and gained immense MSM 
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coverage in the process. However, MSM’s Self-awareness discourse, identified during the 
Hashtag Begins Period, reveals a disdain for social media’s setting of the news agenda, as 
well as MSM reflecting on why they had failed to regard the abduction as newsworthy 
from the outset. 
 
Research Question 2 
Were there differences in attitudes/sentiments 
between mainstream media and social media coverage 
of the #BringBackOurGirls movement? What do such 
differences, or similarities, indicate? 
 
Examining the differences, or similarities, between distinct media forms’ 
coverage of #BringBackOurGirls, is essential to understanding the movement itself. In 
this examination, the MSM refer to the combined coverage of the selected MSM 
newspapers. As such, difference between the sampled outlets (TNYT; TG; AJ) is not of 
significance. To examine the differences in attitudes or sentiments of MSM and social 
media coverage of #BringBackOurGirls, the CDA of articles and tweets was utilised. As 
the CDA results indicated, the sampled Twitter tweets expressed a greater diversity of 
discourse, while MSM tended to rely upon the same discourses throughout the two-year 
period. However, in spite of this difference of diversity, the prevailing discourses of 
MSM and Twitter were far more similar than different.  
 
Overarching discourses 
The overarching discourses of this study were identified through combining the 
CDA results of the four sampled periods. The prevailing discourses of MSM were: 
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‘Backwards’ Africa; Western Saviour; and Superiority. Social media’s overarching 
discourses were: ‘Backwards’ Africa; Sympathy; and Self-interest. The overarching 
discourses within MSM and social media were very similar, despite them emanating from 
different media platforms. MSM, in particular, tended to the event through a reliance on 
familiar tropes of the global south. Social media acted similarly, as evidenced by the 
‘Backwards’ Africa discourse’s prevalence. Notably, the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse was 
the most prominent discourse within MSM and social media coverage. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse works to enforce a colonialist, imperialist 
response to the abduction; therefore, casting the event as common within the barbaric 
‘dark continent’ it occurred (Bassil, 2011). The most prevalent discourses of both media 
forms are all those adhering to a power dynamic. These discourses work to empower one 
group above another, enacting a hegemonic relationship that seeks to disenfranchise an 
already subjugated group.  
 
Interpreting discourses 
Power dynamic discourses, as defined in this research, are discourses that serve 
to enact an unequal power relationship through ideological forces and the perpetuation 
of hegemony. As indicated by the CDA results, the most prominent discourses for both 
MSM and social media are discourses enacting this power dynamic. The ‘Backwards’ 
Africa discourse invents a version of Africa that elides the cultural complexities of the 
continent (Mekgwe, 2010). As such, the ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse constructs Africa 
and the wider global south within “a paradigm of difference” (Mekgwe, 2010: 191) that 
favours the west. The Western Saviour, Superiority, and Sympathy discourses act 
similarly, through the enforcement of difference between the west and the global south. 
Within these discourses, the west represents the ‘self’, the superior figure, while the 
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global south or Africa represents the ‘other’, a hapless victim, in need of western support 
(Hall, 1992: 318). Power dynamic discourses disenfranchise members of the global south, 
through casting them as ‘other’. Othering, in this sense, establishes global south subjects 
as figures distanced from the west, both geographically and symbolically, therefore 
determining them to be inferior to westerners (Chilisa & Ntseane, 2010: 618). Such 
representations maintain a Eurocentric historical outlook, which serves to essentialise the 
cultures of the global south (Mekgwe, 2010: 193). Thus, enforcing the hegemonic 
relationship that Agnew (2005) posits to have mediated relations between the west and 
global south for centuries.  
 
The Self-interest discourse adheres to the same hegemonic practices, although 
not as evidently. Self-interest is a self-serving discourse; it involves an actor making a 
distant others’ plight about themselves, and how that plight this might impact upon 
them. It is through this emphasis on the self and ignorance of the other that the Self-
interest discourse enables actors to exhibit power over the other; in the case of 
#BringBackOurGirls, the other represents the global south. When the global south is 
condensed to an object of contemplation, or an opportunity for a western actor to 
communicate their care for Africans (Tiplady Higgs, 2015: 345), the colonial and imperial 
dynamics that have shaped and governed the global south for centuries, are enforced. 
Therefore, power dynamic discourses serve not only to disenfranchise the already 
disenfranchised, but also to further fortify their positions of inferiority.  
 
The most prevalent discourses of MSM and social media are all considered power 
dynamic discourses. This classification stems from the way they each serve to enforce an 
unequal power relationship. Such inequality is considered the perpetuation of a 
hegemonic relationship. The prevalence of discourses adhering to the power dynamic 
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definitions indicates MSM and social media approached #BringBackOurGirls similarly. 
With such prevalence suggesting #BringBackOurGirls was presented, and engaged with, 
in a manner accentuating and enforcing differences between the west and global south.  
 
Change over time 
MSM discourses remained relatively constant over time, with ‘Backwards’ Africa 
maintaining the lead at each period. For the most part, all of the discourses revealed 
exhibited hegemonic traits, in alignment with the power dynamic definition. The 
introduction of non-power dynamic discourses did occur, but minimally. The Self-
awareness discourse actively critiqued the unequal power distribution that accompanies 
media coverage of the global south, but this discourse was not abundantly present. The 
arrival of the Feminist discourse, at the First Anniversary Period, was again an 
opportunity to overcome the negativities of the power dynamic discourses. However, the 
Feminist discourse presence was relatively lacklustre, regarding overall prevalence and 
longevity; appearing minimally for one period. The Feminist discourse also aligned with 
the power dynamic discourse, and this will be discussed in greater depth subsequently. 
Therefore, MSM’s coverage of the abduction and #BringBackOurGirls was linear 
throughout the two-year sample period. Other than two insignificant deviations, the 
power dynamic discourses reigned supreme throughout MSM coverage. 
 
As noted earlier, social media coverage demonstrated a greater diversity of 
discourse than revealed within MSM. Such diversity is demonstrated through the high 
number of emotionally grounded discourses, such as Accomplishment; Disgust; Distrust; 
Optimism; Anger; and Frustration. While the most prevalent discourses were selected 
through which discourses maintained high propensity during three or more sampled 
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periods, social media’s CDA results are interesting due to dramatic shifts from period to 
period. Although CDA of MSM articles consistently revealed the ‘Backwards’ Africa 
discourse to be the most prevalent discourse, social media’s most dominant discourse 
changed at each period. The Abduction Period revealed ‘Backwards’ Africa as most 
prevalent; the Hashtag Begins Period identified the Sympathy discourse as dominant; the 
First Anniversary Period saw the Frustration discourse emerge as most prevalent, and the 
Second Anniversary Period revealed the Sympathy discourse to be most prevalent. As 
these results depict, the social media coverage was more fluid than MSM coverage. 
Sentiment and attitude shifts were common, and arc back the prevalence of emotionally 
grounded discourses. While emotionally grounded discourses are absent, for the most 
part, from MSM coverage, they were abundant within social media coverage. Such 
discourses enable an actor to share their feelings; something MSM shies away from to 
remain objective. The context of social media encourages the value sharing and intimacy 
attained through emotionally grounded discourses. The emotionally grounded discourses 
identified through this research’s Twitter CDA again enforce hegemonic relationships, 
hence their classification as power dynamic discourses. So, while there might be a greater 
variety of discourses within social media coverage, they nonetheless served to perpetuate 
hegemony. The prevalence of power dynamic discourses within social media again points 
to similarities regarding how MSM and social media approached this event. Discourse 
differentiation may occur, but the discourses serve to create the same effects.  
 
Conclusion 
MSM and social media covered the Chibok abduction and #BringBackOurGirls 
through attitudes that served to ‘other’ and enforce unequal relations. The most 
prevalent discourses were power dynamic discourses that served to perpetuate the 
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hegemonic relationships that benefit the west and disenfranchise the global south. Both 
media forms relied upon tropes of the global south and Africa, which cast subjects from 
these regions as needy, barbaric, and inferior. Such inequity and discrimination have 
hallmarked communication between the west and global south for centuries, yet in our 
supposedly ‘post-colonial’ world, such practices have been eliminated (Heugh, 2011). 
However, as these results depict, such power dynamics featured dominantly within 
coverage from two distinct media forms.  
 
Research Question 3 
What contributed to making the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement so globally relevant? 
 
The Chibok abduction did not ignite global outrage overnight. Analysis of the 
Abduction Period revealed MSM had portrayed the event as insignificant and dedicated 
little coverage to the matter. The same period saw minor engagement around #Chibok; 
where discourses of Disgust, Distrust, and Sympathy, showcased this event as significant 
to members of the public. The concern for the abducted Chibok students progressed 
into the creation of #BringBackOurGirls by the Nigerian community. The hashtag 
developed into something more and exploded in May 2014 (Figure 3). MSM coverage of 
the abduction, now with the additional angle of the hashtag, suddenly increased. MSM 
levels of coverage grew by 670 percent in May 2014, when compared to coverage in 




Social media virality 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the fact MSM coverage increased so 
dramatically after the creation and success of #BringBackOurGirls, indicated the 
hashtag’s virality played a role in focusing MSM attention. However, while this explains 
MSM coverage, it leaves the question of why the hashtag rose to prominence on social 
media unanswered. The creation of #BringBackOurGirls launched a discussion of the 
abduction, that was absent in other media reporting of the event. The hashtag amplified 
the outrage and discontent within the kidnapped students’ communities and Nigeria as a 
whole. The emotion embedded within the tweets that featured the hashtag provided 
alternate views of the issue. In essence, #BringBackOurGirls created a mouthpiece for a 
counterpublic (Leung & Lee, 2014: 343). A counterpublic represents a collection of 
diverse voices that, for whatever reason, have been excluded from the mainstream public 
dialogue. Given the lack of attention the abduction received in MSM, at the Abduction 
Period, it was most certainly an issue relegated to the margins of global public discourse. 
Therefore, through #BringBackOurGirls a counterpublic was enabled and formalised. 
Castells (2015: 252) claims counterpublics, as established through social media, can 
garner immense levels of support through the manner they display injustice and trigger 
hope at the possibility of change. #BringBackOurGirls represented multiple injustices: 
the kidnap of female students; persecution based on gender; government inaction; and 
exclusion from the mainstream public agenda. Fotopoulou (2016: 991) claims digital 
networks are efficient, in mobilising support and growing in dissemination, due to the 
unique ways they frame public concerns. While MSM’s framing of the abduction at the 
Abduction Period framed the event as unimportant (Figure 4), as evidenced by the 
minimal coverage and embedded discourses; #BringBackOurGirls represented the 
inherent injustices of the abduction and provided a space to challenge domination, share 
outrage, and feel connected (Castells, 2015: 257).  




The participatory culture of social media, and the virtual groupings it enables, 
also contributes to the development of counterpublics in an online setting (Keller, 2012). 
The Internet is a “many-to-many medium” (van Laer & van Aelst, 2010: 1151), wherein 
ideas and issues diffuse on an unprecedented scale. While traditional forms of media 
previously dictated what issues were important, the advent of social media has 
reconceptualised the media consumer (Clark, 2016). #BringBackOurGirls exemplifies 
the participatory culture of social media. The hashtag represents an issue deemed 
unimportant by MSM but thrust into the spotlight through the recognition of its inherent 
injustices, as facilitated by the ability of media consumers to participate in the 
construction of cultural texts (Keller, 2012: 434). The #BringBackOurGirls movement 
offered an opportunity for empowerment, as involvement in the movement required 
making an affective statement in front of an audience. However, Keller (2012: 2000) 
argues in the context of a hashtag this potential for empowerment is greater still, as 
hashtags consist of more provocative statements, and one’s position is immediately 
identifiable. As such, the role of hashtag activism with this movement could also be 
responsible for its global relevance.  
 
 Hashtags enable social media users to “label the meanings they express” 
(Zappavigna, 2012: 1). Tagging online speech enables “searchable talk” (Zappavigna, 2012: 
1; emphasis in original), wherein discourse is marked so that it might be found by others 
who share the same interests. Therefore, hashtags enable users to bond around particular 
values, as they signify who a user is, and what they represent. Thus, hashtagging is a 
result of the human desire for affiliation; it is a method of value sharing and meaning 
making within social networks (Zappavigna, 2012: 38; Zappavigna, 2013: 212). In the 
context of the #BringBackOurGirls, the hashtag activism it represented provided an 
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opportunity for participants to express their values, and project their identity in an online 
setting. As with other examples of hashtag activism, #BringBackOurGirls expanded 
from its online origins and into the real world; aided by its pre-established slogan, high 
levels of participation, and overall notoriety (Latina & Docherty, 2014; Stache, 2015). 
The opportunity for self-expression afforded by #BringBackOurGirls, teamed with its 
counterpublic roots, contributed to the development of the movement.  
 
Ease of participation 
 Traditionally, social movements required a great deal of effort, and were thus 
costly to the participant; concerning time dedicated, money spent, and physical factors, 
such as, attending protests. In contrast, OSMs are much easier to participate in and come 
at minimal cost to participants. For some participants of #BringBackOurGirls, 
participation involved clicking ‘retweet.’ In fact, the prevalence of retweets throughout 
the four time periods sampled in this research grew at every stage. Retweets continually 
accounted for over half of the sampled tweets at each period, including an especially high 
rate at the Second Anniversary Period, which revealed three out of every four tweets 
from the period was a retweet. Tweets that featured no text other than 
#BringBackOurGirls were also present, but not to the same degree. Such hashtag-only 
tweets indicate minimal action as they involve a participant only typing a hashtag without 
any other accompanying material. Harlow (2011) asks whether a member of an OSM can 
truly be dedicated to a cause if their action only consists of “clicking a mouse” (229) or 
copy-pasting something. In retweeting, or sharing a hashtag-only tweet, participants do 
not even have to go through the effort of crafting their own message. They simply 
disseminate another’s message further, in essence, letting the writer of said message 
speak for them too. #BringBackOurGirls’ high rates of retweeting, and presence of 
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hashtag-only tweets, are slacktivism. Slacktivism is a form of low-cost online action that 
requires little effort and achieves little (Glenn, 2015). Slacktivism’s benefits stem from 
the way it makes a participant feel, with Lee and Hsieh (2013) comparing its effects to 
that of traditional civic action. However, slacktivism is considered a show of token 
support and may result in a lack of meaningful, costly engagement. While some 
participants of the #BringBackOurGirls movement were happy to share a hashtag, 
through tweeting or retweeting, assumedly this was the limit of their engagement. It was 
unlikely these participants would go on to undertake more meaningful contributions to 
the cause (Kristofferson et al., 2014).  #BringBackOurGirls was presented to the public 
as an act of protest and civic action that they could participate in easily, and that is 
exactly what the public did. The discourses discovered within Twitter tweets attest to 
this. The prevalence of self-serving discourses, such as Superiority; Sympathy; Prayer; 
Self-interest; and Accomplishment, instilled participants with the ‘feel-good’ feeling 
(Glenn, 2015) that the slacktivism is known for. Therefore, it appears that many of the 
participants of #BringBackOurGirls neglected the true purpose of the hashtag. 
#BringBackOurGirls became less about the abduction and its associated aims, (Khoja-
Moolji, 2015), and more about self-expression. As such, the focus on the self that the 
embedded discourses of the tweets represent, emphasise the slacktivist nature of this 
movement.  
 
Representation of the global south 
 #BringBackOurGirls’ origins lie in the global south, in particular, Nigeria. As 
such, the movement’s aims were designed to benefit this region. As the movement 
spread beyond its initial borders, people distanced from the realities of the global south 
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began to participate. The discourses embedded in #BringBackOurGirls on Twitter, 
demonstrate this change.  
 
Power dynamic discourses of ‘Backwards’ Africa, Superiority, and Western 
Saviour, which were prevalent within tweets, enforce a hegemonic relationship between 
the west and global south, in a manner benefitting the west. This is a time-worn, familiar 
representation of the global south. Audiences recognise this imperialist and colonial 
depiction of Africa. It involves tropes of the continent as uncivilised and barbaric; 
stereotypes that should be combatted. However, such tropes provide a sense of security, 
as audiences know how to respond to such a matter. Many respond by further 
perpetuating such tropes, hence the continuation of the power dynamic discourses 
throughout the periods selected for analysis. It is through the perpetuation of these 
misrepresentations that #BringBackOurGirls rose to global prominence. When the event 
was cast through this lens, audiences recognised a longstanding representation. Thus, 
these audiences felt comfortable engaging with the movement in the same manner they 
would have a charity appeal for Oxfam – through a token gesture of support. In this 
case, the token gesture was sharing #BringBackOurGirls, being rewarded with 
slacktivism’s ‘feel-good’ feeling, before losing interest in the event. When shroud in 
power dynamic discourses, the inherent seriousness of the abduction as represented by 
#BringBackOurGirls was neglected. Audiences felt comfortable enacting slacktivist 
behaviour in response, as that is how tragedies in the global south are typically addressed, 
but this minimal gesture merely satiated their need for action, and they moved forward 
fulfilled, while the tragedy, despite its ‘trending’ status, remained untended. 
 




 The Chibok abduction represented by #BringBackOurGirls became a global 
event following the hashtag’s virality on social media and MSM coverage. While this 
research points to MSM’s coverage being influenced by the online trend of 
#BringBackOurGirls, the factors behind the hashtag’s rise to global prominence were 
not as well understood. This research maintains the #BringBackOurGirls movement 
attained global virality through a combination of factors. Social media’s role in 
establishing a counterpublic saw audiences engage with the injustices inherent within the 
abduction. The participatory nature of social media provided a space wherein emotional 
reactions could be shared, and hope at the possibility of change could be fostered. Also, 
the role of hashtag activism in this movement enabled value sharing which helped to 
disseminate the message further. The ease of access provided by social media, regarding 
contributing to this social movement, was also paramount in attaining global relevance. 
This was further bolstered by the slacktivist nature of participation within 
#BringBackOurGirls; with the click of a retweet button enabling participants to feel 
rewarded. Furthermore, the engagement of western audiences in a movement from the 
global south, manifested in reliance on tropes of Africa, as evidenced by the power 
dynamic discourses. The interactions audiences had with #BringBackOurGirls saw them 
recognise the familiar way in which to respond to such tragedy, and this familiarity made 
the movement more attractive to audiences. Without these factors, #BringBackOurGirls 
and the abduction may have remained on the periphery of global discourse. However, 
these reasons behind engagement do not, at first glance, showcase a public determined to 
‘bring back’ the students. Maintaining an understanding of the factors that led to 
#BringBackOurGirls’ relevance is important. However, relevance is not the central 
feature of humanitarian communication; understanding the incentives for involvement is 




Research Question 4 
What were the incentives behind people’s involvement 
in the #BringBackOurGirls movement? Were 
participants acting in solidarity or self-interest? 
 
The #BringBackOurGirls movement is a prime example of humanitarian 
communication in the new technological age. Humanitarian communication has always 
aimed to ignite a sense of solidarity. However, appropriate solidary action hinges upon 
the ignition of a cosmopolitan impulse. Chouliaraki (2008) defines cosmopolitanism as 
the promotion of identification with distant strangers who do not readily belong to one’s 
community. In Chapter Two, this thesis deemed the ideal expression of solidarity to be 
Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism. Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism recognises the asymmetric power 
distributions that have long defined humanitarian communication and aims to eliminate 
these through depicting distant others accurately (Corpus Ong, 2009). The inequality 
Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism seeks to eliminate is defined as the Politics of Pity; which 
serves to disenfranchise vulnerable others by appropriating them within western 
discourses (Chouliaraki, 2010). The Politics of Pity exacerbates the distance between 
other and spectator, resulting in the emergence of tropes of imperialism and colonialism 
(Littler, 2008). While the Politics of Pity has long been a hallmark of humanitarian 
communication, Chouliaraki (2013a) posits this has now shifted towards a paradigm of 
solidarity as irony. Within Ironic Solidarity, the suffering of distant others becomes more 
tangible and interesting through the invitation for self-reflection (Chouliaraki, 2013a: 20). 
Thus, Ironic Solidarity is defined as public solidary action, wherein action has become an 
individual pursuit designed to reward the self in a way which can be publically recognised 
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(Eagleton, 2009; Chouliaraki, 2013a). This study maintains that Ecstatic 
Cosmopolitanism is the ideal solidary reaction, while Ironic Solidarity would display an 
individual to be acting in self-interest. 
 
Before #BringBackOurGirls’ rise to virality, the hashtag represented a small 
community determined to secure the freedom of the abducted students. 
#BringBackOurGirls’ humble origins as a local Nigerian campaign are important to 
remember. The hashtag was initially a response to the perceived inaction of the Nigerian 
government, and as such intended to raise awareness in Nigeria for the students’ plight. 
#BringBackOurGirls’ development towards hashtag activism and humanitarian 
communication on a global scale, was unintentional (Maxfield, 2015). Madianou (2013) 
states social media use within humanitarian communication holds the promise of 
“fostering a cosmopolitan public” (250); in examining individuals’ responses to 
#BringBackOurGirls, such a claim might be realised. However, as the hashtag bounced 
around the globe, it may have come to be represented, in different ways than intended. 
#BringBackOurGirls may have grown from pure solidary origins, but whether it 
continued to embody these traits is yet to be known. The next paragraphs seek to 
understand the incentives behind involvement in #BringBackOurGirls, and whether 
participants may have acted in solidarity or self-interest. 
 
Response 
In examining individuals’ incentives behind involvement in the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement, MSM discourses are of little relevance. Instead this 
section is concerned with Twitter discourses; in particular, the discourses of Prayer; 




The Twitter discourses announced above all bear striking similarities regarding 
the way they facilitate an individual focus. The tweets these discourses featured within 
generally displayed a sense of care for, and identification with, the plight of the distant 
others they addressed. CDA enabled a more in-depth examination of these tweets, 
revealing their discourses and self-serving natures. While these tweets appeared to display 
solidarity with #BringBackOurGirls and what it represented, the presence of certain 
discourses revealed these tweets were vehicles for performances of the self. Papacharissi 
(2012) believes Twitter provides a space for “individuals [to] perform the self in 140 
characters or less” (1989). Within this space of self-performance, individuals can present 
an ideal version of themselves – an ideal that may not be truly reflective of oneself, but 
instead all the best parts (Muenter, 2014 cited in Alaoui, 2015: 32). The discourses of 
Prayer, Anger, Self-interest, Sympathy, and Frustration are elements of self-expressive 
communication, which focuses on “the emotionality of the [individual], rather than the 
vulnerability of the distant other as a key motivation for solidarity” (Chouliaraki, 2013a: 
17). The formation of idealised selves aligns with Chouliaraki’s (2013a: 16) dramaturgical 
consciousness argument, which claims social media’s connectivity has enabled a theatre 
of sorts, wherein acts of solidarity become a performance of the self. Therefore, tweets 
from the #BringBackOurGirls movement that involve outbursts of anger, or share 
prayers for the abducted students, are not examples of solidary action but instead 
displays of self-interest. Through the performance of the self, individuals can imagine 
themselves as citizens who act and speak out in the name of a moral cause, without 
taking tangible action (Chouliaraki, 2012).  
 
Within the performance of the self, the “hoped-for, possible selves” (Skoric, 
2012: 81) inherent to the definition of slacktivism are apparent. Slacktivism is considered 
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a “pointless exercise” (Skoric, 2012: 77) because such action does not involve a financial 
or personal risk, but serves instead as a “form of light commitment that brings only 
social acknowledgement and praise” (78; Boltanski, 1999). This light commitment is 
demonstrated within the aforementioned Twitter discourses that steer away from the 
true aims of #BringBackOurGirls. Instead, tweets expressing these discourses focus on 
the benefit to the self; evidencing what Madianou (2013) labels a “fetishization of action” 
(260), removed from an understanding of the contexts or causes of suffering. While 
slacktivism provides individuals with that ‘feel-good’ feeling, their actions have produced 
no meaningful contribution, and their engagement will end before any tangible action is 
achieved (Skoric, 2012).  
 
The #BringBackOurGirls movement achieved great support in May 2014, before 
numbers dropped and the movement stagnated (Figure 4). This occurrence provides 
evidence of Carter Olson’s (2016) claims that #BringBackOurGirls was an example of 
time-bound activism. Time-bound activism refers to the way activist movements amass 
huge support in a short amount of time, but fail to sustain such levels over time (Carter 
Olson, 2016; Chouliaraki, 2010: 117). Brock (2012) claims time-bound activism is a result 
of the “weak tie relationships” (531) enabled by Twitter. Weak tie relationships 
encourage initial support, but fail to engage individuals beyond this; meaning those who 
do participate in movements such as #BringBackOurGirls, do so not because they are 
invested in contributing to its aims, but due to current trends. The online activism of 
#BringBackOurGirls was not long-lasting, just a fleeting moment of awareness, quickly 





Politics of Pity 
The Politics of Pity within humanitarian communication was supposedly ousted 
by Ironic Solidarity (Chouliaraki, 2013a). However, the power dynamic discourses, as 
revealed in the tweets from #BringBackOurGirls, demonstrate hallmarks of the Politics 
of Pity. Within the Politics of Pity, Chouliaraki (2010) believes distant others are cast as 
“objects of contemplation” (110), and therefore, individuals fail to connect with the 
humanity of others (Boltanski, 1999). In this context, such representation enables distant 
others to be appropriated within western discourses. For instance, in examining the 
‘Backwards’ Africa discourse, the analysis determined it portrayed Africa as a barbaric, 
‘dark’ continent, wherein events such as the Chibok abduction occurred regularly (Bassil, 
2011). The ‘Backwards’ Africa discourse is a power dynamic discourse, as it perpetuates 
the hegemonic relationship between the west and global south; in doing so, proliferating 
the colonial and imperial histories that work to disempower already vulnerable subjects. 
The presence of the Politics of Pity within participants’ involvement in 
#BringBackOurGirls, again demonstrates a lack of appropriate solidary engagement. 
While the Politics of Pity does not denote self-interest, it certainly does not convey 
Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism.  
 
Ironic Solidarity 
The majority of the discourses embedded within #BringBackOurGirls are those 
that fail to ignite the solidary ideal of Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism. In fact, many of the 
discourses (Prayer; Anger; Self-interest; Sympathy; Frustration) instead indicate 
participants of the #BringBackOurGirls movement acted not in solidarity, but instead 
self-interest. As such, there is a presence of Ironic Solidarity within #BringBackOurGirls.  
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    #BringBackOurGirls sought to raise awareness of the injustices surrounding the 
Chibok abduction. Therefore, through participation in the movement one can assume an 
individual had aimed to eliminate said injustices. However, as indicated by the presence 
of Ironic Solidarity and the overwhelming presence of power dynamic discourses, these 
injustices (unequal power relations; lack of autonomy; insignificance) are perpetuated. 
The inequality perpetuated through Ironic Solidarity responses to the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement affirm the participants as superior actors, and those 
represented by the hashtag as unimportant, subordinate ‘others’. In keeping with Khoja-
Moolji’s (2015) claim that what individuals who participated #BringBackOurGirls drew 
from, and rearticulated, “long-standing colonial and imperial conceptualizations” about 
Africans, third world women, and Muslims (349). Thus, enforcing the hegemonic 
relationship between the west and the global south (Agnew, 2005). 
 
The presence of Ironic Solidarity reveals participants of #BringBackOurGirls 
used the online movement not to draw attention to the plight of abducted students, but 
instead to draw attention to themselves. Using the hashtag, and what it represented, as a 
tool of self-expression generated this attention. In making the hashtag about them – 
through drawing attention to how the event had affected them emotionally as in the Self-
interest and Frustration discourses – participants displayed themselves as humanitarian 
actors. However, their action was minimal, and by focusing on themselves, they 
detracted the issue at hand: the abducted students. Madianou (2013) claims when 
individuals perform actions without a reflexive understanding of the issue at hand, any 
moral meaning is lost. As such, the cultivation of a cosmopolitan sensibility requires a 
reflexive awareness of the self and others (Madianou, 2013: 260-261). Through 
participants’ focus on self-expression, within #BringBackOurGirls, their capacity for 




Ironic Solidarity is marked by a propensity toward minimal action, similar to 
slacktivist engagement, within humanitarian communication. The Prayer discourse 
exemplifies this minimal action superbly. Through the Prayer discourse participants again 
detract from the core aims of #BringBackOurGirls by championing a low-cost, low-
commitment method of action, this study regards as ineffective. The Prayer discourse 
exemplifies Ironic Solidarity in action because it focuses on the self. Prayer, in the 
context of humanitarian communication, is slacktivism because it requires minimal effort 
from the participant but satiates their appetite for action. Additionally, the action, as 
showcased through the Prayer discourse, has no measurable effect on the situation; it is 
not of monetary value, nor is it tangible. Boltanski (1999: 17-18) claims speech can only 
be considered a form of action if it serves to reduce suffering; the Prayer discourse is 
therefore detached from action. For these reasons, the Prayer discourse is regarded as an 
expression of Ironic Solidarity and provides further evidence of participants acting in 
self-interest in response to #BringBackOurGirls. 
 
Conclusion 
While the online activism of the #BringBackOurGirls movement may have 
served to rouse awareness for its cause, awareness is not tangible. Twitter trends do not 
indicate palpable action. In the case of #BringBackOurGirls, it comprised simply of 
words on a screen (Boltanski, 1999). Participants engaged with #BringBackOurGirls but 
through the problematic responses of the Politics of Pity and Ironic Solidarity, not the 
cosmopolitan ideal of Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism. Within this response, the rights of 
‘distant others’ are ignored, and the inequalities that plague relations between the west 
and the global south are enforced. Therefore, the benefits stemming from 
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#BringBackOurGirls were for its participants – who shared the hashtag and felt 
rewarded as a result – and not the movement’s central subjects. Fenton (2007: 235) 
claims solidarity is about engaging beyond the click of a mouse; and in the case of 
#BringBackOurGirls, this has not occurred.  The majority of the abducted students 
remain missing, and rescue efforts have stagnated (Coughlan, 2017). As such, the 
abundant presence of the Politics of Pity and Ironic Solidarity indicate the incentives 
behind participants’ involvement #BringBackOurGirls were not appropriately solidary in 
nature; instead, participants acted in self-interest. This outcome is problematic, as 
Madianou (2013) warns: 
without an understanding of the causes of humanitarian appeals and without a moral 
framework of engagement with distant others, action becomes almost meaningless at 
least when evaluated from a standpoint of cosmopolitan ethics (260) 
 
Research Question 5 
What role, if any, did the inclusion of western first 
world feminism play in the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement? In what way(s) might this impact upon 
third world women?  
 
#BringBackOurGirls was heralded as a feminist campaign and an example of 
hashtag feminism in action (Khoja-Moolji, 2015). It was such feminist attribution that 
influenced the direction of this thesis; as #BringBackOurGirls provided a grand example 
of an OFM in the context of humanitarian communication. By researching the hashtag 
in-depth, this study posited it would likely uncover the presence of feminist discourses 
that could provide grand insight(s) into the interplays between feminism and 
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humanitarian communication in the technological age. However, this was not the case. 
Instead, the CDA of Twitter tweets and MSM articles identified only the minimal 
presence of one broad Feminist discourse. Thereby, this finding casts doubt onto 
#BringBackOurGirls’ strength as an OFM; but also provides the opportunity to decipher 
what this movement represented, or came to represent, and how this might impact those 
at the core, the movement’s subjects: third world women.  
 
As discussed, the majority of the discourses identified through this research’s 
CDA were power dynamic in nature, in that they served to enforce hegemony. Amongst 
these discourses was the minor presence of the Feminist discourse. While the Feminist 
discourse demonstrated the key ideals of equality that underpin feminism, it was often 
found in tandem with power dynamic discourses. Such concurrence indicated the 
Feminist discourse exhibited traits of western first world feminism, rather than third 
world feminism. Given this was a supposedly third world feminist movement such a 
revelation is fascinating. #BringBackOurGirls began as a method of raising awareness 
about the abduction amongst the Nigerian community, but then became a rallying cry for 
women’s rights in the global south. This research reveals that it took on another meaning 
through western involvement in the movement. As such, this research contends any 
elements of #BringBackOurGirls as a third world feminist movement were usurped by 
western first world feminism through the explicit appropriation of #BringBackOurGirls 
(Berents, 2016: 8).  
 
Enforcing hegemony 
While the feminist traits of this movement were predicted to be much more 
prevalent than CDA revealed them to be, their minimal presence still warrants 
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discussion. As established, #BringBackOurGirls’ roots lie in the global south. As such, 
this movement was born out of the third world, but CDA has revealed its overarching 
discourses, as well as the Feminist discourse, to be inherently western in nature. Western 
first world feminism is steeped in a history of exclusion and prejudice (Rejer, 2012: 20). 
Yu (2009: 8) claims when western first world feminism encounters third world women, it 
continues to approach their issues within the context of western culture. As such, 
women in the third world are condensed into “symbol[s] of oppression, subordination 
and victimhood” (Yu, 2009: 9). Western first world feminism neglects third world 
women’s cultural needs, and their sources of oppression. Instead demarcating the space 
between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ by establishing the west as “free” (Chowdhury, 2009: 52) and 
the global south as “powerless” (Mohanty, 1991: 57). Furthermore, while western first 
world feminism labels patriarchy as their main source of oppression, third world 
feminism is less concerned with patriarchal forces. Instead, third world feminism is 
“committed to each and every person” (Eisenstein, 2004: 207), making this feminism “a 
more inclusive notion of humanity” (207).  
 
The presence of western traits within the Feminist discourse of 
#BringBackOurGirls served to usurp this third world feminist movement. The western 
gaze established third world women as helpless victims, in need of rescuing (McEwan, 
2001: 99; Mansoor, 2016: 2-3). A continuation of what Spivak (1981: 155 cited in 
Mansoor, 2016) considers the establishment of third world women as colonial objects 
through hegemonic first world practices. This is hegemony in action. The west has 
usurped a movement fuelled by third world feminist goals and identities, and replaced it, 
albeit to a minor degree, with an ill-suited alternative: western first world feminism. As 
discussed, western first world feminism is focused primarily on the eradication of gender 
discrimination as the route to ending women’s oppression. However, such a narrowly 
 
 148 
defined feminism is “insufficient to redress the oppression of third world women” 
(Mohanty, 1991: 315); as third world women’s oppression is often linked to race relations 
and imperialism (314).  
 
Impact on third world women 
Khoja-Moolji’s (2015) interpretation of the #BringBackOurGirls movement 
warned the involvement of western feminism would “produce an oversimplified analysis 
of the situation” (349). In prescribing western first world feminism as the ‘cure’ to the 
ailments represented by #BringBackOurGirls, the chance to comprehend and engage 
with the issues surrounding the abduction was neglected (Khoja-Moolji, 2015). The 
Feminist discourse instead represented the belief “that African women’s apparent 
suffering [could] be alleviated through white-Western intervention” (Tiplady Higgs, 2015: 
345). As such, it served to obscure the fact women in the global south have their 
conceptions of feminism, alongside their local feminist identities and histories (Dosekun, 
2015: 962).  
 
The disregard for the autonomy, histories, and realities of third world women, as 
demonstrated by the Feminist discourse, is inherently harmful. McEwan (2001) considers 
it a form of ‘othering’ that enforces asymmetrical power distributions and serves to 
disenfranchise women in the global south. While western first world feminisms might 
claim to be committed to equality, through the usurpation of #BringBackOurGirls, they 
perpetuate the very injustices they seek to eliminate.  
 
Transnational feminisms are important, but they must be appropriate and 
inclusive. Mohanty (2003) perceives appropriate transnational feminism to be built upon 
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strong feminist solidarities that are self-reflexive, and understanding of “the divisions of 
place, identity, class, work, belief, and so on” (251). Western first world feminism’s 
involvement may not have been so negative had it been enacted appropriately, in a 
manner respectful of the context(s) the movement had grown from. Similarly to 
Chouliaraki’s (2008) claim of Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism as the premier mode of solidary 
engagement, Dean (1996) posits an effective transnational feminism would stem from a 
reflexivity grounded in a “mutual expectation of a responsible orientation to the relationship” (29; 
emphasis in original). Transnational feminism should not grow from the common 
experience of pain or oppression, but instead from the ability to recognise, and 
empathise with, distant others in a manner of respect and responsibility (Dean, 1996: 
177; 181). The manner through which western first world feminism usurped the feminist 
aims of #BringBackOurGirls further demonstrates the lack of appropriate solidary 
engagement within the movement as a whole. As a result, third world women were 
further marginalised. Third world feminist identities have been silenced through this 
usurpation, indicating to third world women their voices and opinions are of little value. 
Furthermore, the distance between women in the third world and their western ‘sisters’ 
has been further widened. This enforcement of difference may result in the impairment 
of third world women’s agency and ability (Mohanty, 1991; Ram, 1991).  
 
Third world feminism possesses the ability to expose, and tend to, inequities in 
the global south. Third world feminists are best positioned to understand what action is 
necessary, and how to take it. The activism of #BringBackOurGirls evidences the ability 
and courage of third world feminist activists; it was a campaign that revealed the real 
struggles women in northern Nigerian face in their attempt to get an education (Njoroge, 
2016: 322). Western actors, through non-solidary action, appropriated and undermined 
the campaign, and the actions of those who sparked it (Tiplady Higgs, 2015: 346). The 
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global south actors, striving for the freedom of the students, had their actions relegated 
to the sidelines, as the grand narrative of #BringBackOurGirls developed into a story of 
western endeavour (Kurian, 2001: 66) wherein third world feminist action and identity 
was undermined. This obscuring of identity and agency again reinforced the hegemonic 
relationship between the west and global south and perpetuated imperialism and 
colonialism (McEwan, 2001). Through the presence of western first world feminism 
within this third world feminist movement, third world women were further 
disenfranchised and alienated from global feminist practices (Berents, 2016; McEwan, 
2001; Khoja-Moolji, 2015). The opportunity to implement effective and necessary 
change in their communities was seized. Third world women were cast in roles of 
powerlessness and inferiority through western intervention; signalling their actions and 
intentions were of less value than those of western origin. Such an indication could be 
capable of deterring activists in the global south from taking further civic or 
humanitarian action. Thus, enforcing western hegemony and limiting the possibility of 




The initial aim of #BringBackOurGirls was to secure the freedom of the 
abducted students. As the hashtag spread, its cause was redefined through the inclusion 
of third world feminist objectives. As #BringBackOurGirls achieved global notoriety, its 
aims were co-opted by western ideals with little regard for the movements’ origins in the 
global south. This co-option, for the most part, neglected the feminist traits of the 
hashtag, aside from the minor presence of the Feminist discourse. The Feminist 
discourse was determined to be a power dynamic discourse and exhibited traits of 
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western first world feminism. As such, this research determined #BringBackOurGirls to 
be a third world feminist movement usurped by western first world feminism. 
#BringBackOurGirls’ appropriation made the campaign merely another facet of 
imperialism (Herr, 2014), through which the west exhibited power over the global south. 
The research suggests co-option of #BringBackOurGirls is partly responsible for the 
movement’s failure to achieve its set goals. As of March 2017, the majority of the 
abducted students remain at large (Coughlan, 2017), and access to education for women 
in northern Nigerian remains marginal (Zakari, 2016). While western feminists’ 
participation in #BringBackOurGirls may have been an attempt at solidarity, it ultimately 




 The results indicate social media trends influenced MSM coverage of this event. 
However, while this influenced levels of coverage, it did not affect the manner of 
coverage. MSM sentiment remained fixed throughout the two-year sampled period, with 
coverage exuding the same power dynamic discourses. Social media similarly exhibited 
power dynamic discourses. However, these discourses varied at each sampled period, 
indicating social media sentiment to be less static. #BringBackOurGirls’ global notoriety 
came as a result of hashtag activism’s slacktivist nature, the ease of participation, and the 
familiar representations of the global south that were presented to audiences. The 
embedded discourses within MSM coverage and social media tweets indicated 
#BringBackOurGirls failed to foster appropriate cosmopolitan responses. Instead, these 
discourses served to perpetuate the problematic ‘othering’ inherent within the Politics of 
Pity. Additionally, CDA of the sampled tweets indicated online activists responded to the 
#BringBackOurGirls in self-interest, thereby revealing the presence of Ironic Solidarity. 
While #BringBackOurGirls was said to be an OFM with hallmarks of third world 
feminism, this research reveals feminism was not an overarching theme of the 
movement. However, the presence of a minor Feminist discourse did indicate that 
western first world feminism came to override any features of third world feminism. 
Over all, these results prove that while #BringBackOurGirls originated in the global 
south, its rise to global prominence saw westerners participate and skew the movement 
to enforce hegemonic practices, and further disenfranchise citizens of the global south. 
Therefore, the ‘achievements’ of the #BringBackOurGirls movement are in direct 
conflict with its initial aims.  






 The following chapter seeks to discuss limitations of research, present 
suggestions for further research, and revisit previous chapters to unite the main points of 
this thesis.  
 
Limitations of Research 
This research used CDA as the primary mode of analysis. CDA is inherently 
subjective, meaning that a different analyst might render different results. As such, 
implementing a different form of analysis, one more quantitative and objective, such as 
Content Analysis, might have produced more robust results.  
 
This research was additionally limited through the sample sizes permitted. CDA 
is a time-consuming form of analysis, as it cannot be automated. As such, the sample 
sizes of this research – regarding the number of tweets and articles analysed – were 
relatively small. Increasing the sample size might have broadened the perspectives 
presented. Thus, better supporting arguments relating to MSM and social media 
interaction, which this study recognises were minimal in this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, the Twitter data utilised can include more metadata – such as 
gender, age, location, and more. Such information was deemed unnecessary in the 
context of this study but would have provided more to analyse. This study blamed 
westerners for their intervention in #BringBackOurGirls, yet there was no geographical 
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data attached to these tweets, making this argument relatively speculative. Additionally, 
the sampled tweets and articles were only English language texts. This study found an 
overabundance of western power dynamic discourses, but this might be attributed to 
only sampling English texts. Analysing texts from various languages may have altered the 
results. 
 
This research was concerned with western involvement in a third world 
movement. However, the author of this study is herself a westerner. This study criticised 
the actions of westerners who intervened in this global south event but likely did not 
understand the region’s history or needs. One may argue the author of this research has 
attempted to do the same; yet, they are similarly geographically and culturally isolated 
from the realities they have intervened in.  
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
It would be beneficial to further research prominent OSMs to identify the ways 
participants engage with them. While Ironic Solidarity was said to have replaced the 
Politics of Pity, this research found the two modes of humanitarian communication 
present concurrently. Therefore, researching this further and testing this claim may 
advance understandings of humanitarian communication.  
 
As this research noted, there is much discontent in academia regarding social 
media’s impact on MSM. This research revealed that while social media did influence 
MSM coverage, it did not influence the manner of coverage. Further studies that contrast 
social media and MSM coverage of events are necessary to create a robust scholarly 
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dialogue in this area. While this research provides valuable insight, to corroborate it 
further, greater research is necessary. 
 
Further research, either concerning #BringBackOurGirls or other OSMs, might 
contrast the region where a movement began, with the areas in which it grew. For 
instance, performing CDA on relevant tweets from Nigeria during the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement, and those from a western nation. Such research might 
reveal different aims for a movement, and more thoroughly identify how ‘outside’ 
involvement might skew the original narrative(s) and aim(s) of an OSM. 
 
While much scholarly attention has been paid to first world feminisms, third 
world feminisms have been neglected in academia (Mohanty, 1991). This research is one 
small step towards remedying this, but given this study’s broad content it was unable to 
examine third world feminisms in-depth. Greater dedication to researching feminisms in 
the global south may provide the tools to empower third world women further and 
enable these concepts of feminism to flourish. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
In April 2014, the tensions and violence that have long impaired Nigeria spilled 
onto the global news agenda. Boko Haram’s abduction of 276 female students from the 
town of Chibok ignited outrage. Boko Haram’s influence, particularly in northern 
Nigeria, had been growing in response to a variety of endemic issues (Joy, 2015; Walker, 
2012). The abduction represented merely another notch in the militant group’s belt, and 
the Nigerian government treated it as such by assigning minimal security forces to the 
rescue mission (Smith, 2015). However, the Nigerian public refused to let this atrocity be 
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overlooked; they responded by establishing #BringBackOurGirls (Maxfield, 2015). This 
hashtag was primarily designed to raise awareness for the missing students and aimed to 
propel the Nigerian government to action. However, also embedded within the hashtag 
were third world feminist objectives, particularly aims to secure access to education for 
women in Nigeria (Khoja-Moolji, 2015). #BringBackOurGirls surpassed its original 
expectations as it spread internationally on social media, and became an OFM (Carter 
Olson, 2016).  
 
#BringBackOurGirls arose from what this thesis defined as third world 
feminism. Third world feminism is a community-focused feminism that claims 
oppression in the global south stems from a variety of sites, not merely patriarchal forces 
(Eisenstein, 2004; McEwan, 2001). Third world feminism is at odds with western first 
world feminism, which represents an amalgamation of feminisms dominant in the first 
world. Western first world feminism strives for justice on a grand scale and highlights 
gender equality as its enduring goal (Rejer, 2014). In the context of this research, these 
categories were deemed necessary for investigating #BringBackOurGirls’ spread from its 
Nigerian origins, to global notoriety. 
 
Also of interest was the way participants engaged with #BringBackOurGirls. 
OSMs have emerged relatively recently in the context of global communication, and such 
emergence has impacts for consumers, as well as traditional communication channels. 
Regarding humanitarian communication, this research discussed how theories in this 
field have developed in recent years, with some scholars indicating communication 
grounded in pity, labelled the Politics of Pity, has been ousted by a self-interested mode 
of solidarity, termed Ironic Solidarity (Chouliaraki, 2010; Chouliaraki, 2013a). This 
research maintained both modes of humanitarian communication are inadequate solidary 
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responses, as they fail to ignite cosmopolitan ideals that focus on common humanity and 
a “welcoming of difference” (Corpus Ong, 2009: 449). In acknowledging this, the 
research sought to reveal the ways #BringBackOurGirls was engaged with, and how this 
might impact upon the third world women at the core of the movement.  
 
To achieve the aims of this research, CDA was selected as the primary mode of 
analysis. CDA provides a multifunctional view of text, allowing analysis to reveal how 
language has been used to create meaning (Widdowson, 1998; Hansen & Machin, 2013). 
Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2003) three-dimensional framework provided the structure of 
the CDA, through which a sample of Twitter tweets and MSM articles from four distinct 
periods of the #BringBackOurGirls movement were analysed. Additional quantitative 
research was also employed, in the form of examining rates of MSM coverage, and the 
global trend of #BringBackOurGirls.  
 
The results indicated the abduction was propelled to the forefront of global news 
by social media. MSM coverage was minimal before the virality of #BringBackOurGirls, 
but following global engagement with the hashtag, MSM coverage increased. MSM and 
social media both failed to sustain these heights. The CDA of articles and tweets revealed 
similar discourses, with the majority being classed as ‘power dynamic’ discourses – 
discourses that served to perpetuate the hegemonic relationship that exists between the 
west and global south. Surprisingly, the CDA found only the minor presence of the 
Feminist discourse within what was heralded as an OFM.  
 
In interpreting the results of this analysis, the results were examined alongside the 




Research Question 1 sought to understand how interaction between MSM and 
social media shaped the #BringBackOurGirls movement. The results indicated that 
while social media influenced MSM’s coverage of the event, MSM assisted in 
disseminating the movement further. Also, while social media influenced the mainstream 
news agenda, the manner of coverage remained outside social media’s remit.  
 
Research Question 2 looked at the difference in attitudes/sentiments between 
MSM and social media. The results indicated they were remarkably similar, as, for the 
most part, they served to perpetuate the unequal power relationship between the west 
and global south. In coverage of Nigeria, both MSM and social media relied upon 
depictions of the global south that enforced stereotypes of backwardness and inferiority. 
The reliance on these tropes was considered a perpetuation of western hegemony and 
the imperial, colonial histories that have long disenfranchised the global south. 
 
Research Question 3 examined what made #BringBackOurGirls so globally 
relevant. The results indicated #BringBackOurGirls enabled a counterpublic’s voice to 
be heard, while the participatory function of social media enabled emotional responses to 
flourish. The movement’s grounding in hashtag activism enabled an ease of participation 
that encouraged slacktivism; while this made the movement popular, it is also responsible 
for the time-bound activism and lack of tangible change that stemmed from 
#BringBackOurGirls. The tropes of Africa, which the movement exhibited, were also 
credited with its success, as they provided a familiarity of sorts within which audiences 
were comfortable to act.   
 
Research Question 4 sought to determine whether participants of 
#BringBackOurGirls acted in solidarity or self-interest. While the research hypothesised 
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that Ironic Solidarity had ousted the Politics of Pity, the results determined the two 
occurred concurrently in the #BringBackOurGirls movement. Where the Politics of Pity 
and Ironic Solidarity were present, participants failed to ignite an appropriate 
cosmopolitan reaction in response to distant suffering. Instead, these responses 
perpetuated hegemony, thus enforcing difference and distance. Where these modes of 
humanitarian communication were present, the solidary ideal of Ecstatic 
Cosmopolitanism was absent. As such, this research contended the majority of 
#BringBackOurGirls’ participants acted in self-interest, not solidarity.  
 
Research Question 5 investigated the role of western first world feminism in 
#BringBackOurGirls, and repercussions for third world women. The research 
determined that while the Feminist discourse was minimal, its presence alongside power 
dynamic discourses revealed it to exhibit more qualities of western first world feminism, 
than third world feminism. As #BringBackOurGirls began as a third world feminist 
movement, this finding demonstrated western first world feminism had usurped the 
movement. #BringBackOurGirls’ appropriation disregarded the role(s) of third world 
women and minimised their contributions. As a result, third world women were further 
disenfranchised, and their conceptions of feminism were denigrated in favour of the ill-
fitting western first world feminism. Such an impact again served to perpetuate the west’s 
power over the global south.  
 
Participation in an OSM might have the propensity to effect change, and as such 
movements become common the evidence to support this is growing (Skoric, 2012). It is 
undeniable that #BringBackOurGirls made an impact. The movement was headline 
news for a considerable amount of time and engaged a global community. However, in 
this case, an online trend cannot be considered palpable action or change. Change, for 
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the Chibok students and their communities, would be the achievement of freedom and 
the protection of education rights; triumphs yet to be realised. Instead, the 
#BringBackOurGirls movement exemplified the continued dominance of the west over 
the global south. #BringBackOurGirls was engaged with through stereotypes that 
depreciated and ‘othered’ citizens of the global south, resulting in the enforcement of 
western hegemony. Furthermore, the appropriation of the movement’s feminist aims 
demonstrated a complete disregard for the complexities and histories of women in the 
global south. As a result, third world women’s capacity to influence change in their 
communities may be diminished.  
 
OSMs may be the new vehicles for humanitarian communication, but without 
appropriate solidary responses, any change achieved will be sullied by the inappropriate 
manner of participation. While Ecstatic Cosmopolitanism may appear an unattainable 
ideal, the appropriate representation of subjects and their causes is one step in the right 
direction. Through participants’ intrinsic self-interest, #BringBackOurGirls represented a 
less than ideal OSM. However, Nordlinger (2015) claims that while #BringBackOurGirls 
had its faults, he “can’t quite blame the hashtaggers, who, in their impotence, wanted to 
do something, or say something – wanted not to be bystanders. This is an honourable 
impulse” (28). The challenge this research poses to humanitarian communication and 
OSMs of the future is to act from informed positions and in appropriate solidarity, so as 







‘Ice Bucket Challenge funds gene discovery in ALS (MND) research.’ (2016) BBC News. 
At: <www.bbc.com/news/heatlh-36901867>. 27 July. Retrieved: 1 March, 2017. 
‘Terrorism in Nigeria: A dangerous new level.’ (2011) The Economist. At: 
<http://www.economist.com/node/21528307>. 3 September. Retrieved: 19 
July, 2016. 
‘The Times Sees Circulation Growth in First Quarter.’ (2015) The New York Times 
Company. At: <http://www.nytco.com/the-times-sees-circulation-growth-in-
first-quarter/>. 1 May. Retrieved: 7 February, 2017. 
Abalo, E. (2012) ‘First hegemony, then democracy: On ideology and the media discourse 
on the coup against Hugo Chávez.’ Observatorio 6(3): 105-128. 
Adesoji, A. (2010) ‘The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria / Die 
Boko-Haram-Unruhen und die Wiederbelebung des Islam in Nigeria.’ African 
Spectrum 45(2): 95-108. 
Adisesh, A., Melville, S., Pulinilkunnil, T., Lutchmedial, S., & Brunt, K. (2014) ‘Diving 
into the ice bucket challenge.’ Canadian Medical Association Journal 186(18): 1404-
1405. 
Agnew, J. (2005) Hegemony. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Ahmed, S., Jaidka, K., & Cho, J. (2016) ‘Tweeting India’s Nirbhaya protest: a study of 
emotional dynamics in an online social movement.’ Social Movement Studies: 1-19. 
 
 162 
Ainley, K. (2008) Individual Agency and Responsibility for Atrocity. In: Jeffery, R. (ed.) 
Confronting Evil in International Relations: Ethical Responses to Problems of Moral Agency. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 37-60. 
Al Jazeera. (2012) ‘Advertising on this website: Full details of the advertising costs and 
banner available on aljazeera.com.’ At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/2006/11/200852519431429892.html>. 4 
April. Retrieved: 7 February, 2017. 
Alaoui, F. Z. C. (2015) Women of Color and Social Media Multitasking: Blogs, Timelines, Feeds, 
and Community. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Aliyu, A., Moorthym, R., & Bin Idris, N. A. (2015) ‘Towards Understanding the Boko 
Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria.’ Asian Social Science 11(10): 307-317. 
Anyadike, N. O. (2013) ‘Boko Haram and National Security Challenges in Nigeria; 
Causes and Solutions.’ Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 4(5): 12-23. 
Asur, S., Huberman, B. A., Szabo, G., & Wang, C. (2011) Trends in social media: Persistence 
and decay. Paper presented at the Fifth International AAAI Conference on 
Weblogs and Social Media, Barcelona, Spain. 
Atton, C. (2002) ‘News Cultures and New Social Movements: radical journalism and the 
mainstream media.’ Journalism Studies 3(4): 491-505. 
Azumah, J. (2015) ‘Boko Haram in Retrospect.’ Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 26(1): 
33-52. 
Bassil, N. R. (2011) ‘The roots of Afropessimism: the British invention of the ‘dark 
continent.’ Critical Arts 23(3): 377-396. 
Bennett, W. L. (2003) New Media Power: The Internet and Global Activism. In: 
Couldry, N. & Curran, J. (eds.) Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a 
Networked World. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 17-38. 
 
 163 
Berents, H. (2016) ‘Hashtagging girlhood: #IAmMalala, #BringBackOurGirls and 
gendering representations of global politics.’ International Feminist Journal of Politics 
18(4): 1-15. 
Biklen, S., Marshall, C., & Pollard, D. (2008) ‘Experiencing second-wave feminism in the 
USA.’ Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 29(4): 451-469. 
Blakeman, K. (2013) ‘Finding research information on the web: how to make the most of 
Google and other free search tools.’ Science Progress 96(1): 61-84. 
Blommaert, J., & Bulcaen, C. (2000) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis.’ Annual Review of 
Anthropology 29: 447-466. 
Boltanski, L. (1999) Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bonilla, Y., & Rosa, J. (2015) ‘#Ferguson: Digital protest, hashtag ethnography, and the 
racial politics of social media in the US.’ American Ethnologist 42(1): 4-17. 
Bouvier, G. (2015) ‘What is a discourse approach to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and 
other social media: connecting with other academic fields?’ Journal of Multicultural 
Discourses 10(2): 149-162. 
Breindl, Y., & Francq, P. (2008) ‘Can Web 2.0 applications save e-democracy? A study of 
how new Internet applications may enhance citizen participation online.’ 
International Journal of Electronic Democracy 1(1): 14-31. 
Brock, A. (2012) ‘From the Blackhand Side: Twitter as a Cultural Conversation.’ Journal of 
Broadcasting & Electronic Media 56(4): 529-549. 
Brown, G. W. (2009) Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan 
Constitution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Bruns, A., & Burgess, J. (2011) ‘The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad 
Hoc Publics.’ Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 
conference, Reykjavik, 25-27 August. 
 
 164 
Calhoun, C. (2008) The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and 
Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action. In: M. Barnett, R. G. Weiss 
(eds.) Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 73-97. 
Campbell, J. (2011) ‘To Battle Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns: How to 
Undermine the Growing Islamist Threat.’ Foreign Affairs. At: 
<https:www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/Africa/2011-09-09/battle-nigerias-
boko-haram-put-down-your-guns>. 9 September. Retrieved: 19 July, 2016. 
Carter Olson, C. (2016) ‘#BringBackOurGirls: digital communities supporting real-world 
change and influencing mainstream media agendas.’ Feminist Media Studies: 772-
787. 
Castells, M. (2015) Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Chilisa, B., & Ntseane, G. (2010) ‘Resisting dominant discourses: implications of 
indigenous, Africa feminist theory and methods for gender and education 
research.’ Gender and Education 22(6): 617-632. 
Chiluwa, I., & Ifukor, P. (2015) ‘‘War Against Our Children’: Stance and Evaluation in 
#BringBackOurGirls Campaign Discourse on Twitter and Facebook.’ Discourse 
and Society 26(3): 267-296. 
Cho, S. E., & Shin, D. (2014) ‘Media discourse in a hyper connected society: a 
comparison between media frame and Twitter discourse during media strike.’ Info 
16(2): 67-79. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2006) The Spectatorship of Suffering. London: Sage. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2008) ‘The Mediation of Suffering and the Vision of a Cosmopolitan 
Public.’ Television & New Media 9(5): 371-391. 
 
 165 
Chouliaraki, L. (2010) ‘Post-humanitarianism: Humanitarian Communication Beyond a 
Politics of Pity.’ International Journal of Cultural Studies 13(2): 107-126. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2011) ‘‘Improper Distance’: Towards a Critical Account of Solidarity as 
Irony.’ International Journal of Cultural Studies 14(4): 363-381. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2012) ‘The Theatricality of Humanitarianism: A Critique of Celebrity 
Advocacy.’ Communications and Critical/Cultural Studies 9(1): 107-126. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2013a) The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the age of Post-Humanitarianism. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2013b) ‘Mediating Vulnerability: Cosmopolitanism and the Public 
Sphere.’ Media, Culture & Society 35(1): 105-112. 
Chouliaraki, L., & Orgad, S. (2011) ‘Proper Distance: Mediation, Ethics, Otherness.’ 
International Journal of Cultural Studies 14(4): 341-345. 
Chowdhury, E. H. (2009) ‘Locating Global Feminisms Elsewhere: Braiding US Women 
of Color and Transnational Feminisms.’ Cultural Dynamics 21(1): 51-78. 
Clark, C. (2014) ‘#NotBuyingIt: Hashtag Feminists Expand the Commercial Media 
Conversation.’ Feminist Media Studies 14(6): 1108-1110. 
Clark, R. (2016) ‘“Hope in a hashtag”: the discursive activism of #WhyIStayed.’ Feminist 
Media Studies: 1-17. 
Comolli, V. (2015) Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency. London: Hurst. 
Corpus Ong, J. (2009) ‘The cosmopolitan continuum: locating cosmopolitanism in media 
and cultural studies.’ Media, Culture & Society 31(3): 449-466. 
Coughlan, S. (2017) ‘Don’t forget us, says Chibok schoolgirl as third year of captivity 
approaches.’ BBC News. At: <http://www.bbc.com/news/education-
39285042>. 18 March. Retrieved: 6 April, 2017.  
 
 166 
Cristaldi, M., & Pampanini, G. (2016) ‘Research and activism about girls’ education for 
global democracy: The case of the campaign ‘Etna, Volcano of Peace’, Catania, 
Italy.’ Policy Futures in Education 14(5): 578-589. 
Derpmann, S. (2009) ‘Solidarity and Cosmopolitanism.’ Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 12(3): 303-315. 
Dixon, K. (2014) ‘Feminist Online Identity: Analyzing the Presence of Hashtag 
Feminism.’ Journal of Arts and Humanities 3(7): 34-40. 
Dorer, J., & Hipfl, B. (2013) ‘Current perspectives and future challenges in feminism and 
media studies.’ International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 9(3): 305-313. 
Dosekun, S. (2015) ‘For Western Girls Only?’ Feminist Media Studies 15(6): 960-975. 
Eagleton, T. (2009) Trouble with Strangers: A Study on Ethics. Cambridge: Polity. 
Eisenstein, Z. (2004) Against Empire. London: Zed Books. 
Evans, E., & Chamberlain, P. (2015) ‘Critical Waves: Exploring Feminist Identity, 
Discourse and Praxis in Western Feminism.’ Social Movement Studies 14(4): 396-
409. 
Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Fairclough, N. (1995) Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language. New York: 
Longman. 
Fairclough, N. (2003) Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: 
Routledge. 
Fairclough, N. (2006) Language and globalization. New York: Routledge. 
Farinosi, M., & Treré, E. (2014) ‘Challenging mainstream media, documenting real life 
and sharing with the community: An analysis of motivations for producing 




Fenton, N. (2007) Contesting Global Capital: New Media, Solidarity, and the Role of a 
Social Imaginary. In: Cammaerts, B. & Carpentier, N. (eds.) Reclaiming the Media: 
Communication Rights and Democratic Media Roles. Chicago: Intellect Books. 225-242. 
Fenton, N. (2008) ‘Mediating Solidarity.’ Global Media and Communication 4(1): 37-57. 
Fine, R. (2007) Cosmopolitanism and Natural Law. In: Cosmopolitanism. New York: 
Routledge. 22-38. 
Fotopoulou, A. (2016) ‘Digital and networked by default? Women’s organisations and 
the social imaginary of networked feminism.’ New Media & Society 18(6): 989-
1005. 
Gamble, S. (ed.) (2001) The Routledge Companion to Feminism and Postfeminism. New York: 
Routledge. 
Gens, S. (2006) ‘Third Way/ve: The Politics of Post-feminism.’ Feminist Theory 7(3): 333-
353. 
Glapka, E. (2010) Ideology in Media Language: Hegemonic Discourse or Multiple 
Discourses? In: C. Lin., & J. McSweeney (eds.) Representation and Contestation: 
Cultural Politics in a Political Century. New York: Rodopi. 47-68. 
Glenn, C. L. (2015) ‘Activism or “Slacktivism”: Digital Media and Organizing for Social 
Change.’ Communication Teacher 29(2): 81-85. 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Translated by Q. 
Hoare and G. N. Smith. New York: International Publishers. 
Gramsci, A. (1992) Prison Notebooks: Volume I. Translated by J. A. Buttigieg. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Hansen, A., & Machin, D. (2013) Text and Talk: Critical Discourse Analysis. In: Media & 
Communication Research Method. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 115-151. 
 
 168 
Harlow, S. (2011) ‘Social media and social movements: Facebook and an online 
Guatemalan justice movement that moved offline.’ New Media & Society 14(2): 
225-243. 
Held, D. (2010) Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hermida, A. (2012) ‘Tweets and Truth.’ Journalism Practice 6(5/6): 659-668. 
Herr, R. S. (2014) ‘Reclaiming Third World Feminism: Or Why Transnational Feminism 
Needs Third World Feminism.’ Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism 12(1): 1-
30. 
Jamieson, A., Slawson, N., & Khomani, N. (2017) ‘Women’s March events take place in 
Washington and around the world.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/live/2017/jan/21/womens-march-
on-washington-and-other-anti-trump-protests-around-the-world-live-coverage>. 
22 January. Retrieved: 7 February, 2017. 
Joy, A. I. (2015) ‘Demystifying Extremism in Nigeria: Understanding the Dynamics of 
Boko Haram.’ Accord 3: 1-16. 
Keller, J. M. (2012) ‘Virtual Feminisms.’ Information, Communication & Society 15(3): 429-
447. 
Kenix, L. J. (2011) Alternative and Mainstream Media: The Converging Spectrum. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
Kennedy, M. D. (2006) ‘Calhoun’s Critical Sociology of Cosmopolitanism, Solidarity and 
Public Space.’ Thesis Eleven 84: 73-89. 
Khan, A., & Hamidu, I. (2015) ‘Boko Haram and turmoil in Northern Nigeria.’ Jadavpur 
Journal of International Relations 19(1): 22-42. 
Khoja-Moolji, S. (2015) ‘Becoming an “Intimate Publics”: Exploring the Affective 
Intensities of Hashtag Feminism.’ Feminist Media Studies 15(2): 347-350. 
Knysh, A. D. (2011) Islam in historical perspective.’ New York: Routledge. 
 
 169 
Kristofferson, K., White, K., & Peloza, J. (2014) ‘The Nature of Slacktivism: How the 
Social Observability of an Initial Act of Token Support Affects Subsequent 
Prosocial Action.’ Journal of Consumer Research 40: 1149-1166. 
Kurian, A. (2001) Feminism and the Developing World. In: Gamble, S. (ed.) The Routledge 
Companion to Feminism and Postfeminism. New York: Routledge. 66-79. 
Kwon, K. H., Bang, C. C., Egnoto, M., & Rao, H. R. (2016) ‘Social media rumors as 
improvised public opinion: semantic network analyses of Twitter discourses 
during Korean saber rattling 2013.’ Asian Journal of Communication 26(3): 201-222. 
Latina, D., & Docherty, S. (2014) ‘Trending Participation, Trending Exclusion?’ Feminist 
Media Studies 14(6): 1103-1105. 
Lazar, M. M. (ed.) (2005) Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis: Gender, Power and Ideology in 
Discourse. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lee, Y., & Hsieh, G. (2013) ‘Does Slacktivism Hurt Activism?: The Effects of Moral 
Balancing and Consistency in Online Activism.’ Chi 2013: Changing Perspectives: 
811-820. 
Leung, D. K. K., & Lee, F. L. F. (2014) ‘Cultivating an Active Online Counterpublic: 
Examining Usage and Political Impact of Internet Alternative Media.’ The 
International Journal of Press/Politics 19(3): 340-359. 
Linklater, A. (2007) ‘Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations.’ International Politics 
44: 19-36. 
Lippizzi, C., Dessavre, D. G., Iandoli, L., & Ramirez Marquez, J. E. (2016) ‘Towards 
computational discourse analysis: A methodology for mining Twitter 
backchanneling conversations.’ Computers in Human Behavior 64: 782-792. 
Littler, J. (2008) ‘‘I Feel your Pain’: Cosmopolitan Charity and the Public Fashioning of 
Celebrity Soul.’ Social Semiotics 18(2): 237-251. 
 
 170 
Loimeier, R. (2012) ‘Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement 
in Nigeria.’ African Spectrum 47(2/3): 137-155. 
Loken, M. (2014) ‘#BringBackOurGirls and the Invisibility of Imperialism.’ Feminist 
Media Studies 14(6): 1100-1101. 
Madianou, M. (2013) ‘Humanitarian Campaigns in Social Media.’ Journalism Studies 14(2): 
249-266. 
Maiangwa, N., Uzodike, U. O., Whetho, A., & Onapajo, H. (2012) ‘“Baptism by Fire”: 
Boko Haram and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria.’ Africa Today 59(2): 40-57. 
Mansoor, A. (2016) ‘“Marginalization in third world feminism: its problematics and 
theoretical reconfiguration.’ Palgrave Communication 2: 1-9. 
Mare, A. (2013) ‘A complicated but symbiotic affair: The relationship between 
mainstream media and social media in the coverage of social protests in southern 
Africa.’ Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 34(1): 83-98. 
Maxfield, M. (2015) ‘History retweeting itself: imperial feminist appropriations of “Bring 
Back Our Girls”’. Feminist Media Studies. At: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2015.1116018>. Retrieved: 28 May, 2016:  
McCafferty, D. (2011) ‘Activism vs. Slacktivism.’ Communications of the ACM 54(12): 17-
19. 
McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972) ‘The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.’ 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2): 176-187. 
McEwan, C. (2001) ‘Postcolonialism, feminism and development: intersections and 
dilemmas.’ Progress in Development Studies 1(2): 93-111. 
McRobbie, A. (2009) The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change. London: 
Sage. 
Mekgwe, P. (2010) ‘Post Africa(n) Feminism?’ Third Text 24(2): 189-194. 
Melucci, A. (1996) The Playing Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 171 
Miles, H. (2006) ‘Al Jazeera.’ Foreign Policy 155: 20-24. 
Moeller, S. (1999) Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War, and Death. 
London: Routledge. 
Mohanty, C. T., Russo, A., & Torres, K. (1991) Third World Women and the Politics of 
Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Mohanty, C.T. (2003) Feminism without borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Montesano Montessori, N. (2011) ‘The design of a theoretical, methodological, analytical 
framework to analyse hegemony in discourse.’ Critical Discourse Studies 8(3): 169-
181. 
Moscato, D. (2016) ‘Media Portrayals of Hashtag Activism: A Framing Analysis of 
Canada’s #Idlenomore Movement.’ Media and Communication 4(2): 3-12. 
Munro, E. (2013) ‘Feminism: A Fourth Wave?’ Political Insight 4(2): 22-25. 
Nagarajan, M., Purohit, H., & Sheth, A. P. (2010) ‘A Qualitative Examination of Topical 
Tweet and Retweet Practices.’ ICWSM 2(10): 295-298. 
Njoroge, D. (2016) Broken Silence: #Bringbackourgirls and the Feminism Discourse in 
Nigeria. In: Mutsvario, B. (ed.) Digital Activism in the Social Media Era. New York: 
Springer. 311-325. 
Nordlinger, J. (2015) ‘Symbols and Their Limits: A caution against the yellow-ribbon 
culture.’ National Review. At: 
<https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/427934/symbols-and-their-
limits>. 21 December. Retrieved: 7 September, 2016. 
Orgad, S. (2011) ‘Proper distance from ourselves: The potential for estrangement in the 
mediapolis.’ International Journal of Cultural Studies 14(4): 401-421. 
Oyewole, S. (2016) ‘Rescuing Boko Haram’s Schoolgirl Victims.’ New Zealand International 
Review 41(1): 25-28. 
 
 172 
Papacharissi, Z. (2012) ‘Without You, I’m Nothing: Performances of the Self on 
Twitter.’ International Journal of Communication 6: 1989-2006. 
Parkinson, D. B., & Farwaneh, S. (2003) Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics: Papers from the 
Fifteenth Annual Symposium on Arabic Linguistics, Salt Lake City 2001. Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Pendergrass, W. S. (2015) ‘#NotAllMen, #BringBackOurGirls & #YesAllWomen: Three 
Months of Gender Discussion in the Age of Twitter.’ Issues in Information Systems 
16(1): 60-68. 
Pham, J. P. (2012) ‘Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat.’ Africa Security Brief 20: 1-8. 
Pürçek, Y. (2014) ‘The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Foreign Policy: Nigerian 
Case.’ Turkish Journal of Politics 5(1): 5-19. 
Ram, K. (1991) ‘“First” and “Third World” feminisms: a new perspective?’ Asian Studies 
Review 15(1): 91-96. 
Rawlinson, K. (2014) ‘Guardian wins newspaper and website of the year at British press 
awards.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/02/guardian-observer-glory-
press-awards>. 2 April. Retrieved: 7 February, 2017. 
Rejer, J. (2012) Everywhere & Nowhere: Contemporary Feminism in the United States. New York: 
Oxford. 
Rejer, J. (2014) ‘Debating US Contemporary Feminism.’ Sociology Compass 8(1): 43-51. 
Rheault, M., & Tortora, B. (2012) ‘Northern Nigerians' Views Not in Line With Boko 
Haram's.’ Gallup. At: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/152780/northern-nigerians-
views-not-line-boko-haram.aspx>. 20 February. Retrieved: February 6, 2017. 
Richardson, J. E. (2007) Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 173 
Rickford, R. (2016) ‘Black Lives Matter: Toward a Modern Practice of Mass Struggle.’ 
New Labor Forum 25(1): 34-42. 
Riley, S. (2013) ‘“First” and “Third” World Feminism(s): Does Paul Ricœur’s Philosophy 
Offer a Way to Bridge the Gap?’ Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies 4(1): 57-70. 
Rogstad, I. (2016) ‘Is Twitter just rehashing? Intermedia agenda setting between Twitter 
and mainstream media.’ Journal of Information Technology & Politics 13(2): 142-158. 
Roy, S. (2012) ‘Culturally Unconscious: Intercultural implication of The New York 
Times representation of the Israel-Palestine conflict in 2009 and 2011.’ The 
International Communication Gazette 74(6): 556-570. 
Salaam, A. O. (2012) ‘Boko Haram: Beyond Religion Fanaticism.’ Journal of Policing, 
Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7(2): 147-162. 
Silverstone, R. (2002) Proper Distance: Towards an Ethics for Cyberspace. In: G. Liestol, 
A. Morrison and T. Rasmussen (eds.) Innovations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
469-490. 
Silverstone, R. (2005) The sociology of mediation and communication. In: C. Calhoun, 
C. Rojek, & B. Turner (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Sociology. London: Sage. 188-
207. 
Silverstone, R. (2007) Media and Morality. Cambridge: Polity. 
Singer, J. B., & Ashman, I. (2009) ‘“Comment Is Free, but Facts Are Sacred”: User-
generated Content and Ethical Constructs at The Guardian.’ Journal of Mass Media 
Ethics 24(1): 3-21. 
Siollun, M. (2015) ‘How Boko Haram can be defeated.’ New African. At: 
<http://newafricanmagazine.com/boko-haram-can-defeated/>. 19 January. 
Retrieved: 19 July, 2016. 
Skoric, M. M. (2012) ‘What is slack about slacktivism?’ Inter-Asia Roundtable 2012: 
Methodological and Conceptual Issues in Cyber Activism Research: 77-92. 
 
 174 
Small, T. A. (2011) ‘What The Hashtag?’ Information, Communication & Society 14(6): 872-
895. 
Smith, M. (2015) Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War.’ London: I.B. Tauris. 
Solomon, H. (2012) ‘Contesting Ethnic, Religious and Regional Identities: The case of 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram.’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa 34(2): 92-109. 
Sontag, S. (2003) Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Stache, L. C. (2015) ‘Advocacy and Political Potential at the Convergence of Hashtag 
Activism and Commerce.’ Feminist Media Studies 15(1): 162-164. 
Stoddart, M. C. J. (2007) ‘Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A Critical Review of Theories 
of Knowledge and Power.’ Social Thought & Research 28: 191-225. 
Susanti, E. (2016) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: Hegemony of the Social Media Twitter 
About National Issues in Indonesia and its Implications to the Discourse 
Analysis Subject in Colleges.’ Tarbiya: Journal of Education in Muslim Society 2(2): 
153-166. 
Thomson, V. (2012) ‘Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria.’ Global 
Security Studies 3(3): 46-60. 
Thurston, A. (2016) ‘‘The disease in unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious and political 
worldview.’ The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World 22: 1-30. 
Tiplady Higgs, E. (2015) ‘#JusticeforLiz: Power and Privilege in Digital Transnational 
Women’s Rights Activism.’ Feminist Media Studies 15(2): 344-347. 
Torfing, J. (1999) Discourse. In: The New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 84-100. 
Tuczu, P. (2016) ‘“Allow access to location?”: Digital feminist geographies.’ Feminist 
Media Studies 16(1): 150-163. 
 
 175 
Umar, M. S. (2012) ‘The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-
radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram.’ Journal of Religion In Africa 
42(2): 118-144. 
Usher, N. (2014) Making news at The New York Times. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
van Dijk, T. A. (1993) ‘Principles of critical discourse analysis.’ Discourse & Society 4(2): 
249-283. 
van Laer, J., & van Aelst, P. (2010) ‘Internet and Social Movement Action Repertoires.’ 
Information, Communication & Society 13(8): 1146-1171. 
Voll, J. O. (2015) ‘Boko Haram: Religion and Violence in the 21st Century.’ Religions 6: 
1182-1202. 
Walker, A. (2012) ‘Special Report: What Is Boko Haram?’ United States Institute of Peace 
308: 1-15. 
Warner, Z. (2012) ‘The Sad Rise Of Boko Haram.’ New African. At: 
<http://newafricanmagazine.com/the-sad-rise-of-boko-haram/>. 1 April. 
Retrieved: 19 July, 2016. 
Widdowson, H. G. (1998) ‘The Theory and Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis.’ 
Applied Linguistics 19(1): 136-151. 
Williams, S. (2015) ‘Digital Defense: Black Feminists Resist Violence with Hashtag 
Activism.’ Feminist Media Studies 15(2): 341-344. 
Yu, S. (2009) ‘Third-Wave Feminism: A Transnational Perspective.’ Asian Journal of 
Women’s Studies 15(1): 7-25. 
Zakari, B. (2016) ‘Women education in northern Nigeria: Due for a new approach?’ The 
Cable. At: <https://www.thecable.ng/women-education-northern-nigeria-due-
new-approach>. 17 November. Retrieved: 6 April, 2017. 
 
 176 
Zappavigna, M. (2012) Discourse of Twitter and Social Media: How We Use Language to Create 
Affiliation on the Web. London: Continuum. 
Zappavigna, M. (2013) ‘Enacting identity in microblogging through ambient affiliation.’ 
Discourse & Communication 8(2): 209-228. 
Zappavigna, M. (2015) ‘Searchable talk: the linguistic function of hashtags.’ Social Semiotics 
25(3): 274-291. 
Zenn, J. (2014) ‘Nigerian al-Qaedaism.’ Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 16: 99-117. 
Zimmer, M., & Proferes, N. J. (2014) ‘A topology of Twitter research: disciplines, 






The New York Times 
‘#BringBackOurGirls: Kidnapping Horror in Nigeria.’ (2014) The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/opinion/bringbackourgirls-
kidnapping-horror-in-nigeria.html>. 6 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016.  
‘Nigeria: Dozens of Girls Kidnapped.’ (2014) The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/world/africa/nigeria-dozens-of-girls-
kidnapped.html>. 15 April. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
 ‘Nigeria: Teenagers Are Freed, but Militants Continue Attacks.’ (2014) The New York 
Times. At: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/world/africa/nigeria-
teenagers-are-freed-but-militants-continue-attacks.html>. 16 April. Retrieved: 9 
September, 2016. 
Brooks, D. (2014) ‘The Real Africa.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/brooks-the-real-africa.html>. 
8 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2014. 




&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article>. 14 April. Retrieved: 9 September, 
2016. 
Cumming-Bruce, N. (2014) ‘U.N. Refugee Agency Says Thousands Fleeing Nigeria 
Region.’ The New York Times. At: 
 
 178 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/10/world/africa/nigeria.html>. 9 May. 
Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Dell’Antonia, K. (2014) ‘What Can I Do to #BringBackOurGirls?’ The New York Times. 
At: <http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/what-can-i-do-to-
bringbackourgirls/>. 6 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Estrin, J. (2014) ‘The Real Story About the Wrong Photos in #BringBackOurGirls.’ The 
New York Times. At: <http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/the-real-story-
about-the-wrong-photos-in-bringbackourgirls/>. 8 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 
2014. 
Gladstone, R. (2014) ‘Real Threat in a Known Market for Children.’ The New York Times. 
At: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/africa/real-threat-in-a-
known-market-for-children.html>. 7 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Gordon, M. R. (2014) ‘Schoolgirl Abductions Put Scrutiny on U.S. Terrorism Strategy.’ 
The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/world/africa/schoolgirl-abductions-
put-scrutiny-on-us-terrorism-strategy.html>. 8 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 
2014. 
Gross, S., & Schulten, K. (2014) ‘Skills and Strategies: Engaging in Causes Via ‘Hashtag 
Activism’.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/skills-and-strategies-engaging-
in-causes-via-hashtag-activism/>. 9 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Kristof, N. (2014) ‘Honoring the Missing Schoolgirls.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/opinion/kristof-honoring-the-missing-
schoolgirls.html>. 7 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2014. 
 
 179 
Kristof, N. (2015) ‘Smart Girls vs. Bombs.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-
smart-girls-vs-bombs.html>. 11 April. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Mackey, R. (2014) ‘Can Hashtag Activism Save Kidnapped Nigerian Girls?’ The New York 
Times. At: <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/can-hashtag-
activism-save-kidnapped-nigerian-girls/>. 7 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Nossiter, A. (2014a) ‘Nigerian Islamist Leader Threatens to Sell Kidnapped Girls.’ The 
New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/nigeria-kidnapped-
girls.html>. 5 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Nossiter, A. (2014b) ‘New Kidnapping Reported in Nigeria as U.S. Offers Help.’ The 
New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/world/africa/outrage-grows-over-
kidnapping-of-nigerian-schoolgirls.html>. 6 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Nossiter, A. (2015) ‘Boko Haram Abducted Nigerian Girls One Year Ago.’ The New York 
Times. At: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/africa/nigeria-boko-
haram-chibok-kidnapped-girls.html>. 14 April. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Nossiter, A., & Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2014) ‘Abduction of Girls an Act Not Even Al 
Qaeda Can Condone.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/africa/abduction-of-girls-an-
act-not-even-al-qaeda-can-condone.html>. 7 May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Schmidt, M. S. (2014) ‘Obama Addresses the Limits of Using Power in Syria and 
Nigeria.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/us/politics/obama-meditates-on-the-




Shetty, S. (2015) ‘The Menace of Boko Haram.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/opinion/the-menace-of-boko-
haram.html>. 13 April. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
Stein, C., & Searcey, D. (2016) ‘2 Years After Boko Haram Kidnapping, the Search Goes 
On for Nigerian Girls.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/world/africa/nigeria-boko-
haram.html>. 14 April. Retrieved: 9 September, 2016. 
The Editorial Board. (2014) ‘Nigeria’s Stolen Girls.’ The New York Times. At: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/opinion/nigerias-stolen-girls.html>. 6 
May. Retrieved: 9 September, 2014. 
 
The Guardian 
‘‘It’s horrific’: Muslim girls around the world react to the Nigeria kidnapping.’ (2014) The 
Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/muslim-
girls-react-nigeria-kidnapping>. 8 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
 ‘88 Nigeria schoolgirls abducted by Islamic extremists still missing.’ (2014) The Guardian. 
At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/19/88-nigerian-
schoolgirls-abducted-by-islamic-extremists-still-missing>. 19 April. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016. 
 ‘Chibok kidnapping: rallies held to mark first anniversary – in pictures.’ (2015) The 
Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2015/apr/14/chibok-
kidnapping-rallies-first-anniversary-in-pictures>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016.  
 
 181 
 ‘Hundreds killed in Boko Haram raid on unguarded Nigerian town.’ (2014) The Guardian. 
At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/boko-haram-
massacre-nigeria-gamboru-ngala>. 8 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
 ‘Nigerian president urges safe return of kidnapped girls.’ (2014) The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/04/nigerian-president-
directive-kidnapped-girls>. 4 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
‘Nigerian students’ fate uncertain as head denies they have been released.’ (2014) The 
Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/nigerian-
students-headteacher-kidnapped-schoolgirls-army-freed>. 17 April. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016. 
 ‘Students kidnapped by suspected Islamic militants in Nigeria are freed.’ (2014) The 
Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/students-
kidnapped-suspected-islamists-nigeria-freed>. 17 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2016. 
 ‘The Guardian view on the Boko Haram kidnappings: a tragedy with no end in sight.’ 
(2016) The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/12/the-guardian-
view-on-the-boko-haram-kidnappings-a-tragedy-with-no-end-in-sight>. 12 April. 
Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Adele-Oso, O. (2016) ‘It’s time for Nigeria’s government to tell the truth about the 
missing Chibok girls.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/14/nigeria-truth-
chibok-girls-boko-haram-kidnapping>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Adewunmi, B., Mark, M., & Burke, J. (2014) ‘Nigeria’s mass kidnapping: the vital 




mass-kidnapping-vital-questions>. 7 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Ahmed, N. (2014) ‘Behind the rise of Boko Haram – ecological disaster, oil crisis, spy 
games.’ The Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-
insight/2014/may/09/behind-rise-nigeria-boko-haram-climate-disaster-peak-oil-
depletion>. 9 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Balogun, J. (2014) ‘‘Dear world, your hashtags won’t #BringBackOurGirls’.’ The 
Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/09/nigeria-
hashtags-wont-bring-back-our-girls-bringbackourgirls>. 9 May. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016. 
Brown, G. (2015) ‘The fight to free Nigeria’s girls from Boko Haram must continue.’ The 
Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/13/free-nigeria-girls-
boko-haram>. 13 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Collins, M. (2014) ‘#BringBackOurGirls: the power of a social media campaign.’ The 
Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-
network/2014/may/09/bringbackourgirls-power-of-social-media>. 9 May. 
Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Cosslett, R. L. (2014) ‘Western feminists should speak up for the kidnapped Nigerian 
girls.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/06/western-
feminists-kidnapped-nigerian-girls-boko-haram>. 6 May. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016. 
Danladi-Saleh, G. (2016) ‘The night Boko Haram kidnapped our girls: a Chibok resident 




kidnapped-our-girls-a-chibok-resident-remembers>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016. 
Howard, E. (2014) ‘Bring back our girls: global protests over abduction of Nigerian 
schoolgirls.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/bring-back-our-girls-
global-protests-abduction-nigerian-schoolgirls>. 7 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2016. 
Jones, S. (2015) ‘800,000 children in Nigeria ‘running for their lives’, says Unicef.’ The 
Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/apr/13/children-nigeria-conflict-unicef-boko-haram>. 14 
April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Jones, S. (2016) ‘Boko Haram: soaring numbers of children used in suicide attacks, says 
Unicef.’ The Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/apr/12/children-suicide-attacks-boko-haram-unicef-
nigeria>. 12 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Jones, S., & Howard, E. (2014) ‘#BringBackOurGirls focuses world’s eyes on Nigeria’s 
mass kidnapping.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/twitter-hashtag-
bringbackourgirls-nigeria-mass-kidnapping>. 8 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2016. 
Mark, M. (2014a) ‘Suspected Boko Haram gunmen kidnap eight girls from village in 
Nigeria.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/06/suspected-boko-haram-
gunmen-kidnap-girls-village-nigeria>. 6 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Mark, M. (2014b). ‘Nigerian president: kidnapping will mark beginning of the end of 




kidnapping-beginning-end-terror>. 8 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Mark, M. (2014c). ‘Nigeria had warning of Boko Haram attack but failed to act, says 
Amnesty.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/09/nigeria-military-warning-
boko-haram-attack-amnesty-international>. 9 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2016. 
Mark, M. (2015) ‘Chibok kidnapping: stoicism as girls taken by Boko Haram are 
remembered.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/anniversary-boko-haram-
kidnapping-chibok-schoolgirls>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Mark, M., & Carroll, R. (2014) ‘Nigeria offers $300,000 reward for help finding 
kidnapped schoolgirls.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/nigeria-offers-reward-
kidnapped-schoolgirls-boko-haram>. 7 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Mark, M., & Jones, S. (2014) ‘Nigeria offers reward for kidnapped schoolgirls at UK 
prepares to send experts.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/kidnapped-schoolgirls-
nigeria-reward>. 8 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2014.  
Mark, M., Carroll, R., & Norton-Taylor, R. (2014) ‘Nigeria kidnap: US and UK offer help 
in hunt for schoolgirls.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/nigeria-kidnap-
schoolgirls-us-uk-help>. 7 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
McGreal, C. (2014) ‘Nigeria kidnapping: why Boko Haram is a top security priority for 




policy-nigeria-kidnap>. 9 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2014. 
Nagarajan, C. (2015) ‘#Bringbackourgirls hasn’t brought back Chibok’s girls, but it has 
changed Nigeria’s politics.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/14/nigeria-women-
activists-boko-haram>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
Norton-Taylor, R. (2014) ‘UK could send SAS to Nigeria to help find girls kidnapped by 
Boko Haram.’ The Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/may/06/uk-ready-sas-nigeria-kidnapped-girls>. 6 May. Retrieved: 12 
September, 2016. 
Onuzo, C. (2014) ‘#BringBackOurGirls. And bring back our country, President 
Jonathan.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/07/bring-back-our-
girls-nigeria-president-jonathan-boko-haram>. 7 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2014. 
Orr, D. (2014) ‘The story of Nigeria’s stolen girls fell through the gaps of western 
journalism.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/09/nigeria-stolen-
girls-boko-haram-twitter-michelle-obama>. 9 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2016. 
Pearson, E., & Zenn, J. (2014) ‘How Nigerian police also detained women and children 
as weapon of war.’ The Guardian. At: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/06/how-nigerian-police-also-




Shearlaw, M. (2015) ‘Did the #bringbackourgirls campaign make a difference in Nigeria?’ 
The Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/nigeria-
bringbackourgirls-campaign-one-year-on>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 
2016. 
Sherwood, H. (2016) ‘Missing Nigerian girls appear in video shown to Chibok parents.’ 
The Guardian. At: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/missing-
nigerian-girls-video-chibok-parents>. 14 April. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
 
Al Jazeera 
‘Armed men kidnap schoolgirls in Nigeria.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/armed-men-kidnap-
schoolgirls-nigeria-2014415134310107956.html>. 16 April. Retrieved: 14 
September, 2016. 
‘Boko Haram ‘to sell’ abducted schoolgirls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/boko-haram-claims-nigeria-
abductions-201455134957975542.html>. 6 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
‘Boko Haram attack kills hundreds in Nigeria.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/boko-haram-attack-kills-
hundreds-nigeria-201457181134779575.html>. 8 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 
2016. 
‘Boko Haram attacks with children ‘suicide bombers’: UN.’ (2016) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/boko-haram-children-suicide-
bombers-160412093755915.html>. 13 April. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
 
 187 
‘Buhari: We will make every effort to save schoolgirls.’ (2015) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/buhari-effort-save-schoolgirls-
150414014638824.html>. 14 April. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
‘Confusion over missing Nigerian schoolgirls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/principal-nigeria-schoolgirls-
still-missing-2014417134438490718.html>. 18 April. Retrieved: 14 September, 
2016. 
‘Forest searched for abducted Nigerian girls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/forest-searched-abducted-
nigerian-girls-20144185940910331.html>. 18 April. Retrieved: 14 September, 
2016. 
‘Malala slams world leaders over Chibok schoolgirls.’ (2015) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/malala-slams-world-leaders-chibok-
schoolgirls-150413184624188.html>. 14 April. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
‘More schoolgirls kidnapped in Nigeria.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/boko-haram-abducts-more-
niegera-schoolgirls-20145612512991127.html>. 7 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 
2016. 
‘Nigeria ‘arrests abduction protest leaders’.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/nigeria-arrests-abduction-
protest-leaders-201455103929656287.html>. 6 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 
2016. 
‘Nigeria leader seeks help over missing girls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/nigeria-appeal-find-




‘Nigeria protesters demand action on Chibok abductions.’ (2015) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/nigeria-protesters-demand-action-
chibok-abductions-150414132238241.html>. 15 April. Retrieved: 16 September, 
2016. 
‘Nigeria’s president vows to defeat Boko Haram.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/nigeria-president-vows-
defeat-boko-haram-20145813934474867.html>. 9 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 
2016. 
‘Nigerian army frees kidnapped female students.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/nigerian-army-frees-
kidnapped-female-students-201441622223936711.html>. 17 April. Retrieved: 14 
September, 2016. 
‘Nigerian girls kidnapped by Boko Haram seen in video.’ (2016) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/video-missing-nigerian-girls-offers-
hope-families-160414072054519.html>. 15 April. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
‘Police post reward for missing Nigerian girls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/police-post-reward-missing-
nigerian-girls-20145713640576749.html>. 8 May. Retrieved: 12 September, 2016. 
‘Report: At least 2,000 women abducted by Boko Haram.’ (2015) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/nigeria-boko-haram-
150414043301574.html>. 15 April. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
‘US officials fear for abducted Nigerian girls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/us-officials-fear-abducted-
nigerian-girls-2014565945897810.html>. 6 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
 
 189 
‘US to help Nigeria rescue schoolgirls.’ (2014) Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/us-help-nigeria-rescue-
schoolgirls-20145317372360636.html>. 5 May. Retrieved: 14 September, 2016. 
Mutasa, H. (2015) ‘Girls who escaped Boko Haram refuse to be victims.’ Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/04/girls-escaped-boko-
haram-refuse-victims-150414055116756.html>. 15 April. Retrieved: 16 
September, 2016. 
Richmond, M. (2015) ‘Note to Boko Haram: Western education is NOT a sin.’ Al 
Jazeera. At: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/note-boko-
haram-western-education-sin-150413122944300.html>. 14 April. Retrieved: 16 
September, 2016. 
Shetty, S. (2014) ‘Nigeria: A serious test of stability.’ Al Jazeera. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/nigeria-serious-test-
stability-2014576032277296.html>. 7 May. Retrieved: 16 September, 2016. 
